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ABSTRACT 
This paper exammes the firm-specific characteristics, the R&D spending, and 
R&D performance of U.S. R&D tax credit users (i.e. , firms with currently earned R&D 
tax credits). Prior literature finds that the R&D tax credit is effective in increasing R&D 
expenditures and reducing managers ' myopic behavior. However, most of these findings 
are based on estimated R&D tax credits rather than actual R&D tax credits. In contrast, I 
use actual R&D tax credits reported by the firms in their 10-Ks. 
I examine three issues related to the use of R&D tax credits. First, I investigate 
whether the likelihood of using the credit varies with characteristics related to research 
ability and tax advantages of fmns. Next, I analyze whether the use of R&D tax credit 
increases real R&D spending. Finally, I explore if the tax credit impacts 
R&D performance, by examining innovation quality, future pre-tax profitability, and 
return volatility. 
The results are consistent with my hypotheses. Firms with more research ability and 
tax advantages are more likely to use R&D tax credits. I find that R&D tax credits 
increase real R&D spending. Finally, compared to the R&D of non-credit users, the 
Vll 
excess qualified research of tax credit users contributes to better innovation quality and 
higher return volatility, but lower pre-tax profitability. Overall, these fmdings are 
consistent with the stated congressional purposes in enacting the R&D tax credit 
prOVISIOnS. 
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CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE 
OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TAX CREDIT USERS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper empirically identifies and examines the fum-specific characteristics, the 
research and development (R&D) spending, and R&D performance of U.S. R&D tax 
credit users. The phrase "R&D tax credit users" refers to firms with currently earned 
R&D tax credits, while "non-R&D tax credit users" refers to firms without R&D tax 
credits. Specifically, I investigate three research questions: What are the characteristics of 
firms that are more likely to use R&D tax credits?1 Do R&D tax credits really increase 
firms' R&D spending? Is research done using the R&D tax credit of higher quality than 
research that does not use R&D tax credits? 
Academics, practitioners, and Congress members have been paying attention to the 
effectiveness of R&D tax credits (e.g., Klassen et al. 2004; GAO 2009). In particular, 
prior studies suggest that the R&D tax credit is effective, providing evidence that one 
dollar of R&D tax credit results in an increase of at least two dollars in firms' R&D 
investments (e.g., Klassen et al. 2004; Gupta et al. 2011). According to a Government 
Accountability Office report (GAO 2009), the credit reduced the after-tax cost of 
additional qualified research by an estimated 6.4 to 7.3 percent in 2005 . Also, Congress 
has had a consensus that R&D tax credits are valuable incentives to increase R&D, so 
they introduced the credit in 1981 and have extended the expired R&D credits 14 times. 
1 Hereafter, I describe "use R&D tax credits" interchangeably with "earn R&D tax credits". Both 
mean the actions that firms take to claim R&D tax credits from the Internal Revenue Service in 
the current year. 
1 
However, little IS known about how R&D tax credits impact R&D decisions and 
performance. 
Firms' eligibility for R&D tax credits may affect their R&D decisions. Firms are 
eligible for R&D tax credits under the Internal Revenue Code Section 41 (IRC § 41) if 
they conduct R&D projects that follow four principal requirements for qualified research 
expenditures (QREs), and if the expenditure on the projects exceeds a firm-specific base 
amount. Therefore, a firm's ability or preference to conduct excess QREs may affect its 
use of R&D tax credits, and the amount of R&D tax credits it can get may further affect 
its total R&D spending decisions. 
R&D tax credits reduce the effect of R&D expenditures on after-tax earnings2 and 
cash outflow to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), so firms are motivated to change 
their R&D decisions to be able to earn R&D tax credits. However, not all firms use R&D 
tax credits. This paper examines two factors that may affect firms ' use of R&D tax 
credits: research ability (size, technology intensity, prior success in patenting, R&D 
leaders, and high risk preference) and tax advantages (taxable profit and R&D startups). 
Research ability may influence the use of R&D tax credits. First, large firms are more 
likely to conduct qualified research to earn R&D tax credits than small firms. QREs 
contain tremendous amount of technological and commercial uncertainty. The ability of 
large firms to reduce the uncertainty of profitability (Ciftci and Cready 2011) makes them 
more likely to use R&D tax credits than small firms. 
2 Specifically, R&D tax credits equal20% of excess QREs net of tax, so excess QREs are 
equivalent to Jess costly expenses than other R&D expenses. 
2 
Second, high-tech firms are more likely to be qualified for R&D tax credits than 
traditional manufacturing firms due to relatively generous R&D tax credits for firms ' 
basic research (IRC§ 41(e)). These types of firms are mainly in high-tech industries and 
are more R&D intensive (OECD 2003; Matolcsy and Wyatt 2008), such as 
pharmaceuticals, defense, engineering, medical, or aerospace. Various congressional 
reports also indicate that lawmakers enacted the R&D tax credit primarily to benefit high-
tech industries.3 
Third, firms with more patents are more likely to be qualified for R&D tax credits 
than firms with fewer patents. Under the Patent Safe Harbor Rule (Treasury Regulation§ 
1.41.4), receiving a patent is conclusive evidence that a firm's R&D project satisfies the 
criterion of discovering new technological information. Past success in patenting R&D is 
accordingly an indicator of a firm's ability to successfully patent R&D projects and thus 
use R&D tax credits. 
Following the above arguments, R&D leaders and risk-seeking firms are also more 
likely to use R&D tax credits. The purpose of R&D tax credits is to encourage more 
innovation. R&D leaders would increase QREs to compete with other firms because they 
may want to maintain their leading status within their industry. Therefore, R&D leaders 
are more likely to have excess QREs and thus use R&D tax credits. On the other hand, 
QREs are mainly research expenditures, so they are more risky than development costs. 
3 For instance, the House and Senate hearings prior to the adoption ofiRC section 44F (dealing 
with research excluded from the R&D tax credit before 1986, namely IRC Section 41(d) after 
1986) indicate that Congress wanted to encourage investment in high-tech R&D. Moreover, 
members of high-tech industries testified that a tax credit would enhance their ability to compete 
with foreign competitors (Nellen 2001). 
3 
Firms that prefer high risk are more likely to conduct qualified research and thus use 
R&D tax credits. 
Tax advantages increase the likelihood of using R&D tax credits. Firms with taxable 
profits (hereafter, profitable firms) are more likely to engage in qualified research 
projects to use R&D tax credits than loss firms, because unlike loss firms, profitable 
firms can earn and realize R&D tax credits concurrently and do not have the uncertainty 
of realization from carryforwards. 
As a firm with a shorter R&D spending history (less than ten years), an R&D startup 
IS more likely to have excess QREs than firms with a long R&D spending history 
(established firms). QREs have to exceed a fixed percentage of prior sales to be eligible 
for R&D tax credits. Thus fmns with a lower applicable fixed percentage are more likely 
to earn R&D tax credits. The applicable fixed percentage for R&D startups is less than 
1 00% of the actual average fixed percentage during prior years selected by IRC §41. By 
contrast, established firms' applicable fixed percentage is 100% of the average 
percentage. The lower base amounts for R&D startups suggest that R&D startups are 
more likely to have excess QREs and thus claim R&D tax credits. 
The second question is whether the R&D tax credit provision motivates more R&D 
spending after considering possible misclassification SG&A as R&D. Prior studies have 
used estimated R&D tax credits to investigate this question and find that tax incentives 
are effective in increasing R&D spending (e.g., Berger 1993; Klassen et al. 2004). 
However, their evidence is based on estimated R&D tax credits rather than actual R&D 
tax credits. The estimation of R&D tax credits assumes that recognized R&D expenses 
4 
are equal to QREs, which is not true for most companies. To reduce the possible errors 
from estimating R&D tax credits, I use the footnotes in 1 0-K to identify actual R&D tax 
credits used. 
In examining the effect of R&D tax credits on R&D spending, it is important to 
consider whether firms report R&D expenses by misclassifying other expenses as R&D 
expenses. Skaife et al. (2013) contend that R&D tax credit users misreport R&D by 
classifying other expenses as R&D expenses in order to avail themselves of the tax 
benefits. Selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses are the most likely 
example as some wages are qualified for R&D tax credits. However, R&D tax credit 
claims draw the IRS's attention to the claimed QREs in the additional tax form and the 
supporting documents. Indeed, Hanlon et al. (2012) find that firms subject to the IRS's 
close monitoring have better financial reporting quality. Therefore, I expect that R&D tax 
credits increase the R&D spending. Still, I test the impact of R&D tax credits not only on 
reported R&D, but also on adjusted R&D by excluding the possible misclassified SG&A 
from the reported R&D to conservatively measure the impact on R&D expenses. 
The third question I investigate is if the excess QREs of R&D tax credit users 
generate different performance from the R&D of non-R&D credit users in terms of 
innovation quality, pre-tax profitability, and return volatility. 
The purpose of the R&D tax credit is to encourage firms to increase QREs. The IRS 
can decide whether a firm's research is a QRE under the tax definition of research 
qualified for innovation (IRC § 41 ). As only innovative research qualifies for R&D tax 
5 
credits, I expect that the excess QREs of the R&D tax credit users generate better 
innovation quality than the R&D of the non-R&D credit users. 
Firms increase their QREs to earn R&D tax credits because the qualified projects 
generate positive cash flow after considering the tax benefits. Prior research indicates that 
most firms evaluate their investment projects based on their expected net present value 
(NPV) (Moore and Reichert 1983; Trahan and Gitman 1995; and Graham and Harvey 
2001). R&D tax credits increase the NPV of qualified research projects without changing 
the pre-tax profitability. As some negative NPV projects may become positive NPV 
projects after receiving R&D tax credits, I expect that qualified research projects generate 
lower pre-tax profitability than the R&D projects of the non-R&D tax credit users. 
Besides, I expect that relative to the R&D of the non-R&D tax credit users, the excess 
QREs of the R&D tax credit users generate more return volatility. QREs are the cost of 
research that requires substantial experiments and that is conducted before commercial 
production, rather than development costs. Development costs are incurred subsequent to 
the success of experiments. Thus, QREs contain more technological and commercial 
uncertainty than development costs. According to a report from National Science 
Foundation (NSB 2012), firms' R&D expenditures consist mostly of development costs. 
As Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) do not restrict the R&D 
expenditures of the non-R&D tax credit users to be qualified research, most of the R&D 
expenditures of non-R&D tax credit users are likely to be development costs. 
Accordingly, the uncertainty embedded in qualified research projects may generate more 
return volatility than the R&D of the non-R&D tax credit users. Overall, I expect that the 
6 
excess QREs of the R&D tax credit users generate higher innovation quality, lower 
profitability, and higher return volatility. 
To measure the characteristics, the R&D spending, and the R&D performance of 
R&D tax credit users, I first use a logistic regression to study how the impact of R&D tax 
credits on R&D decisions varies with firm characteristics. Next, I classify R&D tax credit 
users as the treatment group and use propensity score matching to create a matched non-
qualifying control sample. I use the combined matched sample to examine the impact of 
R&D tax credits on R&D spending and R&D performance. in R&D tax credit users and 
non-R&D tax credit users. 
The results are consistent with all of my hypotheses. Consistent with H 1 a and b, firms 
with more research ability and tax advantages are more likely to use R&D tax credits. 
The results also support my second and third hypotheses. R&D tax credits encourage not 
only more reported R&D spending but more adjusted R&D spending that excludes 
possible misclassified SG&A as well. Compared with the R&D of the non-R&D tax 
credit users, excess qualified research of R&D tax credit users contributes to better 
innovation quality and higher return volatility but lower pre-tax profitability. 
This paper provides four contributions to the literature. First, this paper is the first 
attempt to identify actual R&D tax credit users using hand collected R&D tax credit 
amounts or rates using the footnotes in annual reports. While Rao (2013) uses actual 
QREs from the IRS to derive actual R&D tax credits, her data is from 1981 to 1991 and 
thus do not cover the recent R&D tax credits after the expiration period between 1995 
and 1996. The period between 1995 and 1996 is the first and only time that Congress did 
7 
not re-instate R&D tax credits since the tax credit was established. Therefore, R&D tax 
credit users after the expiration period may not behave the same as those before the 
expiration. 
Second, this is the first attempt to detail the differences among different types of 
R&D tax credit users and to document which firms are more likely to use R&D tax 
credits by using the disclosed R&D tax credits in footnotes of annual reports. Although 
Klassen et al. (2004) indicate that the design of R&D tax credits result in various 
responses of firms to the R&D tax credit provision, they do not investigate how the 
impact of R&D tax credits on R&D decisions varies across firm characteristics. 
Third, this is the first attempt to investigate how R&D tax credit users behave 
differently from non-R&D tax credit users from 1997 to 2007 with respect to the 
qualified research spending and R&D performance (including quality and risk). Although 
the impact of R&D tax credits on R&D investments has been the focus of a long stream 
of research, dating back to Eisner et al. (1984 ), these efforts have been mainly restricted 
to how much additional R&D spending is motivated by R&D tax credits. In addition, 
R&D tax credits in these previous studies are estimated from the reported R&D 
expenditure. The measure is likely to contain some error as it assumes that QREs are the 
same as R&D expenditures. 
Fourth, this paper contributes to the extant literature on innovation quality by using 
patent data, including the adjusted patent citations and patent rank. Prior literature mainly 
uses the patent data as a proxy for innovation quality to evaluate the productivity or value 
relevance ofR&D (e.g., Griliches 1990; Gu 2005; Pandit et al. 2011; Kao 2012) and the 
8 
agency problems related to patent activities (e.g., Francis and Smith 1995). However, 
they do not examine how tax incentives affect innovation quality. 
My paper has important implications for tax policy. The government has spent 
billions of dollars in granting R&D tax credits to profitable firms, and the bill just passed 
on January 1, 2013 includes an extension of the R&D tax credit retroactively to January 1, 
2012 and through December 31, 2013. However, the extant evidence does not show 
whether R&D tax credits produce good quality innovation. 
The structure of my paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses institutional 
background related to this study. Section 3 covers related literature to R&D tax credits, 
other incentives and disincentives for R&D spending and innovation, and further 
develops the hypotheses. Section 4 addresses my research design, including sample 
selection and data description. Section 5 presents the empirical results of my tests. 
Section 6 contains a series of additional analyses. Finally, Section 7 concludes and raises 
policy issues that are relevant for the R&D quality, R&D risk and design of tax credit 
schemes in general. 
9 
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
This section provides background information relevant to this study. I first discuss the 
U.S. federal legislation of R&D tax credits to provide conceptual background for the 
study. I then briefly discuss the changes in the legislation because the legislation of R&D 
tax credits is a temporary provision but it has usually been extended whenever it expired, 
except for the time during 1995-1996. Finally, I summarize the U.S. state legislation of 
R&D tax credits to show that most states also provide tax benefits to qualified research 
activities and that the difference between federal and states is limited. · 
2.1 Legislation of R&D Tax Credits 
Federal and state R&D tax credits offer firms credits against their income tax liability 
based on the incremental amount of qualified research expenditures (excess QREs) done 
within the U.S. over a firm-specific base amount. The federal R&D tax credit is a 20-
percent credit taken on excess QREs based on a firm-specific fixed percentage (i.e., past 
research intensity over 1984-1988) of the prior average four-year gross receipts under 
Internal Revenue Code Section 41(a) (IRC § 41 (a)). The maximum R&D credit is 20-
percent ofhalfofcurrent QREs, namely, 10% ofthe current QREs. IRC § 41(d) defines 
QREs for U. S. federal R&D tax credits as the wages, materials expenses, rental costs of 
computers, and contract research expense incurred in performing research "undertaken to 
discover information" that is "technological in nature" for a new or improved business 
purpose. 4 This definition of research expenditures under IRC § 41 covers a narrower 
4 R&D tax credits for states generally follow the above definition for U.S. federal R&D tax 
credits. 
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range than R&D expenses for tax deduction (IRC § 174i or financial reporting (SF AS 
Specifically, firms are eligible for R&D tax credits if their R&D projects satisfy the 
following four criteria for QREs (IRC § 41(d) and Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4). First, their costs 
of R&D projects are the expenditures that may be treated as expenses under Internal 
Revenue Code Section 174 (IRC §174), including basic research, wages, supply costs, 
rental or lease costs of computers, and contractor costs paid or incurred in the taxable 
year. 
Second, QREs only refer to expenses used to discover scientific or technological 
information and exclude social science or humanities research. Such information 
fundamentally relies on principles of the physical or biological sciences, engineering, or 
computer science. Additionally, firms must show that the information can apply not only 
to the product that is actually developed but also to other products. Namely, QREs 
exclude development costs. 
Third, the discovered information is for the purpose of developing a new or improved 
business component. Business component stands for any product, process, computer 
software, technique, formula, or invention that is to be sold, leased, or licensed. IRC § 41 
also explicitly excludes internal-use software expenditures as QREs. Therefore, firms 
5 For example, utilities and overhead related to research in the experimental or laboratory sense, 
are § 17 4 expenditures, but are not QREs under §41. Legal and patent expenses, including 
attorney fees in making and perfecting the application, are R&E expenditures under § 17 4, but are 
neither QREs under §41 nor R&D expenses under FAS 2. 
6 For example, different from R&D expenses under FAS 2, QREs under §41 exclude: 1) research 
conducted outside the U.S ., 2) research in the social sciences or humanities, and 3) funded 
research. 
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may not be qualified for R&D tax credits in service industries that sell service without 
selling their software, such as accounting, consulting, or banking services. 
Fourth, substantially all of the research activities constitute elements of a process of 
experimentation for a new or improved function, performance, reliability, or quality. 
Besides, qualified research generally excludes research conducted outside the U.S., 
research costs incurred after the beginning of commercial production, customization or 
duplication of an existing product or process, social science studies, research related to 
certain internal-use computer software, and research funded by any grant, contract, or any 
person (including government). These criteria generally require firms to conduct basic 
research and applied research, excluding development cost. Therefore, firms' ability or 
preference to conduct qualified research that satisfies all criteria may affect their use of 
R&D tax credits. 
2.2 Changes in Legislation of Federal R&D Tax Credits 
The credit was most recently renewed in January 2013, effective for two years 
(retroactively) from January 2012. In 1981, IRC § 44F (currently IRC § 41) Research & 
Experimentation (R&E) Tax Credit was signed into law, as a part of Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 (Public Law 97-'34). The act was considered to be temporary and was 
intended to provide companies with an incentive to keep high tech jobs in the United 
States and help fuel corporate growth. Since then, the tax credit has been extended 15 
times. The tax credit has been allowed to expire eleven other times temporarily, and it 
once really expired between July 1995 and June 1996. Therefore, this paper focuses on 
R&D tax credit users since 1997, the first full year after the lapse from 1995 to 1996. 
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Appendices 1 and 2 summarize legislation of R&D tax credits. Appendix 1 tabulates 
the history of legislation of federal R&D tax credits. There were seven changes in the 
credit rules, each enacted in 1986, 1988, 1989, 1996, 1999, 2006, and 2008. Appendix 2 
summarizes the changes in legislation and differences among different operation of R&D 
tax credits, including regular R&D tax credits, alternative incremental research credit 
(AIRC), and alternative simplified research credit (ASRC). 
For regular R&D tax credits, the formula per §41(a) (1) is 20% x [QRE less base 
amount]. Base amount is the maximum of 50% of QREs and the average of prior-four-
year gross receipts times a fixed percentage. The fixed percentage is the minimum of 
16% and the research intensity (i.e., aggregate QREs/aggregate gross receipts for 1984 -
1988), because Congress believes that a business often decides its research budget based 
on a fixed percentage of gross receipts. Startups are applied to special rules under IRC 
§41(c) (3) (B). 
This paper focuses on regular R&D tax credits because the regular credit rate is 
relatively higher than other types of R&D tax credit rate. Besides, most firms choose to 
use regular R&D tax credits rather others (GAO 2009). Therefore, I discuss the detailed 
information and formula to calculate AIRC and ASRC in Appendix 3. Appendix 3 
describes the details of the federal R&D tax credits. The tax credit is now called the 
corporate research credit by the IRS, although the official name for the credit on IRS 
Form 6765 is the Credit for Increasing Research Activities. 
2.3 State R&D Tax Credits 
More and more states in the U.S. have offered firms state-level R&D tax credits to 
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encourage them to undertake R&D investments within the state since 1981. The state-
level R&D tax credit laws vary across states in terms of the use of incremental or non-
incremental R&D, different methods to calculate base amounts, and the number of years 
allowed for carryback or carryforward. However, most state R&D tax credit codes are 
derived from the federal R&D tax credit codes. 
Appendix 4 provides a summary of state-level R&D tax credit laws from 39 states, 
including the five currently expired state R&D tax credit laws (Delaware, Maryland, 
Montana, Missouri, and Oregon). For each of these 39 states, the table shows the duration 
of the laws (including an enactment year and an expiration year), the statutory state credit 
rate (for the highest tier of R&D spending if the state has a multi-tiered credit), its top 
marginal corporate income tax rate, the type of base used in calculating the credit, and the 
number of years allowed to be carried back or carried forward. 
The effective state rate of an R&D tax credit depends on whether the credit applies to 
all qualified R&D expenditures or only ·to those expenditures above a designated base 
level, and, if the latter, how the base is defined. If the R&D tax credit is non-incremental 
(e.g., the R&D tax credit applies to all qualified R&D as in West Virginia, Washington, 
and Hawaii), then the effective state credit .rate is simply the statutory state credit rate. In 
most of the state tax laws, the R&D tax credit applies only to incremental R&D above 
some base level. In 21 states, the base is the product of sales and the R&D-to-sales ratio 
averaged over some fixed past time period. In ten other states (e.g., Colorado, Delaware, 
Illinois, and Kansas), the base is the product of current sales and a moving average of the 
R&D-to-sales ratio over some number of recent years. This moving-average formula 
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reduces the value of the credit, as current R&D spending serves to lower the amount of 
R&D that qualifies for the credit in future years. For this reason, since 1991 most states 
have moved from the moving-average formula to a fixed base percentage based on the 
federal R&D tax credit. 
Regarding the interaction between the federal tax and the state tax, firms pay 
corporate income taxes to states based on an apportionment of their total federal taxable 
income. 7 While some states allow full deductibility of federal income taxes from state 
taxable income, some allow only partial deductibility and some allow no deductibility. 
However, a firm's state taxes are deductible from its federal tax liability, and the state 
statutory corporate income tax rate (less than 10%) is relatively lower. than the federal 
statutory corporate income tax rate (35%). Therefore, any benefit that accrues at the state 
level is smaller by the amount of the marginal federal tax rate faced by the firm. 
Additionally, states generally use the federal definition of qualified research and 
development in their tax codes. Firms' location in different states accordingly may not 
result in significant differences in terms of their use of R&D tax credits. 
7 There are five states (Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming) that have no 
corporate income tax, but Texas does have a "Franchise" tax, which is quite similar to an income 
tax. (A franchise tax is a tax on either apportioned federal taxable income plus compensation for 
officers and directors or tangible assets.) Therefore, Texas enacted in 2001 a R&D tax credit 
against franchise taxes. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This section reviews the relevant literature and develops hypotheses on characteristics 
and performance of R&D tax credit users. The literature includes the effectiveness of the 
U.S. R&D tax credit on firms' R&D spending and other factors that affects U.S. firms ' 
R&D spending decisions and innovation (including patents as a proxy for innovation 
generation, adjusted patent forward citations as a proxy for innovation quality or success, 
and citations per R&D as a proxy for innovation efficiencies). 
3.1 Literature Review 
3.1.1 R&D Tax Credits 
Several studies have investigated the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives in 
increasing firms' R&D investments. Economists have been skeptical of the efficacy of 
tax incentives, and studies show insensitive or moderately sensitive R&D behavior to 
R&D tax credits in the eighties (Eisner et al. 1984; Mansfield 1986; Altshuler 1988). 
However, later studies since the nineties have found a significant response of corporate 
R&D behavior to R&D tax credits (Berger 1993; Hall 1993; Hines 1993; Baily and 
Lawrence 1992; Mamuneas and Nadiri 1996; Klassen et al. 2004; Brown and Krull2008 ; 
Rao 2013). 
The studies either use cost-benefit analysis or a test for the price elasticity of R&D. In 
cost-benefit analysis, early studies suggest that R&D tax credits are not effective, fmding 
a benefit-cost ratio less than one (Eisner et al. 1984; Tillinger 1991; McCutchen 1993). 
For example, Eisner et al. (1984) took a natural experiment approach and used special 
survey data describing the composition of firm R&D spending to construct a difference-
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in-difference estimate of the effect of the R&D tax credit. They find that spending on 
research that qualified for R&D tax credits grew 25.7% faster than unqualified research 
expenditures between 1980 and 1981. However, they find that difference in spending 
growth was statistically insignificant in 1982. This result suggests that the policy change 
did not fundamentally alter corporate spending patterns, as the moving average base 
amount may reduce firms' incentives to further increase qualified research after 
increasing qualified research for the first year. -
Furthermore, Mansfield (1986) compares the experiences of the US, Canada and 
Sweden using firm-level survey data. In the survey, executives of a stratified sample of 
firms were asked to estimate the effect of the relevant tax incentives on the firm's R&D 
expenditures. According to the executives, each dollar of foregone tax revenue resulted in 
30 to 40 cents of induced R&D spending. However, these results may not only be due to 
the moving average base amount originally used to calculate the credit from 1981 to 1989 
but also to the limited sample size suggested by Hall and van Reenen (2000). 
Using confidential IRS data, Altshuler (1988) fmds that between 1981 and 1984 
average effective credit rates were just a fraction - less than one-tenth - of the period's 
25 percent statutory credit rate. Some firms even have effective credit rates as zero or 
negative in her study. The effective credit rate is defined as the discounted credit benefits 
weighted by the probabilities of each of the three states of research expenditure growth 
(low, normal, and high) from 1981 to 1984. To gain a larger sample size, Tillinger (1991) 
estimates the R&D tax credit by using R&D expenditures in Compustat from 1981 to 
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19858. The results show that on average, the R&D tax credit induces $460 million of 
R&D expenditures at a cost of $2.4 billion, which translates into only $0.19 of additional 
R&D per dollar of foregone tax revenue from 1981 to 1985. Thus, R&D tax credits 
provide small incentives or disincentives for firms' R&D spending in the eighties. 
Following the change in the design of R&D tax credits in 1986 and 1989 (see 
Appendix 2 for details), Klassen et al. (2004) and Gupta et al. (2011) also use Compustat 
data to construct R&D tax credit estimates and find that the R&D tax credit is effective in 
inducing more R&D spending during the 1990s.9 For instance, Klassen et al. (2004) use a 
matched sample of 110 U.S. and 58 Canadian firms in the nineties and find that the U.S. 
R&D credit induces $2.96 of additional R&D spending for every dollar of taxes foregone. 
These results in recent studies further convince Congress members that R&D tax credits 
are effective in increasing firms' R&D spending and worth extending the temporary 
provision (Guenther 2012). 
In the price elasticity of an R&D test, studies (e.g., Mamuneas and Nadiri 1993; Hall 
1993) measure how responsive corporate R&D investment is to changes in its after-tax 
cost. The price elasticity of R&D means the ratio of the percentage increase in R&D 
spending for a given percentage declines in the after-tax cost of qualified excess R&D. A 
price elasticity of negative one or more is an indication that the tax credit is effective at 
stimulating incremental R&D investment. While early studies find the price elasticity of 
8 She assigns an indicator when current R&D expenses exceed the base amount based on IRC § 
44F (currently IRC § 41). 
9 Gupta et al. (2011) assign QRE equal to 50% of Compustat R&D expense to determine 
eligibility of R&D tax credit. Klassen et al. (2004) calculate the effective credit rate as the 
statutory credit rate times the after-tax current R&D expenditures that exceed the base amount 
based on IRC § 41, divided by total current R&D expenditures. 
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R&D is less than one, generally in the range of -0:2 to -0.5 (GAO 1989), later studies fmd 
that it is around -1 to -1.5 (Berger 1993). Berger's results (1993) imply that a decline in 
the after-tax cost of R&D of 10% can be expected to produce a rise in R&D spending of 
10% to 15%. 
Hines (1993) explores the effect of changes in the allocation rules of R&D expensing 
on the R&D activity of multinational firms. Using Compustat data between 1984 and 
1989, Hines estimates the response of R&D spending to its after-tax price after 
considering R&D tax credits. His short-run estimates ranging from -1.2 to -1.6 and long-
run estimates ranging from -1.3 to -2.0 suggest that the tax-price elasticity of R&D well 
exceeds unity. Hall (1994) also uses Compustat data from fmancial filings to investigate 
the efficacy of R&D tax credits from 1981 to 1991. In her log first-difference 
specifications, Hall uses cross-time within-firm variation in tax positions and marginal 
R&D tax subsidies to estimate a short-run elasticity of -1.5 and a long-run elasticity of-
2.7. Both of the above studies show that R&D tax credits reduce firms' R&D user costs. 
Recently, Rao (2013) re-examines the impact of R&D tax credits on R&D user costs by 
using confidential tax data from the IRS between 1981 and 1991 and also fmds the 
efficacy of R&D tax credits. 
Overall, the R&D tax credit is effective in the sense that on average, one dollar of 
R&D tax credit generates more than one dollar of R&D investment, but it is unexplored 
how the impact of R&D tax credits on R&D decisions varies with firm characteristics and 
how R&D tax credits affect R&D quality. The main reason why the prior literature does 
not try to answer these two research questions is that the R&D tax credit is estimated by 
19 
usmg R&D expenditures recognized in the financial reports, while only a qualified 
portion of R&D spending can be used to claim R&D tax credits. As most firms' R&D 
expenditures are development costs rather than research costs or even qualified portions 
of research costs for R&D tax credits, it is likely to be inaccurate to use estimates of 
R&D tax credits rather than the actual R&D tax credit. Thus, this paper intends to fill this 
gap by using the disclosed R&D tax credits in firms ' annual reports to investigate these 
two questions. 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the R&D tax credit increases R&D spending after 
the first lapse from 1995 to 1996. Following the skepticism of economists in the eighties, 
the IRS and several researchers mention the possibility that firms re-classify other 
expenses to QREs to earn R&D tax credits. For example, Skaife et al. (2013) find a 
positive association between discretionary R&D reporting and firms that disclose R&D 
tax credit in their annual reports. Discretionary R&D reporting refers to the 
misclassification of SG&A expenses or other expenses as R&D expenses. Besides, a 
recent IRS audit technique guide emphasizes the discretion managers have in determining 
QREs for the R&D tax credit: 
"The determination of the "qualified" percentage is based on a selected manager 's 
recollection or estimate of the amount of time particular employees devote to qualified 
activity, excluded activity, or other nonqualified activities. These managers/employees 
are sometimes referred to as Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). They may or may not have 
worked in the areas or performed services for the taxpayer during the years for which 
they will be opining. These representations may or may not be supported by measurable 
20 
corroborative records. In some instances, taxpayers may not even apply percentages at 
the employee level. Rather, a single percentage is determined and applied to total 
department wage costs. " (IRS 20 12) 
Hence, R&D tax credits may just encourage discretionary R&D reporting rather than 
R&D spending. Then the results may not hold in prior studies without controlling for 
possible discretionary R&D reporting or using R&D tax credit estimates rather than 
actual ones. However, firms that claim R&D tax credits suffer more monitoring of tax 
returns from the IRS than non-R&D tax credit users. R&D tax credit users accordingly 
may still increase R&D spending when claiming R&D tax credits. As the answer remains 
unclear, this paper will investigate this question of whether R&D tax credits encourage 
not only more reported R&D but also more adjusted R&D that excludes possible 
misclassified SG&A. 
3.1.2 Other Factors Affecting Discretionary R&D Spending and Innovation 
There exists a large stream of literature investigating the firm-level factors affecting 
R&D spending decisions and innovation. Besides R&D tax credits, the factors include the 
motives to meet targeted earnings or analysts' forecasts, initial public offerings (IPO), 
seasoned equity offerings (SEO), firms that are subject to SEC Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs), financing constraints, cash holdings, institutional 
shareholdings, CEO compensation, the independence of directors, auditors' industry 
expertise, and CEO tenure, turnover, and overconfidence. 
In the real earnings management literature, empirical and anecdotal evidence shows 
that managers cut R&D to meet earnings benchmarks (Baber et al. 1991; Dechow and 
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Sloan 1991; Bens et al. 2002; Roychowdhury 2006). For example, using Compustat data, 
Baber et al. (1991) find that firms mitigate R&D to avoid earnings decreases. Evidence in 
Bens et al. (2002) also suggests that firms increase share repurchases to offset the 
earnings per share dilution of option exercises by decreasing the capital available for 
R&D spending. Besides, Roychowdhury (2006) indicates that firms attempt to avoid 
losses by reducing discretionary expenditures, such as R&D. 
The increase in real earnings management may be due to the passage of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (SOX) (Cohen et al. 2008). Using survey data, Graham et al. (2005) and Jong 
et al. (2012) also fmd that firms prefer using real earnings management to accrual 
earnings management. Specifically, Graham et al. (2005) survey 401 executives and find 
that 80% of participants would decrease discretionary expenditures, such as R&D, to 
meet an earnings target. Jong et al. (2012) find similar results by surveying fmancial 
analysts. Based on this stream of literature, cutting R&D seems to be a preferable way for 
average firms to manage earnings. 
However, R&D tax credits require firms to increase qualified portions of R&D for 
R&D tax credits. As IRC §41 requires QREs to have large portions of uncertainty to be 
solved, R&D tax credit users may need to take more risks to manage earning by cutting . 
R&D but increasing QREs than non-R&D tax credit users. It remains an empirical 
question of whether R&D tax credit users have similar preference to conduct a real 
earnings management by cutting R&D. Thus, it is more interesting to see if R&D tax 
credits increase R&D spending post-SOX. 
22 
Recent studies find that during specific periods, such as during IPOs, SEOs, or 
misstatements resulting in AAERs, firms increase R&D to inflate stock prices (Singer et 
al. 2012; Sun 2013). Specifically, Singer et al. (2012) find that IPO firms do not manage 
earnings by cutting R&D, but rather manage sales and increase R&D. Using firms subject 
to AAERs, Sun (2013) finds that misstating firms reduce SG&A, but increase R&D when 
they overstate earnings. Based on these fmdings, during certain periods, firms that are 
eager to earn R&D tax benefits to reduce their tax burden may be willing to misclassify 
other expenses as R&D expenses. Thus, it is likely that R&D tax credits encourage 
discretionary R&D reporting rather than R&D spending for firms that conduct SEOs or 
have overstated earnings. 
Moreover, prior studies show that fmancing constraints and cash holdings affect firms' 
R&D spending and innovation (Hall 2002; Schroth and Szalay 2010; Lyandres and 
Palazzo 2012). Hall (2002) indicates that R&D-intensive firms exhibit considerably less 
leverage than other firms, as the structure of a debt contract is not well suited for R&D-
intensive firms with uncertain and volatile returns (Stiglitz 1985). Jensen and Showalter 
(2004) also show that increased leverage decreases firm-level R&D expenditures. 
Recently, Schroth and Szalay (2010) show theoretically and empirically that firms. 
with more cash holdings are more likely to win patent races than those with low cash 
holdings. Rather than taking cash holdings as given, Lyandres and Palazzo (2012) show 
that innovation efficiency is positively related to cash holdings of relatively financially 
unconstrained firms, while it is negatively related to cash holdings of relatively 
constrained firms . Their theory and empirical results suggest that cash holdings have an 
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important strategic role in a setting in which firms compete in innovation development 
and implementation. Brown et al. (2009) provide evidence that young firms in high tech 
industries use equity financing to increase R&D and thus trigger the 1990s R&D boom. 
The results suggest that overpriced equity lowers the cost of capital and may allow 
financially constrained firms the opportunity to issue shares and increase R&D. Therefore, 
this paper would have to control for fmancing constraints and cash holdings when 
investigating the impact of R&D tax credits on R&D spending and innovation. 
The corporate governance studies fmd that institutional investors (Bushee ·1998) and 
compensation committees (Cheng 2004) mitigate managers' opportunistic reductions in 
R&D. Existing studies also find evidence that firms with more R&D intensity use more 
options to compensate managers and employees (Ryan and Wiggins 2002; Cheng 2004). 
Brown and Krull (2008) further find that executives' stock options that earn R&D tax 
credits reduce firms' incentives to cut R&D when facing earnings shortfalls. The authors 
use Compustat data to construct estimates of stock options induced by R&D tax credits 
from 1992 to 2002. Specifically, their results indicate that firms reduce R&D spending by 
0.46 percent of total assets to avoid earnings decreases, but R&D tax credits generated by 
stock option exercises (hereafter, R&D option exercises) offset this decrease by 16 
percent on average and up to 42 percent for a fully taxable firm. R&D option exercises 
are recognized as additional paid-in-capital before the passage of SFAS 123R and reduce 
tax expenses. Thus, firms facing earnings shortfalls may still be able to invest in R&D 
when they have R&D option exercises. 
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The monitoring literature reveals evidence that independent directors limit R&D 
spending (Deutsch 2005; Linck et al. 2008) while independent directors with technical 
expertise encourage more R&D spending (Dalziel et al. 2011). In addition, the auditing 
literature shows that R&D intensive firms hire top-tier auditors or auditors with R&D 
. industry expertise (Godfrey and Hamilton 2005). These findings suggest that independent 
industry specialists may help firms' innovation generation and have higher innovation 
quality. 
Finally, the literature related to CEO incentives or characteristics for R&D spending 
provide evidence that newly appointed CEOs, CEOs with shorter tenure, or overconfident 
CEOs spend more in R&D (Du and Lin 2011; Hirshleifer et al. 2012). Besides, 
Hirshleifer et al. (2012) find that over the 1993-2003 period, firms with overconfident 
CEOs obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for 
given research and development expenditures. These results suggest that when CEOs are 
more risk taking, they are more likely to engage in R&D activities and generate more 
innovation. 
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
After reviewing the relevant literature, I find the following three research questions 
are still pending to be answered: (1) What are the characteristics of R&D tax credit users? 
(2) Does the R&D tax credit increase R&D spending? (3) What is the performance of 
R&D tax credit users compared to non-R&D tax credit users? I discuss rationales and 
develop hypotheses below. 
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3.2.1 Characteristics of R&D Tax Credit Users 
The R&D tax credit provision encourages firms to engage in qualified research over 
some firm-specific base amounts. However, not all firms respond to the provision. There 
are two reasons why I expect that the likelihood of utilizing R&D tax credits varies 
across firms: research ability and tax advantages. Innovation-related firm characteristics 
determine the ability to conduct qualified research projects and to increase QREs above 
the firm-specific base amount. The ability to conduct qualified research projects includes 
the ability to diversify success uncertainty, the heterogeneity of projects available, risk 
considerations, and past success of research. Next, a firm's tax advantages decrease the 
uncertainty of receiving the credit or increase the credit amount. Tax advantages are 
obtained when firms have taxable profits and when firms are R&D startups. Therefore, 
not all firms are incentivized by R&D tax credits to increase QREs, and firms' responses 
to the tax credit vary with firm characteristics. 
To examine how a firm's response to the tax credit varies with two types of firm 
characteristics, the development of my first hypothesis focuses on: (1) research ability 
(size, technology intensity, prior success in patenting, leading R&D behavior, and high-
risk preference); and (2) tax advantages (taxable profits and R&D startups). 
Firms' research ability contains five dimensions. Large firms are more likely to 
engage in qualified R&D projects to be eligible for R&D tax credits than small firms. 
According to Congressional reports (Guenther 2006, 2008), implementing qualified R&D 
projects requires the ability to reduce the technical uncertainty. Ciftci and Cready (20 11) 
argue that relative to small firms, large firms are likely to have less technical and 
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commercial uncertainty, and extract greater rents from innovation, based on the finding 
that large firms' R&D spending generates less variability in future earnings and have 
more profitability than small firms'. Besides, qualified R&D projects mainly consist of 
research costs, which involve more uncertainty related to profitability than development 
costs. Schumpeter (1950) indicates that larger firms can afford the R&D investments that 
need longer time to get payoffs. Thus, the above competitive advantages of large firms · 
over small firms in implementing R&D may lead to more motivation for large firms to 
use R&D tax credits. Besides, IRS (2012) shows that large firms account for substantial 
claimed R&D tax credit amounts. 10 
In terms of technology intensity, high-tech firms are more likely to be qualified for 
R&D tax credits than traditional manufacturing firms due to their high research intensity. 
Specifically, the criteria for QREs (discovering technological information and substantial 
experimentation, IRC §41 (d)) are in favor of firms with more technological research than 
development. Additionally, due to relatively generous R&D tax credits for firms' basic 
research11 (IRC §41(e)), it is easier for firms with more basic research to be eligible for 
1
° Corporations with more than $250 million in business receipts account for 82% of the dollar 
value of all claims in 2009, and in 2001, they account for 73% of dollar claims (IRS 2012). 
11 Basic research refers to payments for qualified basic research performed under a ~ritten 
contract by educational institutions, nonprofit scientific research organizations (excluding private 
foundations), and certain grant-giving organizations. For the basic research credit, a firm's base 
period is during the three tax years preceding the first year in which it had gross receipts after 
1983. The base amount is equal to the sum of a frrm's minimum basic research amount and its 
maintenance-of-effort amount in the base period. The fanner is the greater of 1% of the firm's 
average annual in-house and contract research expenses during the base period, or 1% of its total 
contract research expenses during the base period. For a frrm claiming the basic research credit, 
its minimum basic research amount cannot be less than 50% of the firm's basic research 
payments in the current tax year. The latter is the difference between a frrm's donations to 
qualified organizations in the current tax year for purposes other than basic research and its 
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R&D tax credits. Specifically, basic research payments eligible for R&D tax credits that 
fall below the base amount are treated as contract research expenses for the credit. Prior 
literature indicates that high-tech industries (such as pharmaceuticals, defense, 
engineering, medical, and aerospace) are more research intensive (OECD 2003; Matolcsy 
and Wyatt 2008). Hence, I predict that relative to traditional manufacturing firms, high-
tech firms are more likely to use R&D tax credits. 
In terms of prior success in patenting, firms with more patents are more likely to be 
qualified for R&D tax credits than firms with fewer patents. Successfully patenting R&D 
may represent a firm' s ability to patent QREs, because a firm's receipt of patents 
conclusively satisfies the criterion of discovering new information under the Patent Safe 
Harbor Rule (Treasury Regulation § 1.41.4). Additionally, the number of patents a firm is 
successful in obtaining represents its ability to conduct innovative activities (Griliches 
1990). Thus, I expect that firms with more patents in the prior year are more likely to use 
R&D tax credits. 
In terms of R&D leaders, it is more likely for firms with more prior success in 
patenting than their competitors within the industry (hereafter, R&D leaders) to use R&D 
tax credits. Due to the Patent Safe Harbor Rule, R&D leaders may have more success in 
patenting QREs than their competitors. Additionally, the purpose of the R&D tax credit is 
to encourage more QREs. Therefore, firms with more prior success in patenting than the 
industry average are more likely to have excess QREs and thus use R&D tax credits. 
average annual donations to the same organizations for the same purposes during the base period, 
multiplied by a cost-of-living adjustment for the current tax year. 
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In terms of risk preference, risk-seeking firms are more likely to engage in qualified 
research projects. As qualified research projects contain only reseatch and have lower 
successful rate than projects in the development stage, firms have to be willing to take the 
high risk of qualified research to gain R&D tax credits. Thus, I expect that firms with 
high-risk preference are more likely to use R&D tax credits. Overall, the above reasoning 
leads to my Hypothesis 1 a, stated in the alternative form: 
HI a: Firms with more research ability are more likely to use R&D tax credits. 
Tax advantages include two dimensions. First, · profitable firms are more likely to 
engage in qualified research projects than loss firms . The R&D tax credit. is non-
refundable, which means that only firms with sufficient current income tax expenses 
(profitable firms) may benefit from the amount ofthe credit claimed in a tax year. If 
firms do not have positive taxable income (loss firms) that generates current tax liabilities, 
their R&D tax credits will be carried back to offset past tax liabilities or forward to 
reduce future tax liabilities. 12 Furthermore, firms are better off using the full amount of a 
tax credit today, rather than in the future, because there is no certainty that R&D tax 
credit carryforwards can be used before they expire; especially when firms have sizable 
net operating losses. Therefore, I predict that relative to loss firms, profitable firms are 
more likely to use R&D tax credits. 
Second, firms that have been investing in R&D for less than ten years (hereafter 
denoted as R&D startups) are more likely to have excess QREs than firms that started 
12 Before 1998, R&D tax credit can be carried back three years and forward fifteen years. From 
1998 to 2011 , different from operating loss carryback (two years), R&D credits can be earned 
back one year and forward twenty years. 
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R&D spending ·since at least ten years ago (i.e., established firms). Excess QREs are 
determined by whether a firm's QREs can exceed its base amount. The base amount is 
. further based on a firm-specific fixed percentage (i.e., QREs out of gross receipts from 
1984 to 1988) times the average of prior four-year gross receipts. Assuming the average 
prior four-year gross receipts are similar, whether a firm has a lower base amount is 
determined by the fixed percentage. Due to the lower fixed percentage, R&D startups 
have lower base amounts than established firms (IRC §41 ). Specifically, R&D startups 
include two types of fixed percentage. The fixed percentage is 3 percent for firms that 
started investing in QREs less than five years ago, and less than 100% of the actual 
average fixed percentage13 during prior years selected by the IRS for firms that started 
investing in QREs since 6-10 years ago (IRC §41(a)). On the contrary, established firms ' 
fixed percentage is 100% of the average percentage. 
Moreover, Congress Report (2001) said that "a consequential effect of the 3% rule is 
that it increases the odds that a small fledgling firm will be able to claim the credit in a 
period when it is vulnerable to failure or cash flow problems." To check whether the 
established firms have higher fixed percentage, I also estimate the fixed percentage14 by 
13 Under IRC §41(a), in general firms' fixed-base percentage is QRE/gross receipts during 1984-
1988. R&D startups have different fixed-base percentage from others. For firms' first five taxable 
years, the fixed-base percentage is 3 percent. For finns ' sixth taxable year, the fixed-base 
percentage is 1/6 of QRE/gross receipts for the fourth and fifth years. For firms' seventh taxable 
year, the fixed-base percentage is 1/3 of QRE/gross receipts for the fifth and sixth years. For 
firms' eighth taxable year, the fixed-base percentage is 1/2 of QRE/gross receipts for the fifth to 
seventh years. For firms ' ninth taxable year, the fixed-base percentage is 2/3 of QRE/gross 
receipts for the fifth to the eighth years. For firms' tenth taxable year, the fixed-base percentage is 
5/6 of QRE/gross receipts for the fifth to ninth years. Thereafter, the fixed-base percentage is 
QRE/gross receipts for any of firms ' selected five years from the 5th to 1Oth years 
14 To estimate the average fixed percentage for established firms, I divide R&D by sales for each 
firm year. I assume that R&D and sales can represent QREs and gross receipts respectively, as 
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using the ratio of R&D to sales based on IRC §4l(a). The estimated fixed percentage is 
greater for the established firms than the R&D startups. Therefore, I expect that R&D 
startups are more likely to use R&D tax credits than the established firms. 15 In short, I 
examine Hypothesis 1 b stated in the alternative form: 
Hlb: Firms with tax advantages are more likelyto use R&D tax credits. 
What adds the tension to my first analyses is that managers may discount the benefits 
from R&D tax credits due to the complexity oftax codes .16 Therefore, the characteristics 
I identify from IRC§ 41, innovation and tax advantages, may not necessarily affect firms' 
decision to claim R&D tax credits. However, prior reports or literature suggest that R&D 
tax credits are effective in increasing R&D expenditures (Klassen et al. 2004; Guenther 
2006; GAO 2009); various technology trade groups continuously contend the importanc~ 
of R&D tax credits to extend the expired R&D tax credits. 17 If most firms pass up the 
opportunity of claiming R&D tax credits, it is difficult to believe that they care so much 
about the extension of R&D tax credits. 
both QREs and gross receipts are unobservable without access to confidential data in the IRS. If . 
the ratio of R&D to sales is greater than the maximum fixed percentage 16%, I set the firm's 
estimated fixed percentage as 16%. 
15 On average, the estimated fixed percentage is around 6.72% for the established firms and 
4. 79% for the R&D startups. 
16 For example, Wall Street Journal on July 23, 2012 reported that firms pass up tax breaks 
because the tax benefits are expensive. The tax codes are also complex for them to follow. While 
researchers and politicians believe that the tax breaks change firms' behavior, it may not be 
necessarily true. 
17 For instance, Hill Report on January 2, 2013 mentioned that high-tech trade associations 
applauded the approval of R&D tax credit extension, and that to urge Congress to extend R&D 
tax credits last month, Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) claimed that failing to 
extend R&D tax credits would cause immediate reduce of research plans in the U.S . 
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3.2.2 R&D Spending of R&D Tax Credit Users vs. Non-R&D tax credit users 
The second question is whether the R&D tax credit provision really motivates firms 
to change their economic decisions in increasing their R&D spending. Existing evidence 
suggests that R&D spending is increasing in the R&D tax credit rate. For example, 
Berger (1993) finds that from 1982 to 1985, the R&D tax credit stimulated $1.74 of R&D 
spending per dollar of foregone tax revenue. Klassen et al. (2004) and Gupta et al. (20 11) 
construct similar estimates and find that during the 1990s, the credit generated between 
$2.96 and $2.40 of R&D spending per dollar of foregone tax revenue. Besides, Brown 
and Krull (2008) find that R&D tax credits generated by stock option exercises reduce 
myopic R&D investment related to short-term earnings constraints. 
However, their evidence is based on estimating QREs by using firms' reported R&D 
expenditures in financial reports since the actual QREs only appear in the tax return, 
which is not publicly available information. The estimation process of R&D tax credits 
assumes that R&D expenditures are the same as QREs, while they are in fact different. 
Using the recognized R&D expenditures may overestimate R&D tax credits because 
most firms' R&D expenditures are development costs rather than research costs (NSB 
2012). A firm that has large R&D expenditures does not necessarily have high QREs. 
Therefore, I employ the actual R&D tax credits from the footnotes in the annual report 
and test whether their R&D expenditures are increasing in the marginal R&D tax credit 
rate to address the problem of overestimation. I further require sample firms to have 
positive R&D to reduce the problem of underestimation. 
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Little is known about whether R&D tax credits encourage more R&D spending after 
the expiration between 1995 and 1996. Rao (2013) uses actual IRS data from 1981 to 
1991 and finds evidence that R&D tax credits increase the R&D expenditures and QREs. 
However, her study does not provide evidence that recent R&D tax credits are still 
effectively increase firms' R&D spending after the expiration between 1995 and 1996. 
Recently, Skaife et al. (2013) assert that firms may claim R&D tax credits by 
classifying routine selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses as R&D expense. 
They find that the indicator for firms that mention R&D tax credits in their footnotes of 
annual reports is positively related to positive abnormal R&D expenses, which they 
attribute to misclassification of SG&A expenses as R&D expenses. However, they do not 
provide evidence to rule out the explanation that the relation results from real changes in 
firms' economic decisions rather than expense classification choices. Besides, firms that 
mention R&D tax credits in the current annual reports are not necessarily firms that 
currently earn R&D tax credits. R&D tax credit mentions in footnotes often refer to 
carryforwards of R&D tax credits earned in previous years. 
If a firm claims R&D tax credits, it draws the attention of the IRS to its tax return. 
The approval of R&D tax credits requires firms to have QREs and those QREs to exceed 
some percentage of prior gross receipts. The audit of R&D tax credits may trigger the 
IRS ' s attention to how R&D tax credit users identify their QREs and calculate their 
excess QREs. Furthermore, Hanlon et al. (2012) find that firms subject to the IRS's close 
monitoring have better financial reporting quality, suggesting that the IRS is effective in 
reducing misreporting transactions. If firms try to reduce their tax by misclassifying 
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SG&A as R&D, they are more likely to be caught by claiming R&D tax credits. Still, I 
incorporate the concern that firms may misreport R&D raised by Skaife et al. (2013) and 
others by using two proxies for R&D spending: (a) reported R&D and (b) adjusted R&D. 
In computing adjusted R&D I take out abnormal SG&A expenses from the reported R&D 
expenses for firms that may have misclassified SG&A as R&D, following the method 
similar to that proposed by Skaife et al. (2012). The alternative form of my second 
hypothesis is: 
H2: R&D tax credits induce more R&D expenditures. 
3.2.3 R&D Performance of R&D Tax Credit Users vs. Non-R&D tax credit users 
The third question is whether the excess QREs of the R&D tax credit users contribute 
to different R&D performance from the R&D of the non-R&D tax credit users. This 
impact of the credit on R&D performance can be divided into three aspects: innovation 
quality, pre-tax profitability, and return volatility. 
Specifically, the nature of QREs may affect the relative innovation quality of the 
excess QREs of the R&D tax credit users compared to the R&D of the non-R&D tax 
credit users. The purpose of R&D tax credits is to encourage firms to increase QREs. 
Congress believes that QREs can generate more innovation and encourage economic 
growth. The IRS decides whether a firm ' s research is a QRE. In other words, if the IRS 
believes that a firm's research is not innovative enough to meet the definition of qualified 
research provided in IRC Section 41, the firm will not receive the R&D tax credit. 
Therefore, the excess QREs of the R&D tax credit users should be more innovative than 
the R&D of the non-R&D tax credit users. 
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H3a: Compared with the R&D of the non-R&D tax credit users, the excess QREs of 
the R&D tax credit users have higher innovation quality. 
Firms increase their QREs to earn R&D tax credits because the qualified projects 
generate positive cash flow after considering the tax benefits. Hall and Van Reenen (2000) 
find that R&D tax credits reduce the cost of R&D capital that is qualified for R&D tax 
credits. The model in Klassen et al. (2004) also suggests that firms accept qualified R&D 
projects that have positive expected NPV. Therefore, accepting qualified projects can 
increase firms ' total cash flow in the future. 
Prior research indicates that most firms evaluate their investment projects based on 
their NPV (Moore and Reichert 1983; Trahan and Gitman 1995; and Graham and Harvey 
2001). I presume that firms accept all the projects with positive NPV, and that the 
projects with negative NPV have lower profitability than the projects with positive NPV. 
R&D tax credits increase the NPV of qualified research projects without changing the 
pre-tax profitability. As some negative NPV projects may become positive NPV projects 
after R&D tax credit users receive R&D tax credits, I state Hypothesis 3b as follows: 
H3b: Compared with the R&D of the non-R&D tax credit users, the excess QREs of 
the R&D tax credit users generate lower pre-tax profitability. 
In terms of risk taking behavior, the nature of qualified research projects may contain 
more uncertainty in success than non-qualified R&D projects. Specifically, Treasury 
Regulation § 1.41.4 requires that QREs are undertaken to eliminate uncertainty of the 
development or improvement of process or products. It also requires that at least eighty 
percent of research activities constitute elements of a process of experimentation. The 
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experimentation involves the identification of uncertainty and more than one method that 
tries to eliminate the uncertainty. When firms claim R&D tax credits, they have to . 
provide evidence that substantial technological uncertainty exists in their research. On the 
contrary, unqualified research does not have such restriction. Accordingly, QREs in 
nature contain more uncertainty than unqualified research. 
The uncertainty embedded in QREs can further increase stock return volatility. QREs 
are positively related to stock return volatility as prior studies provide evidence that firms 
with more R&D experience higher stock return volatility (Chan et al. 2001; Mazzucato 
and Tancioni 2012). The reason for the positive association is that a high degree of 
uncertainty surrounding an R&D intensive firm's future prospects results in the volatility 
of returns rising with R&D spending, thereby imposing real costs on investors (Chan et al. 
2001). 
Additionally, the uncertainty embedded in QREs can further contribute to more return 
volatility than unqualified research. QREs exclude development costs because . the 
Government Accountability Office (2009) reports that the qualified research projects 
must be implemented before commercial production. As qualified research projects 
generally take longer than development projects to pay off in commercial products, they 
contain even more uncertainty in generating profits than the development costs. 
According to the report from National Science Foundation (NSB 2012), on average, 
development costs account for around 80% of firms' R&D expenditures. 18 Non-qualified 
18 For instance, firms' development costs accounted for 80% ($226.6 billion) of their R&D in 
2009, while their applied research is 14.5% ($41.1 billion) and basic research is 5.2% ($14.82 
billion). 
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R&D projects thus contain mostly development costs. Therefore, I expect that the excess 
QREs of the R&D tax credit users generate more return volatility than the R&D of the 
non-R&D tax credit users. 
H3c: Compared with the R&D of the non-R&D tax credit users, the excess QREs of 
the R&D tax credit users generate higher stock return volatility. 
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This section describes the sample selection and develops models for hypothesis tests. 
4.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
The sample for this study consists of tWo groups of the U.S. firms that invest in R&D 
during the period between 1997 and 2007: (1) firm-years with R&D tax credits (the 
treatment group) and (2) firm-years without R&D tax credits (the control group). Since 
the U.S. federal R&D tax credit expired during the period between July 1, 1995 and June 
30, 1996, my sample starts from the first full year in 1997. My sample ends in 2007 to 
reduce the concern for lags of patent application-grant and patent grant-citation because 
2011 is the last year for which Commercialization Research on Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship (CRlE) Patent Database updated patent rank, one of my proxies for 
innovation quality. 19 
To identify firms with R&D tax credits, I hand collect U.S. R&D tax credit data from 
the financial statements (10-K) in the LexisNexis Academic database from 1997 to 2007. 
The data include identifiers that indicate whether the firm currently earns R&D tax 
credits, where R&D tax credits are from (U.S. or other countries), and the amount of 
R&D tax credits if the information is available. I collect the amount of R&D tax credits 
· 
19 There is a two-year gap between R&D expenditures (simultaneously occurred with patent 
application) and patents granted as it takes, on average, two years for the USPTO to grant a patent 
application (Hallet al. 2001 , 2005). Hall et al. (200 1) also shows that in 1990, most patents starts 
receiving citations in five years. Recent papers (Hirshleifer et al. 2012; Lyandres and Palazzo 
2012) use three-year gap between R&D expenditures and patent citations to calculate innovation 
efficiency. Therefore, I chose the average, four-year citation lag, resulting in my sample period 
from 1997 to 2007. 
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disclosed in the footnote of 10-Ks, mainly from the reconciliation table for the income 
tax. 
The following describes the data collection procedures of R&D tax credits. I first 
identify firms by searching 10-K reports in the LexisNexis Academic each year from 
1997 to 2007 using possible key words related to R&D tax credits in 1 0-K reports?0 
Second, I extract the Central Index Key (CIK) from the LexisNexis Academic, which is 
used in the SEC's computer systems to identify companies. If CIK is missing in the 
LexisNexis Academic, I collect it from SEC EDGAR. Third, I identify whether the tax 
credit is U.S. or foreign, in order to exclude firms that may have earned foreign R&D tax 
credits rather than U.S. R&D tax credits. -Fourth, I identify firms that possibly claim the 
U.S. R&D tax credits in the current year rather than using R&D tax credits earned in 
previous years to identify R&D tax credit users. These firms include those that disclose a 
reduced effective tax rate due to R&D tax credits, those that disclose R&D tax credit 
amounts in the reconciliation tables, and those that have more R&D tax credit 
carryforwards in the current year than the previous year. I make an assumption for 
identifying firms that have more R&D tax credit carryforwards in the current year than 
the previous year as R&D tax credit users. The assumption is that the increase in R&D 
tax credit carryforwards from the prior year to the current year is due to unused R&D tax 
credits that are claimed in the current year. From 1997 to 2007, the federal statutory tax 
2° Key words include "research and development tax credit," "research and development credit," 
"R&D tax credit," "R&D credit," "research and experimentation tax credit," "research and 
experiment tax credit," "research and experimentation credit," "research and experiment credit," 
"tax credit from research activities," "R&E tax credit," "research tax credit" or "research credit." 
I use Boolean and wildcard to increase the probabilities of identifying R&D tax credit users. 
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rate and the statutory rate for regular R&D tax credits are the same. Finally, I re-check 
CIK and extract current R&D tax credit non-zero amounts/rates in the tax reconciliation 
table. 
To collect other variables for both R&D tax credit users and non-R&D tax credit 
users, I match my hand-collected sample with U.S. firms listed in Compustat North 
America and CRSP from 1997 to 2007. First, I exclude firms in industries of regulated 
utilities and financial services that have SIC codes of 4900-4999 and 6000-6999, 
respectively, since these industries are known to exhibit different behavior from firms in 
unregulated industries. Then I delete firms that acquire, diversify, or spinoff other firms 
with R&D spending because these activities may affect the firms' R&D investment 
decisions and performance that are irrelevant to R&D tax credit incentives. The sample of 
merger, divestiture, and spinoff is drawn from the Security Data Corporation's (SDC) 
Platinum- Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Next, I add the following restrictions. First, I delete the firms with foreign R&D tax 
credits because the foreign tax credit may affect firms' domestic R&D investments. 
Second, I delete firms with missing earnings, with zero, missing, or negative total assets. 
Third, all the firms are required to have positive R&D expenditures for at least one year 
from 1997 to 2007, as listed in Compustat North America and CRSP. This screen is 
intended to exclude firms that do not invest in R&D activities as R&D tax credits are less 
likely to affect these firms. Besides, the firms that do not invest in R&D (i.e., non-R&D 
firms) have different characteristics from those that invest in R&D. As including non-
R&D firms will increase outliers and reduce the power of the tests, I delete the non-R&D 
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firms. Finally, I delete firms that are classified in the SIC codes of 9995 and 9997, which 
are ambiguous by SIC definition and I cannot classify them as high-tech or low-tech. 
The following lists the data sources of information that is required for tests. Financial 
data and the number of segments are from Compustat North America and Con1pustat 
Segment databases, respectively. I also obtain stock returns, executive compensation, and 
institutional share holdings from CRSP, Compustat Executive Compensation, Thomson 
Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings databases, respectively. Furthermore, to use patent 
citations and patent rank as proxies for innovation quality, I use the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) , Patent Network Dataverse at Harvard Business School, and 
· CRIE Patent Databases. Specifically, I obtain each patent's patent rank from CRIE Patent 
Database, which updates the data till 2011. To calculate patents' adjusted forward 
citations, I also obtain the detailed patent data from the Patent Network Dataverse at 
Harvard Business School, which reports granted patent data until 2010, and obtain the 
data in 2011 and 2012 from CRIE Patent Database. 
I follow the following steps to merge patent databases and Compustat/CRSP. To find 
which firms have patents and are also listed in both Compustat North America and CRSP, 
I first use the fum identifier in NBER patent database. The rest of the firms in patent 
databases are those that have patents but no matching firm identifiers. For these firms, I 
remove non-alphabetical symbols in firm names (e.g.,"-. & 'I () ,\")and then manually 
match the firm names shown in the patent databases with the fmn names in Compustat 
North America and CRSP. If the selected furns listed in Compustat North America and 
CRSP have no patents, I replace the missing value with zero to reduce the survivor bias, 
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as approximately half of my sample has no patent. To mitigate the influence of outliers in 
all analyses, I winsorize the variables in my tests lying beyond the 5% or 95% range of 
the sample distribution.21 As the match with patent databases and the winsorization does 
not reduce the number of the final sample, my sample contains 5,367 treatment firm-
years and 11,675 control fmn-years for the test ofHl. 
In the tests of H2 and H3 respectively, I first require the treatment group to be fust-
time R&D tax credit users, and further eliminate firm-years without the data to calculate 
the required variables. Then I match the treatment group of .first-time R&D tax credit 
users with the closest control group by using propensity score matching. These leave 
panels consisting of 1,146, 2,798, 2,730, and 2,790 observations for H2, H3a, H3b, and 
H3c, respectively. The treatment group and the control group have the same number of 
firm-years after propensity score matching. Table 1 summarizes the process and details of 
the sample selection. 
<See Table 1> 
4.2 Test ofHl: Firm Characteristics of R&D Tax Credit Users 
To test my first hypothesis, I estimate the following logistic regression: 2~ 
5 2 
CR = a0 + "L.a1iResearch Ability+ "L.a21Tax Advantage+ 'LfJPontrols 
i=l J=l 
21 I also did 1% and 99% winsorization, and the results are not affected by this alternative 
winsorization. 
22 Firm and year subscripts are suppressed in my equations and discussions. 
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(1) 
The dependent variable CR equals one when firms disclose earned R&D tax credits in 
the current year and zero otherwise. I define the firms that disclose earned R&D tax 
credits in the current year as the R&D tax credit users; otherwise, they are non-R&D tax 
credit users. The firm characteristics are Research Ability and Tax Advantage. I use 
multiple proxies for each characteristic. The proxies for Research ability are TASSET, 
Techlnt, PatSuccess11, RDLead, and StkOption. The proxies for Tax Advantage are . 
TaxProf and RDStart. Appendix 3 provides a detailed description of the variables in all of 
my analyses. 
The first component of Research Ability, TASSET, is a proxy for :firm size that 
represents the ability to resolve technological and commercial uncertainty and to wait a 
long time for payoffs (Ciftci and Cready 2011). Following Ciftci and Cready (2011), I 
measure TASSET as the natural log of total assets. Second, technology intensity (Techlnt) 
is a proxy for a firm' s ability to conduct basic research and other qualified research. I 
measure Techlnt by assigning a value one for high-tech industries and otherwise zero.23 
Third, PatSuccesstl is a proxy for prior success in patenting, so I measure it as the natural 
log of one plus the number of patent applications in the prior year. Fourth, RDLead 
indicates whether a firm is an R&D leading firm. RDLead is a dummy variable equal to 
23 I use the classification developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD 2003) using the first-two SIC code of technology areas . Firms classified by 
OECD as high technology and medium-high tech are re-classified as high-tech. High-tech 
includes pharmaceuticals, computers and peripherals, telecommunications, semiconductors and 
electronics, electrical appliances and components, aerospace and parts, chemicals, biotechnology, 
medical equipment; medical electronics, industrial machinery and tools; office equipment and 
camera, motor vehicles and parts. Other firms are classified as low-tech: power generation, and 
distribution; heating, ventilation, refrigeration; other transport; primary metals, fabric, metals, and 
plastics, polymers and rubber, agriculture, oil and gas, mining, food and tobacco; textiles and 
apparel, wood and paper; glass, clay and cement. 
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one when the firm ranks among the top 25% of firms in terms of the number of patent 
applications in the prior year within its industry and otherwise zero. Fifth, to measure 
stock option (StkOption), a proxy for high-risk preference, I assign a dummy variable 
equal to one in two conditions: if a firm has nonzero executive options outstanding in the 
current year or if a firm has nonzero executive options granted in the current year given 
the options exercised in the same year; otherwise zero. 
I use two proxies for Tax Advantage. TaxProf is a proxy for taxable profits, as 
profitable firms have greater incentives to reduce taxes by earning R&D tax credits 
concurrently. TaxProfis equal to one when the firm has non-zero current tax expense and · 
no operating loss carryforwards in the current year, and 0 otherwise. RDStart is a proxy 
for firms that started spending in R&D less than ten years ago. R&D startups have lower 
base amounts than established firms that have invested in R&D for at least ten years. 
Therefore, R&D startups have a tax advantage with respect to R&D tax credits. RDStart 
is an indicator equal to one for firms that started to spend R&D less than ten years ago 
and zero otherwise. 
Overall, as firms with more innovation and tax advantages are more likely to earn 
R&D tax credits, I predict that the coefficients on these test variables are positive. 
The control variables are Financing Capacity and real gross domestic product (GDP). 
The proxies for Financing Capacity are cash shortfall (CashShort) and leverage (Lev). 
CashShort measures firms' lack of cash inflows for R&D investing, calculated as the 
ratio of the negative free cash flows before R&D to total assets in the current year. Lev 
measures external funding capacity for R&D investing; calculated as the ratio of the sum 
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of the short-term debt and long-term debt to total assets in the current year. The model in 
Klassen et al. (2004) suggests that firms with less financing capacity have fewer 
resources available for R&D spending. Therefore, whether a firm can use R&D tax 
credits is sensitive to the ability to have excess QREs. If general R&D spending is 
positively associated with QREs, firms with less fmancing capacity also have fewer 
resources available for QREs. Thus, I expect the coefficients on CashShort and Lev are 
negative. 
The special nature of excess QREs may motivate firms with funding constraints to 
increase QREs to earn the tax benefits. They are likely to have a greater motive to do 
research that generates R&D tax credits than firms with sufficient funding sources. Hence, 
I add additional variables as the-proxies for Funding Constraints. These are two dummy 
variables for firms with large cash shortfall ( CashShortD) and firms with high leverage 
(LevD) . CashShortD and LevD equal one when a firm is ranked in the top ten percent of 
firms with cash shortfall and with leverage in the current year and otherwise zero, 
respectively. Due to the special nature of excess QREs, I expect the coefficients on 
CashShortD and LevD to be positive. 
GDP represents the impact of the macroeconomic environment on firms' decisions. to 
use R&D tax credits. In a better economy, firms have fewer financial constraints and thus 
are more likely to invest in general R&D (Brown and Krull 2008; Gupta et al. 2011). If 
general R&D is positively correlated with tax-favored R&D, I expect GDP to be positive. 
However, Gupta et al. (2011) show mixed result of the relation between GDP and R&D 
tax credit status. Their findings suggest that firms in better economy are less likely to be 
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eligible for R&D tax credits, but that firms with positive marginal tax rate are more likely 
to earn R&D tax credits. Both· results are marginally significant. Therefore, I make no 
prediction for this variable. To normalize GDP distribution, I use the natural log of real 
GDP (GDP). 
Finally, I use industry- and year-fixed effects and cluster standard errors by firm. 
Industry fixed effect controls for systematic differences in R&D tax credit usages among 
industries. The industry indicators consist of top five industries (which have the first two-
digit SIC codes of 28, 35, 36, 38, and 73) and other industries, as most of other industries 
have few firms. Thus, five industry dummy variables are included in the test of Hl. Year 
fixed effect controls for potential systematic changes in decisions of R&D tax credit 
usage across years. I cluster standard errors by firm to allow for the possibility that 
unobservable firm characteristics cause residual correlation across years. 
4.3 Propensity Score Matching 
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, I use propensity score matching to create a matched 
control sample. The matched control sample comprises non-R&D tax credit users, 
matched with R&D tax credit users based on the predicted probabilities from the frrst-
stage logistic regression, equation (1 ). This method selects a matched control firm that 
has the closest predicted probabilities of utilizing R&D tax credits for each treatment fum 
in each year from 1997 to 2007. If no control is found within 2% difference of propensity 
scores for a treatment record, the record is dropped (approximate drop rate= 0.4%). I use 
the matched sample to examine H2 and H3. 
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In each of the following regressions, I include industry and year indicators to control 
for the industry and year fixed effects, as there are likely unobservable effects from 
industries or time variance. I also cluster the standard errors by firm to allow for the 
possible residual correlations caused by firm. 
4.4 Test of H2: R&D spending of R&D Tax Credit Users vs. Non-R&D Tax 
Credit Users 
To test the second hypothesis whether R&D tax credits really encourage more R&D 
spending, I use first-time R&D tax credit users and the propensity-score matched control 
sample to estimate the following regression: 
(2) 
The dependent variable RD refers to a firm's current R&D spending. I measure RD as 
currently reported R&D expenditures (RepRD) and adjusted R&D expenses that exclude 
misclassified SG&A in the current year (AdjRD). Both RepRD and AdjRD are measured 
with the natural log transformation. To measure AdjRD, I first distinguish misreporting 
firms from non-misreporting firms . Following the argument in Skaife et al. (2013), the 
misreporting firm indicator represents a firm that may discretionarily report R&D 
expenditures by classifying SG&A as R&D in order to obtain the tax benefits. The 
misreporting firm indicator is equal to one if the firm has positive abnormal R&D and 
negative abnormal SG&A; otherwise zero. 
To obtain positive abnormal R&D and negative abnormal SG&A, I need to identify 
firms that have the reported R&D greater than the predicted R&D (i.e., normal R&D) and 
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the reported SG&A smaller than the predicted SG&A (i.e. , normal SG&A). Thus, to 
estimate the normal levels ofR&D and SG&A, I estimate the following equations (3) and 
(4) modified from Gunny (2010) for each industry-year combination with at least 15 
observations: 
(3); 
(4), 
where XRD is the reported R&D expenses (xrd); AT is total assets (at); Sis sales (sale); 
MV equals the natural log of equity market value (prccJ xcsho); TobinQ is Tobin's Q, or 
the ratio of market value to book value of total assets, computed as the sum of market 
value of equity and the book value of debt ( csho x prcc J + dltt + dlc) divided by total 
assets (at); IF refer to internal funds, measured as income (ib) before R&D (xrd) and 
depreciation (dp); SGA is the report SG&A expenses (xsga); D Decreasein Sales is an indicator 
variable equal to one when total sales decrease during the current year and zero otherwise; 
and subscript t refers to the current year. The words in italic are the variable names in 
Compustat, and all the variables are winsorized at the top and bottom five percent to 
avoid the influence of outliers. 
Next, I calculate the difference between actual value and the predicted value of 
dependent variables in equations (3) and (4) as abnormal R&D and abnormal SG&A, 
respectively to identify misreporting firms. After identifying misreporting firms, I assume 
real R&D expenses of misreporting firms equal to the reported R&D expenses that 
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exclude abnormal SG&A as these reduced abnormal SG&A may be the reason for 
increased R&D or even the obtained R&D tax credits. I also assume that non-
misreporting firms' R&D expenses are their reported R&D expenses. Then the 
coefficient on MRDCR can be used to test Hypothesis 2 that R&D tax credits encourage 
more R&D spending. MRDCR measures the marginal R&D tax credit rate, the R&D tax 
credit generated by the last dollar of R&D spending. Consistent with existing literature, I 
expect current-year R&D expenditures to be positively related to the tax benefit of R&D 
expenditures. Therefore, I predict that a 1 is positive. 
Different from prior literature, MRDCR is derived from hand-collected R&D tax 
credit amounts reported in the 1 0-K filing. It is measured as the current-year R&D tax 
credits divided by the change in R&D expenditures from the previous year to the current 
year. If a firm does not disclose its R&D tax credits in the footnotes or only discloses its 
R&D tax credit carryforwards, I assume that the firms do not earn R&D tax credits in the 
current year. Thus, I set these firms' MRDCR equal to zero. 
Control variables in equation (2) include the investment opporturiities, firms' 
operating environment, institutional ownership, and other factors that affect the demand 
for, and the supply of, R&D spending consistent with prior literature (Berger 1993; 
Klassen et al. 2004; Brown and Krull 2008; Hirshleifer et al. 2012). Following Berger 
(1993) and Klassen et al. (2004), I include TobinQ and RD1_1 to control for the firm's 
investment opportunity. RD1• 1· can also be the instrumental variable as R&D investments 
tend to last more than a year and the sustained prior projects may influence decisions 
about current R&D expenditures (Gupta et al. 2011). I use the same measure for TobinQ 
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as defined for equation (4). RDt-1 is the natural logarithm of R&D (xrd) in the prior year. 
Prior studies (Berger 1993; Brown et al. 2009) indicate that firms with more investment 
opportunities have higher demand for R&D and thus invest in more R&D. Therefore, I 
expect positive coefficients on TobinQ and RDt-1· 
A firm 's operating environment affects its R&D investment decisions. To control for 
the influence of operating environment, I include the alternative measure for fum size 
(SALE) , current profitability (ROA) , the volatility of the current performance (sdCF and 
sdSALE), leverage (Lev), and cash holdings (Cash). Consistent with prior studies, I make 
no prediction for firm size (SALE) , which is measured as the natural log of current sales 
(Bens et al. 2002; Gupta et al. 2011). Existing research also fmds evidence that firms with 
poor operating performance, low leverage, and high cash holdings tend to have higher 
R&D expenditures (Hirshleifer et al. 2012). I measure the firm performance as the ratio 
of current earnings to current total assets (ROA). Lev is defined previously in the test of 
Hl. Cash is measured as cash divided by total assets in the current year. Consistent with 
the fmdings in Hirshleifer et al. (2012), I expect negative coefficients on ROA and Lev, 
and a positive coefficient on cash holdings. Standard deviation of cash flow (sdCF) and 
standard deviation of sales (sdSALE) are proxies for the volatility of the fum' s 
performance. The volatility of a firm's current performance may also affect the firm ' s 
willingness to invest in R&D. Therefore, I expect a negative coefficient on the volatility 
of the fum's current performance. 
Firms' institutional shareholders can reduce firms' incentives to cut R&D spending 
(Bushee 1998). When a firm faces constraints of short-term earnings such as an earnings 
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decrease or a loss, it is more likely to reduce R&D (Klassen et al. 2004; Brown and Krull 
2008). Thus, the institutional ownership is one of the factors that induce or maintain firms' 
R&D spending. Therefore, I include the institutional ownership (InstOwn) and the 
indicator for a firm's negative earnings (NegEarn) and the interaction term between these 
two variables. As institutional shareholders can reduce firms' myopic R&D investments, 
I expect a positive coefficient on InstOwn and the interaction term. Moreover, Klassen et 
al. (2004) and Brown and Krull (2008) indicate that firms facing the earnings constraint 
are more likely to reduce R&D. However, some firms manage earnings by increasing 
R&D (Singer et al. 2012; Sun 2013), so these firms with losses may still invest in R&D. 
Therefore, the relation between NegEarn and RD can be positive or negative. 
4.5 Test ofH3: R&D Performance of R&D Tax Credit Users vs. Non-R&D tax 
credit users 
To investigate the impact of R&D tax credits on R&D performance, I use first-time 
R&D tax credit users and the propensity-score matched control sample. First, to test H3a 
about how R&D tax credits affect R&D quality, I estimate the following regressions: 
FCite = a 0 + a 1ExcQRE + ."lJ31Controls + ]_:J3mlndustry+ Lf3nYear + B (6) 
The dependent variables in equations (5) and (6) are the ratio of forward citations to 
backward citations weighted recursively (PatRnk) and the number of forward citations 
per patent (FCite), respectively. PatRnk measures the intrinsic value of a firm's total 
patents, and FCite measures the average quality of a firm's each patent. Both of them are 
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proxies for the firm's innovation quality. Because PatRnk represents the patents' intrinsic 
value (Shaffer 2011) and FCite indicates the impact of the current patent on future 
patents, both can represent the success of the current and past R&D (Griliches 1990). 
FCite has been widely used in various literatures related to R&D or patents (e.g., Hall et 
al. 2005; Hirshleifer et al. 2012). However, FCite assumes that each forward citation is 
weighted equally as each citing patent has the same value. PatRnk is a more precise 
measure as it considers forward citations, backward citations, and their relative 
importance within the entire network to assess each individual patent through the lifetime 
of each patent (Shaffer 2011). 
A firm' s PatRnk is measured as the log of the summation of each patent's total patent 
rank scores. Each score is from the Commercialization Research on Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship (CRIE) database. The scores I use here are from the marginal-combined 
(me) Patent Rank model in Shaffer (2011). The model captures recent utility of a patent 
and its stock value to the fmn while accounting for the technological overlap of a patent 
and its citation. The minimal value of the score is equal to 1 when the patent has no 
forward citation. The scores are distributed as nonlinear S-curve. Therefore, to adjust a 
firm ' s patent rank distribution to be normally distributed, PatRnk is measured as the 
natural logarithm of a fum's total patent ranks. 
FCite is measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of the adjusted citation 
count across all patents applied for by the firm during the year, consistent with 
Hirshleifer et al. (2012). Each patent's citation count is scaled by the average citation 
count of all patents in the same technology class and year. FCite is measured as the 
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average number of four-year-ahead patent citations generated by a firm's currently 
applied patents (FCite4) and as one-year ahead patent citations (FCitel). As large firms 
have a legal department that handles intellectual-property-related applications, they are 
more likely to have more patents (Hall et al. 2005). Therefore, I use the number of 
current patents as the deflator for FCite. 
The test variable ExcQRE for both equations is a proxy for research eligible for R&D 
tax credits. The eligible research is the current QRE that exceeds the base amount, where 
the base amount is defmed as: 
Base1 = max[(± Lk
4
=
1 
Gross Receipt t-k) x min(16%; t 'f G Q~, . J, 50% x QRE1 ] 
1=1984 ross ecezpt 1 
(7) 
Since there is no publicly available data for QREs, I use hand-collected data of currently 
earned R&D tax credit amounts to estimate the eligible research (i.e., excess QREs). 
Because the federal R&D tax credit is 20 percent of excess QREs net of tax, I measure 
ExcQRE as the current credit divided by [.2 x (! - statutory tax rate)]. The current credit 
refers to a fum's earned R&D tax credit disclosed in footnotes of current year's 10-K. 
Therefore, a non-qualifying firm's ExcQRE equals 0. H3a predicts that R&D tax credit 
users' qualified research generate higher innovation quality than non-R&D tax credit 
users, i.e., a 1s are positive in equations (5) and (6). 
Firm-level controls for both equations include R&D expenditures other than excess 
QREs (OthRD) and the variables examined in prior research that affect patenting 
activities. OthRD is a proxy for a fum's R&D expenditures below or equal to the base 
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amount. Namely, OthRD represents unqualified R&D expenditures or the base amount of 
qualified R&D expenditures. I measure OthRD as the current R&D expenditure minus 
ExcQRE. Therefore, OthRD of a non-R&D tax credit user equals its current R&D 
expenditure. Both OthRD and ExcQRE are scaled by current sales. 
· Following Hall and Ziedonis (2001), I include controls for firm size and capital 
intensity, as these would affect a firm's patenting activities. Firm size (SALE) is the 
natural logarithm of sales. Capital intensity (Caplnt) is measured by the natural logarithm 
of the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to the number of employees. Aghion et 
al. (2009) show that institutional shareholdings positively influence innovative activities, 
so I include the percentage of shares held by institutional investors (InstOwn). As a firm's 
investing opportunities and ability may affect their patenting, I also include the additional 
variables used in Hirshleifer et al. (2012): BHAR (buy-and-hold abnormal return over the 
current year), ROA (ratio of current operating income before depreciation to current book 
assets) and Cash (ratio of current cash to current total assets). 
Next, to test H3b how R&D tax credits affect firms' future profitability, I estimate the 
following regressions: 
(8) 
The dependent variable FE refers to future profitability, measured as the one-year-
ahead earnings divided by one-year-ahead sales (FEJ) and the earnings divided by sales 
over five subsequent years (FE5) , because the average life of R&D is five years. 
Consistent with Lev and Sougiannis ( 1996) and Ciftci and Cready (20 11 ), I measure 
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earnings as the operating income before depreciation, advertising and R&D expenditures. 
The dependent variable captures the future profits generated by the R&D intensive firm. 
The coefficient on ExcQRE (a1) allows me to capture the effect of R&D tax credits on 
R&D tax credit users' future earnings attributed to excess QREs relative to non-R&D tax 
credit users' future earnings attributed to unqualified R&D. As R&D tax credits may 
drive R&D tax credit users to choose R&D projects with lower expected NPV, I expect 
that a 1 is negative in my regression. 
I include firm market value (MV), tangible assets (TanATS) , and market to book ratio 
(MTB) as controls, consistent with the model in Ciftci and Cready (20 11 ). As there are 
likely unobservable effects from industries or time variance, I include industry and year 
indicators to control for the industry and year fixed effects. MV is measured as the natural 
logarithm of equity market value. Consistent with Lev and Sougiannis (1996), TanATS is 
measured as tangible assets, the summation of plant property and equipment, inventory, 
investments and advances-equity, and investment and advances-other. The market-to-
book ratio (MTB) is measured as current market value of equity divided by current book 
value of equity. To avoid the right skewed problem, I divide OthRD, ExcQRE, and 
TanATS by current sales to adjust the distribution of observations, consistent with the 
adjustments in Ciftci and Cready (2011). As firms' ownership, investing opportunities 
and ability, and business complexity may affect their performance, I further include the 
additional variables used in Hirshleifer et al. (2012): institutional ownership, ROA, cash 
holdings, leverage, capital intensity, and the number of segments. 
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Finally, to test how R&D tax credits affect R&D risk (H3c), I estimate the following . 
regressiOns: 
The dependent variable, Std _RET, is measured as the standard deviation of current 
stock returns. As a firm's stock returns reflect its expected future cash flow, a firm's 
stock return volatility attributed to R&D reflects its R&D risk. The primary variable is 
ExcQRE, and the controls are the same as those in the test for H3b. H3c states that R&D 
tax credits incentivize R&D tax credit users to choose R&D projects with higher risk. 
Therefore, I predict that a 1 is positive. 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
5.1.1 Characteristics ofR&D Tax Credit Users 
· Tables 2 through 5 report the information related to characteristics of R&D tax credit 
users. The information includes R&D tax credit amounts or rates, R&D intensity, and 
innovation during the sample period from 1997 to 2007. This also includes R&D 
intensity from 1984 to 1988. These tables classify R&D tax credit users by industry and 
fiscal year, and each classification categorizes the users by the types of their R&D tax 
credit usages. 
SpeCifically, Tables 2 and 3 present the cross-sectional and the time-series 
distributions for R&D tax credit users. Table 4 details the descriptive statistics. In Table 5 
I discuss the differences between my sample (i.e., the actual R&D tax credit users) and 
the estimated R&D tax credit users following prior literature (e.g., Klassen et al. 2004; 
Brown and Krull 2008). 
Table 2 Panel A presents the number and the percentage of firms that use R&D tax 
credits (hereafter, denoted as R&D tax credit firms) by industries. Because not all R&D 
tax credit firms disclose R&D tax credit amounts or R&D tax credit rates, those with the 
disclosure of the amounts or the rates are the subset of R&D tax credit firms. Therefore, 
this panel includes the full sample of R&D tax credit firms and the subsample of those 
with the disclosed R&D tax credit amounts. R&D tax credit firms with R&D tax credit 
amounts are classified into 37 2-digit SIC industries. The two industries that do not 
disclose the credit amount are water transportation and health services. 
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<See Table 2, Panel A> 
Panel A also shows that the top fiveindustries are those with the first two-digit SIC 
codes being: 73, 28, 36, 38, or 35 when ranked by the number of firms. Hereafter, I refer 
these industries as "the top five industries." Specifically, most of the R&D tax credit 
firms are concentrated in computer software and data services, which ·accounts for 
20.77% of all the R&D tax credit firms. After that industry, the top four industries with 
the most R&D tax credit users are: chemical, biotech and drug (19.96%), electrical and 
electronic components (16.75%), medical and scientific instruments (16.66%), and 
machinery and computer equipment (11.80%). Far different from "the top five 
industries", 2.63% of R&D tax credit firms account for the sixth ranked industry, which 
is transportation equipment. 
Panel B differentiates R&D tax credit firms into three subsamples by their R&D tax 
credit usages. These subsamples are concentrated in the same top five industries as the 
full sample. The subsamples are the R&D tax credit firms that continuously use R&D tax 
credits each year (continuous R&D tax credit users), those that use, stop, and then use 
R&D tax credits (use-stop-use R&D tax credit users), and those in other conditions (other 
R&D tax credit users).24 Continuous R&D tax credit users account for 26.23%; use-stop-
use R&D tax credit users account for 16.86%. Most of R&D tax credit users belong to the 
category of other R&D tax credit users, around 56.91% of total R&D tax credit firms. 
24 Other conditions include three types of R&D tax credit users: those that use R&D tax credits at 
beginning and then stop during the sample period, those that do not start using R&D tax credits 
until some year during the sample period and continue using the credit at least until the end of the 
sample period, and those that use R&D tax credits during some consecutive years of the sample 
period. 
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<See Table 2, Panel B> 
Panel B also details the distribution of each type of the credit users in different 
industries. While other R&D tax credit users are in 35 industries, the continuous R&D tax 
credit users are in 15 industries and the use-stop-use R&D tax credit users are in 22 
industries. Besides, not every industry has three types of R&D tax credit firms. 
Specifically, 16 industries have one type of R&D tax credit users; 10 industries have two 
types of R&D tax credit users; 13 industries have all three types of R&D tax credit users. 
When ranked by the number of R&D tax credit fiims, "the top five industries" have all 
three types of R&D tax credit users while the bottom twelve industries have only one 
type of R&D tax credit user, either the use-stop .. use R&D tax credit users or other R&D 
tax credit users. 
Table 3 presents the time-series .distribution for R&D tax credit firms with the credit 
amount disclosures. Panel A shows that most users are those with the fiscal year end in 
December as most of them are in manufacturing industries. The largest number of R&D 
tax credit users is concentrated in the 2005 fiscal year, especially the users whose fiscal · 
year ended in December 2005. Because the credit provision in 2004 was only extended 
until December 31 , 2005 and Congress in 2005 did not extend it, firms may have felt 
uncertain to earn R&D tax credit. Thus, 2005 wa,s the fiscal year with most R&D tax 
credit users during the sample period. 
<See-Table 3, Panel A> 
In the table, the fiscal year of 1996 has the least number of R&D tax credit users 
because the sample only contains five months in the calendar year of early 1997. 
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Additionally, most R&D tax credit users are the December-year-end firms. To compare 
1996 with other years, I calculate the hypothetical number of users in 1996. To 
hypothetically include the users from September to December in 1996, it would be 
around 3 70 firms as the number of the users in the 1996 fiscal year, since the enactment 
of R&D tax credit extension in 1996.25 According to the hypothetical calculation for the 
number of the users in 1996, 1997 . becomes the actual fiscal year with the smallest 
number of R&D tax credit users. From 1997 to 2005 there is an increasing trend of using 
R&D tax credit until 2005 in general. 
Panel B shows the number of years an R&D tax credit user earns its R&D tax credits. 
Approximately 80% of the overall R&D tax credit users earn R&D tax credits over one to 
six years. Similarly, in. the subsample of continuous R&D tax credit users, most of them 
earn R&D tax credits consecutively over one to six years. Most of use-stop-use R&D tax 
credit users also earn R&D tax credit within six years while the years of credit usages are .. 
not consecutive. In contrast, most of other R&D tax credit users earn R&D tax credits for 
only three years. 
< See Table 3, Panel B> 
The largest proportion ofthe users only earn R&D tax credits for two years in the full 
sample and in the two subsamples of different types of users, except for use-stop-use 
R&D tax credit users. For use-stop-use R&D tax credit users, most of them use the credit 
25 To obtain the hypothetical sample size in a full fiscal year of 1996 since the extension of R&D 
tax credits on 8/20/1996, I first calculate the proportion of R&D tax credit users from January to 
May from fiscal year of 1997 to 2006 (606 users) accounting for the users from January to May 
and from September to December from fiscal year of 1997 to 2006 (4,231 users). Then I divide 
4 7 R&D tax credit firms in fiscal year of 1996 by the proportion of users and get the 
hypothetically full sample during fiscal year of 1996 since the R&D tax credit extension. 
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for four years. On the other hand, very few firms earn R&D tax credit for the whole 11 
years during the sample period from 1997 to 2007 ·(e.g., around 2% of the overall R&D 
tax credit users). Overall, most firms use R&D tax credit for less than half of the sample 
period. 
Panel C demonstrates the time-series distribution of fust-time R&D tax credit users. 
Similar to Panel A of Table 2, Panel C of Table 3 shows that in appearance very few 
first-time R&D tax credit users earn the credit in fiscal year of 1996. The reason is that 
only a five-month sample is collected in fiscal year of 1996. After the calculation to 
obtain the hypothetical sample in a full year, 1996 becomes the fiscal year with the most 
first-time R&D tax credit users (i.e., 372 users) during the sample period?6 Besides, most 
first-time users are manufacturers because 64.2% of their annual reports are calendar year 
ended. With regard to the time-series changes in first-time users, the number of the fust-
time R&D tax credit users decreases from 3 72 in 1996 to 115 in 1999. Afterwards, there 
are two peaks during the sample·period, 135 users in 2000 and 120 users in 2005. 
<See Table 3, Panel C> 
Panel C further differentiates first-time users into three types of users according to 
their R&D tax credit usages from column 3 to 5. Disregarding the fiscal year of 1996 as it 
does not contain the sample of a full year, most firms of all types start to earn R&D tax 
credits for the first time in fiscal year of 1997. It is possible because 1997 is the first year 
26 I first calculate the proportion offrrst-time R&D tax credit users from January to May from 
fiscal year of 1997 to 2006 (147 users) accounting for the users from January to May and from 
September to December from fiscal year of 1997 to 2006 (1 ,067 users). Then I divide 53 frrst-
time R&D tax credit frrms in fiscal year of 1996 by the proportion of users and get the 
hypothetically full sample during fiscal year of 1996 since the R&D tax credit extension. 
61 
that Congress announced reinstating R&D tax credits after almost two-year temporary 
expiration. Nevertheless, the time-series distributions of first-time users are different 
among three types of R&D tax credit users. In particular, each type of users has the 
smallest number of users in different years. For instance, first-time continuous users have 
the smallest number of users in 2001 and 2002, while others have the smallest number in 
different years. This suggests that the time effect is different depending on which year 
each type of users starts earning R&D tax credits. 
Panel D demonstrates the distribution of R&D tax credit users by fiscal year and by 
industry for the full sample and the subsample of users with three types of R&D tax 
credit usages. In each year, all types of R&D tax credit users are dominated by "the top 
five industries." While the rank among "the top five industries" is different for different 
types of R&D tax credit users, most firms of all types are concentrated in computer 
software and data services in each year. 
<See Table 3, Panel D> 
In addition to the information provided in these panels, there are 580 first-time users 
with zero R&D spending. This sample accounts for less than 10% of the first-time users 
in each year in the sample period. The decreasing trend of R&D tax credit users with zero 
R&D spending over time suggests that more and more users start spending R&D after 
earning R&D tax credits. Panel D presents the frequency of first-time users by industry, 
type of R&D tax credit usage, and by fiscal year. Similar to the distribution shown in 
Panel D, the 1997 fiscal year is the year with most R&D tax credit users for each of "the 
top five industries." 
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Table 4 Panel A presents descriptive statistics of mne variables among the 
subsamples of three types of R&D tax credit users. First, on average other R&D tax 
credit users have the highest R&D tax credit amounts, but use-stop-use R&D tax credit 
users have the highest marginal R&D tax credit rate. Notably, use-stop-use R&D tax 
credit users have the lowest R&D tax credit amount of $31.868 million. These suggest 
that use-stop-use users have relatively small incremental R&D as the denominator for the 
calculation of marginal R&D tax credit rates. 
<See Table 4, Panel A> 
Additionally, continuous R&D tax credit users have the lowest mean of marginal 
R&D tax credit rate, which is 1.9%. The rate is also lower than the average in the full 
sample of R&D tax credit users. However, their average R&D credit amount is not the 
lowest. In terms of the amount, for the continuous R&D tax credit users, the average is 
$39.053 million; for other R&D tax credit users, the average is $44.053 million. Only the 
other R&D tax credit users have the higher average of R&D tax credit amounts than the 
amounts for overall users. 
Second, in terms of R&D intensity, continuous R&D tax credit users spend more than 
the other two types of R&D tax credit users. On average, they spend 69 cents of R&D out 
of their one dollar of revenue, while use-stop-use R&D tax credit users and other R&D 
tax credit users spend 60.2 cents and 46.5 cents of R&D per revenue, respectively. The 
large number of observations in chemical, biotech, and drug industries and their high 
R&D intensities result in these high average R&D intensities for each type of users. 
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Additionally, only the average amount spent by other R&D tax credit users is less than 
the average spent by the overall R&D tax credit users. 
Third, in terms of the innovation, the ranking shows mixed evidence. The use-stop-
use R&D tax credit users have the highest patent rank and patent counts based on either 
application year or grant year. Besides, their patent rank and patent counts are more than 
the mean for overall R&D tax credit users. However, the continuous R&D tax credit 
users have the most one-year-ahead and four-year-ahead forward citations per patent, and 
their forward citations are also more than the average for overall R&D tax credit users. 
Fourth, the use-stop-use R&D tax credit users have the highest estimated fixed base 
percentage. Their estimated fixed base percentage is measured as the average ratio of 
R&D to sales during 1984 through 1988, which is 73.16%. This high ·average is due to 
the large number of observations in chemical, biotech and drug and the R&D intensities 
are high in these industries. The estimated fixed base percentage is 26.48% for the 
continuous R&D tax credit users, and 14.67% for other R&D tax credit users. The 
average estimated fixed base percentage is 25 .16% for overall the credit users. Therefore, 
on average, only use-stop-use R&D tax credit users have relatively higher estimated fixed 
base percentage than overall credit users. 
In Panel B of Table 4, I discuss the following results about the frequency of the users 
in "the top five industries." Differences exist between the industry with the second most 
R&D tax credit observations and the industry with the second largest number of R&D tax 
credit firms during the sample period between 1997 and 2007. Specifically, the electrical 
and electronic industries are the ones with the second most R&D tax credit firm-year 
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observations while they are the industries with the third largest number of R&D tax credit 
firms in Panel A of Table 2. The industry with the third most observations is chemical, 
biotech and drug, which is the industry with the second largest number of R&D tax credit 
firms in Panel A of Table 2. 
<See Table 4, Panel B> 
There are some differences among "the top five industries." First, in the industry with 
the most R&D tax credit users (computer software and data services), on average R&D 
credit amounts are $32.503 million. While this is the industry with the most R&D tax 
credit users, its average R&D credit amount is the least average amount among "the top 
five industries." The amount is ranked as fourteen among all industries. Besides, the 
amount is 45.77% of the highest average credit amount among "the top five industries." 
On average, the highest average credit amount is $59.930 million dollars for the R&D tax 
credit users in chemical, biotech and drug. Their variance of the credit amount is also the 
highest among "the top five industries." Besides, the credit amount is $37.751 million for 
R&D tax credit users in electrical and electronic, $3 3. 918 .million for . those in medical 
and scientific instruments, and $33.748 million for those in machinery and computer 
equipment. Compared to the subsamples (continuous R&D tax credit users, use-stop-use 
R&D tax credit users, and other R&D tax credit users), overall R&D tax credit users have 
the highest average amount shown in the same industry of chemical, biotech and drug 
among "the top five industries." 
In terms of marginal R&D tax credit rates, means range from 2.0% to 2.7% for "the 
top five industries", while the highest average is approximately 23.5% in the industries of 
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transportation services and motion pictures for overall R&D tax credit users in the 
untabulated results. Overall R&D tax credit users have the highest average marginal 
R&D tax credit rates in the same industry of chemical, biotech, and drug as the 
subsample of other R&D tax credit users. Relatively, the highest average marginal R&D 
tax credit rate is in machinery and computer equipment for continuous R&D tax credit 
users and in electrical and electronic components for use-stop-use R&D tax credit users. 
In addition, the standard deviation is around 20% for all types of R&D tax credit users in 
"the top five industries." 
In terms of R&D intensity, chemical, biotech and drug is the industry with the highest 
mean and standard deviation of R&D intensity for all types of users among "the top five 
industries." There is a large difference in R&D intensity among "the top five industries." 
For example, the averages range from 0.139 to 2.202 among "the top five industries" for 
overall R&D tax credit users. Overall, average R&D intensity of "the top five industries" · 
are all ranked within top ten among all the industries. 
Regarding the mean of innovation among "the top five industries", using different 
proxies result in different rankings among the industries. For overall R&D tax credit 
users, on average, the users in machinery and computer equipment have the most one-
year-ahead (0.381) and four-year-ahead forward citations per patent (1.468), while the 
users in electrical and electronic components have the highest patent rank (2.286) and the 
highest patent counts (21.36 in application year and 15.436 in grant year) . Comparatively, 
the users in chemical, biotech and drug have the least average number of one-year-ahead 
(0.123) and four-year-ahead forward citations per patent (0.466), while the users in 
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computer software and data services have the lowest average patent rank (0.676) and the 
fewest patent counts (3.512 in application year and 2.751 in grant year). 
Except for continuous R&D tax credit users, the average one-year-ahead and four-
year-ahead forward citations per patent are the highest in machinery and computer 
equipment for overall R&D tax credit users and the other two types of R&D tax credit 
users among "the top five industries." For continuous R&D tax credit users, the mean of 
forward citations is the highest in electrical and electronic components. 
In terms of· average patent rank, the lowest rank is in computer software and data 
services for all types of R&D tax credit users among "the top five industries." For overall 
R&D tax credit users, as for the subsample of continuous and use-stop-use R&D tax 
credit users, the highest average patent rank is in the same industry of electrical and 
electronic components among "the top five industries." For other R&D tax users, the 
highest average patent rank is in chemical, biotech, and drug. Besides, for each type of 
R&D tax credit users among "the top five industries", the highest mean of patent rank is 
approximately two or three, while the lowest mean is less than one. 
In terms of average patent counts, most types. of R&D tax credit users have the most 
patents in electrical and electronic components while not every type · of users have the 
most patents in the same industry among "the top five industries." In particular, the 
highest average number of patents is 40.373 in electrical and electronic components for 
use-stop-use R&D tax credit users. In addition, every type of R&D tax credit users has 
the lowest mean of patent counts in the same industry (computer software and data 
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services). On average, the lowest number of patents ranges from 2.421 to 5.361 m 
computer software and data services for different types of R&D tax credit users. 
In the following three paragraphs, I discuss the untabulated results of the time-series 
changes in descriptive statistics for overall R&D tax credit users and the subsamples of 
three types of R&D tax credit users from fiscal year of 1996 to 2007. Starting with R&D 
tax credit amounts and marginal rates, on average, the bottom two amounts and rates are 
in 1999 ($31.429 million and 1.34%) and in 2003 ($36.053 million and 0.25%) for 
overall R&D tax credit users. Their highest average amount ($50.797 million) happened 
in 2007 and the highest average marginal rate occurred in 2000 (3.96%). Different from 
overall R&D tax credit users, continuous have the highest average amounts in 1998 
($45.346 million), and use-stop-use R&D tax credit users have the highest average 
amounts in 1996 ($53 .553 million). The highest average marginal rates for these two 
types of users also are incurred in different years 1997 (4.29%) and 2004 (6.48%), 
respectively. On the other hand, the highest average amounts ($57.434 million) and rates 
(4.35%) happened in the same year, 2007, for other R&D tax credit users. Overall, these 
results suggest that variations in R&D tax credit amounts and rates exist over years and 
across users with different types of R&D tax credit usages. 
With regard to R&D intensity, the highest average happened in the mid-2000, from 
2005 to 2007 for other (87.26%), use-stop-use (86.82%), and continuous R&D tax credit 
users (156%), respectively. These high average R&D intensities are attributed to the 
R&D intensities of the users in chemical, biotech, and drug industries. Overall users have 
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the highest average in the same year as continuous R&D tax credit users. Relatively, all 
types of R&D tax credit users have the lowest average in the same fiscal year of 1996. 
Turning to innovation measures, I will first discuss one-'year-ahead and four-year-
ahead forward citations. Except for continuous users (0.589 in 1996), 1999 is the fiscal 
year with the highest average one-year-ahead forward citations for all other users (0.618 
for use-stop-use uses; 0.443 for other users) ; except for other users (1.765 in 1999), 1996 
is the fiscal year with the highest average four-year-ahead forward citations for all other 
users (2.538 for continuous users; 2.854 for use-stop-use users). By contrast, 2007 is the 
fiscal year with the lowest one-year-ahead (0.035 for continuous users; 0.016 for use-
stop-use users; 0.028 for other users) and four-year-ahead forward citations for all types 
of R&D tax credit users (0.080 for continuous users; 0.050 for stop-use users; 0.074 for 
other users). Very different from the citation measure, the average patent rank is highest 
in 2004 for overall R&D tax credit users (2.020), in 2003 for the subsample of continuous 
R&D tax credit users (2.161 ), in 2004 for other R&D tax credit users (1.91 0), and in 2006 
for use-stop-use R&D tax credit users (2.332). The lowest average patent rank occurred 
in 1996 for most types of R&D tax credit users and in 1997 for other R&D tax credit 
users. In terms of patent counts by application year, continuous users have the highest 
average in 2002 (19.549), overall and other R&D tax credit users have the highest 
average in 1997 (22.278 and 30.365 respectively), and use-stop-use R&D tax credit users 
in 1996 (24.455). Also, the lowest average patent counts happened in 2007 for all types 
of R&D tax credit users. In terms of patent counts by grant year, each type of users has 
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their highest or lowest average in different years while overall users have the highest 
average in 1997 (12.845) and lowest average in 2000 (7.605). 
Panel C of Table 4 states the distribution of marginal R&D tax credits for the full 
sample of R&D tax credit users. The missing value of marginal R&D tax credit rates is 
because firms do not disclose R&D tax credit amount or because firms do not earn R&D 
tax credit in the previous year. Most firms have the marginal R&D tax credit rates 
ranging from 0 to 10% each year or over the whole sample period from 1997 to 2007, and 
these firms account for 64.97% of total observations. By contrast, very few firms have 
marginal R&D tax credit rates greater than 80% over the sample period. Overall, the 
number of R&D tax credit users steadily increases until 2005 and slowly decreases since 
then, while it does not change much during the sample period from 1997 to 2007. 
<See Table 4, Panel C> 
Table 5 shows the differences between the hand-collected sample of R&D tax credit 
users and the R&D tax credit users identified by using R&D expenditures in Compustat 
to estimate R&D tax credits as done in prior literature, such as Klassen et al. 2004. 
Hereafter, the estimated R&D tax credit users refers to the R&D tax credit users 
identified using estimated R&D tax credits. The hand-collected sample of R&D tax credit 
users is the actual sample of R&D tax credit users. 
<See Table 5> · 
Panels A and B of Table 5 identify the type I and type II error results. Specifically, 
the type-1-error sample contains 1,530 firms, or 5,377 observations in the sample period 
from 1997 to 2007. That is, using R&D expenditures in Compustat to identify R&D tax 
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credit users over-classify the 1,530 firms (5,377 observations) as the actual R&D tax 
credit users. Besides, 305 firms (1,618 observations) are under-identified. Namely, if 
using R&D expenditures in Compustat to identify R&D tax credit users, I cannot fmd the 
1,618 actual R&D tax credit users, which belongs to the type-II-error sample. Overall, 
type I errors account for 46.06%, calculated as 5,377 of the falsely identified sample 
divided by 11 ,675 of the actual non-R&D tax credit users. Type II errors accounts for 
30.15%, computed as 1,618 of the falsely unidentified sample divided by 5,367 of the 
actual R&D tax credit users. 
Panels C and D detail the descriptive statistics for the falsely identified and the falsely 
unidentified samples to compare the type I and the type II errors. On average, the samples 
of both errors have relatively higher R&D intensity, but -lower R&D expenditures and 
innovation than the correctly identified sample. In Panel D, I test and fmd that the 
differences are significant between the type-II-error sample and the correctly identified 
sample in R&D expenditures, R&D intensity and innovation quality. As both samples are 
actual R&D tax credit users, there is no significant difference in their average R&D tax 
credit amounts or average marginal rates. 
In Panel E, I also compare and find the significant differences between the average or 
median estimated R&D tax credit amounts (rates) and the average or median actual R&D 
tax credit amounts (rates). These differences between estimated R&D tax credits and 
actual R&D tax credits are mainly attributed to the differences between R&D and QREs. 
The R&D tax credit amount or rate from a firm's annual reports allows for accurate 
measurement of the R&D tax credit. In addition, it allows for unbiased assessment of 
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fum characteristics for R&D tax credit users and the impact on R&D spending and R&D 
performance. 
5.1.2 R&D Tax Credit Users versus Non-R&D tax credit users 
Table 6 shows the summary statistics of the variables in the full sample for each 
hypothesis in each Panel. As each test has a different sample size for each hypothesis, I 
separate the descriptive statistics by the hypothesis test in Panels A through E. The 
summary statistics include mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum. I 
use an independent samples t-test (a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) to compare the mean 
(median) of the variables in each hypothesis test between firm-years with R&D tax 
credits (hereafter, R&D tax credit users) and fum-years without R&D tax credits 
(hereafter, non-R&D tax credit users). 
<See Table 6> 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the variables in Hypothesis 1. There are 
17,042 firm-year observations (3,869 unique firms), including 5,367 R&D tax credit 
firm-years (1,483 R&D tax credit fums) and 11,675 non-R&D tax credit firm-years 
(2,3 86 non- R&D tax credit fums ). This Panel shows that the differences in all of the test 
variables for hypotheses 1 are statistically significant between R&D tax credit users and 
non-R&D tax credit users. Specifically, using the natural log oftotal assets as the proxy, 
the average (median) size is $149.008 ($129.709) million for R&D tax users and $98.988 
($77.000) million for non-R&D tax users. Regarding technology intensity, on average, 
around half of both R&D tax credit users and non-R&D tax credit users are high tech 
firms, while it is slightly higher for the proportion of R&D tax credit users in high tech. 
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Regarding prior success in patenting, the full sample, R&D tax credit users, and non-
R&D tax credit users on average applied for 0.777, 1.029, and 0.589 patents in the prior 
year, respectively. Around 15.5% of R&D tax users and 6.8% ofnon-R&D tax users are 
R&D leaders in their industry; around 35.7% of R&D tax users and 25.5% of non-R&D 
tax users have stock options outstanding in the current year. Overall, the average research 
ability is economically and statistically significantly higher for R&D tax credit users than 
non-R&D tax credit users. 
Regarding tax advantages, on average, 37.6% of R&D tax credit users have taxable 
profits, and 33.7% of non-R&D tax credit users have taxable profits. 53.6% of R&D tax 
credit users and 52.2% of non-R&D tax credit users are the R&D startups. On average, 
more R&D tax credit users have tax advantages than non-R&D tax credit users. 
Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for the variables in Hypothesis 2. After 
propensity score matching, the sample reduces to 573 pairs for the test of Hypothesis 2. 
Regarding the dependent variables, on average, R&D tax credit users spend $25.167 
million in reported R&D while non-R&D tax credit users spend $21.681 million in 
reported R&D; on average, R&D tax credit users spend $25.146 million in adjusted R&D 
while non-R&D tax credit users spend $21.668 million in adjusted R&D. This indicates 
that R&D tax credit users have marginally higher R&D expenditures. With respect to the 
test variable, the mean (median) marginal R&D tax credit rate is 5.7% (0) for R&D tax 
users. Besides, the averages of some controls are significantly higher for R&D tax credit 
users than for non-R&D tax credit users, including investment opportunities (RD1_1 and 
TobinQ) , operating performance (ROA), Cash, and InstOwn. On the contrary, the 
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averages of other controls are significantly lower for R&D tax credit users. These include 
Lev, SALE, NegEarn, and the volatility of the firm' s performance (sdSALE and sdSALE). 
Panel C presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in testing Hypothesis 
3a. After propensity score matching, the sample reduces to 1,399 pairs for the test of 
Hypothesis 3a. Starting with the dependent variable, R&D tax credit users produce 
significantly higher innovation quality than non-R&D tax credit users no matter which 
measure of the three measures of innovation quality is used. Specifically, on average 
PatRnk is 3.38 (=exp (1.217)) for R&D tax credit users and 3.16 (=exp (1.152)) for non-
R&D tax credit users. The difference in PatRnk between them is significantly positive 
only in the median but not in the mean. Additionally, the mean (median) is 0.183 (0) cite 
per patent for R&D tax credit users and 0.138 (0) cite per patent for non-R&D tax credit 
users, and the difference in the mean is significantly statistically positive. Similarly, on 
average R&D tax credit users have significantly higher four-year-ahead forward citations. 
R&D tax credit users have significantly higher OthRD than non-R&D tax credit users. 
On average, R&D tax credit users spend 81 cents of excess QREs per revenue and 28.4 
cents in other R&D per revenue. By contrast, non-R&D tax credit users on average spend 
22.6 cents perrevenue in R&D, and none of the money is qualified for R&D tax credits. 
Panel D presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in testing Hypothesis 
3b. After propensity score matching, the sample reduces to 1,365 pairs for the test of 
Hypothesis 3b. Starting with the dependent variable, this Panel shows that on average 
R&D tax credit users produce similar future pre-tax profitability with non-R&D tax credit 
users while the median of pre-tax profitability is significantly higher for R&D tax credit 
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users than non-R&D tax credit users. In particular, the mean (median) one-year-ahead 
profitability is $0.046 ($0.163) per dollar sale for R&D tax credit users and $0.046 
($0.114) per dollar sale for non-R&D tax credit users. In terms of the test variable, R&D 
tax credit users have significantly higher OthRD than non-R&D tax credit users. 
Finally, Panel E shows the descriptive statistics for the variables in Hypothesis 3c. 
After propensity score matching, the sample reduces to 1,395 pairs for the test of 
Hypothesis 3c. Starting with the dependent variable, on average R&D tax credit users 
produce higher return volatility than non-R&D tax credit users as; economically speaking, 
the difference in means is 1.1 %. Specifically, the mean (median) stock return volatility is 
18.8% (16.6%) for R&D tax credit users and 17.7% (15.1%) for non-R&D ta:x credit 
users. In terms of the test variable, R&D tax credit users have significantly higher OthRD 
than non-R&D tax credit users. 
Panel F presents the distribution of the number of patent applications per firm-year 
observation. Approximately half of the full sample (58 .18%) does not have patents. 
While more than half of non-R&D tax credit users have no patent, more than half of 
R&D tax credit users have at least one patent. Among finns with non-zero patents, tnost 
firms have only one or two patents. Moreover, R&D tax credit users are nearly twice as 
many as non-R&D tax credit users among users with patents fewer than 500 but greater 
than zero. However, among the users with more than 500 patents, the number of non-
R&D tax credit users is greater than the number of R&D tax credit users. The largest 
number of patent counts is more than 1,000. 
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Table 7 presents the Pearson and Spearman Correlation Coefficients. As the sample 
for each hypothesis is different due to different missing data in test and control variables, 
each Panel presents correlations for the samples for each hypothesis test. Before 
propensity score matching, Panel A shows that TASSET, Techlnt, PatSuccess11 , RDLead, 
StkOption, and TaxProf are positively correlated with CR, and Lev and ·Cashshort are 
negatively correlated with CR. While the correlation of CR is marginally significant with 
RDStart, the correlations are all significant at one percent level for all other variables. 
<See Table 7> 
Panel B presents the correlations for H2 variables. It shows that both MRDCR is 
significantly positively correlated with AdjRD. Panels C through E report the correlations 
for H3. ExcQRE is significantly positively correlated with patent forward citations but 
negatively correlated with PatRnk in the Pearson test. However, in the Spearman test, 
ExcQRE is only significantly positively correlated with patent forward citations but not 
correlated with PatRnk. The correlations are significantly negative between ExcQRE and 
two measures for pre-tax profitability (FEJ and FE5) in the Pearson Test. Panel E shows 
that ExcQRE is significantly correlated with Std _RET. 
5.2 Empirical Results 
5.2.1 Main Results for HI: Firm Characteristics of R&D Tax Credit Users 
Table 8 shows the results for my tests of Hypothesis Ia- lc of whether the likelihood 
of using R&D tax credits (CR) increases with two firm characteristics: research ability 
(size, technology intensity, prior success in patenting, R&D leaders, and high-risk 
preference) and tax advantages (taxable profit and R&D startups). This table reports 
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standardized coefficients and marginal effects to allow for a relative comparison of each 
variable's association with the use of R&D tax credits. The pseudo R2s are 14.29 and 
14.53, respectively in column [1] and [3] , representing that the model in column [3] is a 
slightly better fit. However, untabulated significant Chi squares suggest both model are 
well fits. The results presented in column [1] and [3] also remain economically and 
statistically similar. Therefore, I mainly discuss the results in column [1] . 
<See Table 8> 
In column [1] , the coefficients on the five dimensions of Research ability namely size, 
technology intensity, prior success in patenting, R&D leaders, and high-risk preference, 
are 0.273, 0.894, 0.226, -0.148 and 0.273, respectively. Except for R&D leaders, the 
other four variables are significantly positive. To provide a clearer economic 
interpretation of the strength of this association, I interpret the result using marginal 
effects (see columns [2] and [4]). The marginal effect of 0.023 (0.026) reported in 
column [2] ([4]) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in TASSET increases the 
probability that a firm earns R&D tax credits by 2.3% (2.6%). According to column [2] , 
the marginal effect of Techlnt, PatSuccess1t, and StkOption suggests that the probability 
of using R&D tax credits is 17.9%, 4.5%, and 5.6% higher for high-tech firms, firms 
successfully patenting in the past, and firms grating stock option to their employees, 
respectively than other firms. While the odds of using R&D tax credits for R&D leaders 
are indifferent from other firms, firms with other research abilities are significantly more 
likely to use R&D tax credits. 
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Regarding Tax Advantage, the likelihood of using R&D tax credits is 5.0% and 5.7% 
higher for firms with · current tax expense but no operating loss carryforwards and for 
R&D startups versus the established firms, respectively. Turning to the controls, the 
significantly negative coefficients on fmancing capacity suggest that firms with cash 
shortfalls or more leverage are less likely to use R&D tax credits. Column [3] further 
shows the positive coefficients on firms with the funding constraint of leverage. This 
suggests firms with the leverage constraint are more likely to claim R&D tax credits to 
maintain research and experimentation. Finally, the coefficient on GDP is not 
significantly different from zero. Overall, the outcome indicates that it is more likely to 
use R&D tax credits for firms with more research ability, tax advantages, and leverage 
constraint. Hence, the results are consistent with Hla and Hl b. 
5.2.2 Main Results for H2: R&D Spending Induced by R&D Tax Credits 
Table 9 presents the results for the test of Hypothesis 2 that R&D tax credits stimulate 
more R&D spending. It includes the models for reported R&D and for adjusted R&D. 
Both models are well fits as the adjusted R2s of the models are 91.18% and 66.88% 
respectively. As the adjusted R2 for the model of reported R&D is relatively high, I assess 
multicollinearity by Variance Inflation Factor (VIP). This table shows the VIP for each 
coefficient, which is below 5 and represents no serious multicollinearity. However, the 
coefficient on SALE is 4.99, which is close to 5. 
Specifically, reported R&D spending is increasing with R&D tax credits. Furthermore, 
R&D tax credits encourage the adjusted R&D that conservatively excludes possible 
misclassified SG&A from the reported R&D. The coefficients for MRDCR regressed on 
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RepRD and AdjRD are 0.419 and 0.516; both are significantly positive at the 0.01 level. 
Economically, the results suggest that 5.7% of the average marginal R&D tax credit rate · 
induce approximately $1 million (=exp (0.419 x 5.7%) million or= exp (0.516x 5.7%) 
million) increase in reported R&D or adjusted R&D spending. These are consistent with 
Hypothesis 2. 
<See Table 9> 
The model for reported R&D has more significant control variables than the model 
for adjusted R&D. In both models, the coefficients on RDt-J, TobinQ, and sdCF are 
significant. Additionally in the model for reported R&D, SALE is significantly positive; 
ROA, sdCF, sdSALE, and Cash are ·significantly negative. All of the significant 
coefficients on controls have consistent signs with the expected ones. 
5.2.3 Main Results for H3a: Performance of R&D Tax Credit Users 
Innovation Quality Attributed to Excess Qualified R&D Expenditures 
Panel A of Table 10 presents the results for the test of Hypothesis 3a that the excess 
QREs of the R&D tax credit users generate higher innovation quality than the R&D of 
the non-R&D tax credit users. The adjusted R2s for the model regressing on PatRnk, 
FCite4, and FCitel are 39.97%, 25.45%, and 19.04%, respectively. These suggest that 
the model for PatRnk explains more variability than other dependent variables. 
<See Table 10, Panel A> 
The coefficient for ExcQRE regressed on patent rank, four-year ahead adjusted 
citations and one-year ahead adjusted citations are significantly positive (0.468, 0.251 
and 0.089) at the 0.01 significance level. Overall, the result is consistent with my 
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Hypothesis 3a, and suggests that R&D tax credit users' research eligible for R&D tax 
credits generates better innovation quality than the. R&D of the non-R&D tax credit users. 
In these three models, the coefficients on some control variables are significantly 
positive at the 0.01 level and consistent with expected sign (OthRD, SALE, Caplnt, 
InstOwn, and Cash). The coefficients on BHAR are also significantly positive in these 
models, but the significance is higher in the model for PatRnk. The coefficient on ROA is 
significantly negative at the 0.01 level in the model for PatRnk, and has consistent sign 
with the expected sign. The coefficient on Lev is significantly positive in the model for 
PatRnk, but not in the other two models. The coefficient on Age is significantly positive 
in the model for PatRnk, but significantly negative in the other two models. 
5.2.4 Main Result for H3b: Performance of R&D Tax Credit Users -
Profitability Attributed to Excess Qualified R&D Expenditures 
Columns [1] and [2] of Table 10 Panel B present the results for my tests of 
Hypothesis 3b that the excess QREs of the R&D tax credit users generate lower 
profitability relative to the R&D of the non-R&D tax credit users. The adjusted R2 for 
each model is 36.42% and 38.81%, respectively. This suggests that 36.42% and 38.81% 
of variances are explained by the models regressing on FE5 and FEJ respectively. The 
coefficients for ExcQRE in both columns are statistically significantly negative ( -0.057 
and -0.055). The results are consistent with Hypothesis 3b and suggest that R&D tax 
credit users' research eligible for R&D tax credits generates lower profitability relative to 
the R&D of the non-R&D tax credit users. 
<See Table 10, Panel B> 
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In both models, the control variables that are significant at the same level have the 
same sign of their coefficients, including OthRD, MV, Caplnt, and ROA. The negative 
coefficient on TanATS is marginally significant at the 0.10 level in the model for FE5, 
but significant at the 0.01 level in the model for FEI. On the contrary, the coefficient on 
InstOwn is significantly positive at the 0.01 level in the model for FE5, but marginally 
significant at the 0.1 0 level in the model for FE I. 
5.2.5 Main Result for H3c: Performance of R&D Tax Credit Users- Return 
Volatility of Excess Qualified R&D Expenditures 
Column [3] of Panel B in Table 10 presents the results for the test of Hypothesis 3c 
that the excess QREs of the R&D tax credit users generate higher return volatility relative 
to the R&D of the non-R&D tax credit users. The adjusted R2 for the model is 44.87% 
suggesting that the model explains 44.87% of variability. Since the coefficient for 
ExcQRE is significantly positive (0.041) at the 0.01 significance level, this is consistent 
with Hypothesis 3c. In terms of control variables, the coefficients on OthRD, MV, MTB, 
InstOwn, Cash, and ROA are all significant at the 0.01 level. This finding suggests that 
R&D tax credit users' research eligible for R&D tax credits contain higher risk than the 
R&D of the non-R&D tax credit users. 
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6. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND SENSITIVITY TEST 
In this section, I conduct additional analyses to examine whether the main results are 
robust by using alternative variables, alternative samples, or alternative methods. 
6.1 Hl: Firm Characteristics of R&D Tax Credit Users 
6.1.1 Reverse Causality 
First to address reverse causality, I replace the original independent variables in 
equation (1) with one-year-lag independent variables. As the significant coefficients on 
contemporaneous firm characteristics might be the result of using R&D tax credits, I test 
whether these year-beginning firm characteristics still affect firms ' likelihood of using 
R&D tax credits. Table 11 reports standardized coefficients and marginal effects to allow 
for a relative comparison of each one- or two-year-lag component' s association with the 
use of R&D tax credits. The results with one-year-lag independent variables are reported 
in columns [1] through [4] of Table 11. Columns [5] through [8] replace the one-year-lag 
patent counts with two-year-lag patent counts to represent an alternative measure for past 
success in patenting. 
<See Table 11> 
Specifically, compared with the result in column [1] of Table 8, the significance of 
the coefficient on TASSET1_1 reduces from the 0.01 level to the 0.5 level in column [1] of 
Table 11. In Column [2], the marginal effect of TASSET1_1 (1.8%) suggests that a one 
standard deviation increase in the year-beginning total assets results in a smaller increase 
in likelihood of using R&D tax credits compared to the marginal effect (2.3%) in the 
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main test. The coefficients on TASSET1_1 in all other columns from column [3] to [8] 
remain significantly positive at 0.01levels, consistent with the main results. 
The coefficient on StkOption is significant at the 0.01 level from column [3] to [8] 
rather than at the 0.05 level in columns [3] and [4] of table 8. The coefficients on other 
variables are similar to those in Table 8. Overall, in both specifications, the coefficient 
estimates on research ability (except for R&D leaders) and tax advantages are 
significantly positive and economically similar to the results reported in table 8. 
6.1.2 Alternative Model 
Second, I use a Tobit regression to validate the main results , as most of my sample 
observations (68.5% of the full sample) do not have R&D tax credits. Hence, a Tobit 
regression might be an efficient model to test H1 . Table 12 reports the results of the first 
equation using a Tobit regression. The results in Table 12 are similar to the results in 
Table 8 and do not change the inference in the main test by using this alternative model. 
<See Table 12> 
6.1.3 Additional Control Variable 
To limit the ability of potential correlated omitted variables to affect my inference, I 
add additional control variables. First, I control for the other external fmancing besides 
leverage: equity financing . Equity fmancing increases firms' R&D investment and may 
further affect the use of R&D tax credits. Brown et al. (2009) suggest that the equity 
financing drives the R&D increase in the late 1990s. If general R&D spending is 
positively associated with QREs, firms with equity fmancing are more likely to use R&D 
tax credits. On the one hand, firms may use the cash from equity financing to increase 
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QREs and thus are more likely to receive R&D tax credits. On the other hand, the cash 
obtained from equity fmancing may reduce the firms' need for earning R&D tax credits. 
Therefore, whether a firm with equity financing is more likely to use R&D tax credits 
remains an empirical question. To answer this question, I use an alternative measure for 
equity financing: NewStkD (a dummy variable representing a firm with positive net cash 
from new stock issuance).Z7 
Next, I control for the probability of an IRS audit. The higher the probability of an 
IRS audit, the lower the likelihood of using R&D tax credits for a firm, because the IRS 
plays a monitoring role in a firm's tax planning (Hoopes et al. 2012). I expect the 
coefficient on TaxAuditProb is negative. Following Hoopes et al. (2012), I measure the 
IRS audit probability (TaxAuditProb) as the number of corporate tax return audits 
completed in the IRS's current fiscal year for an IRS asset size group, divided by the 
number of corporate tax returns received in the previous calendar year for the same IRS 
. 28 
asset s1ze group. 
Finally, I use an alternative control for the macroeconomic effect on the use of R&D 
tax credits. This is the growth of GDP (GDPGr), as the coefficient on GDP is 
insignificant and suggests that this variable does not control for the macroeconomic effect 
on the use of R&D tax credits. GDPGr is measured as the change in the current year's 
GDP divided by the past year' s GDP. While firms in a better economy are more likely to 
27 I also use deciles of NewStk (nine d~mmy variables ranked by the amount from new stock 
issuance) as an alternative measure for equity financing. The results remain similar to the main 
result and the result in the test with NewStkD 
28 The data from 1996 to 2007 is obtained from the table ofExamination Coverage in the IRS ' s 
annual Data Book, which has been posted to the website of the IRS's Statistics of Income 
Division, http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-IRS-Data-Book. 
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invest in general R&D (Brown and Krull2008; Gupta et al. 2011), they may have smaller 
incentives to obtain money from claiming R&D tax credits. Thus, I have no expectation 
on the sign of the coefficient on GDPGr. Moreover, I include the additional controls 
NewStkD and TaxAuditProb to verify that my results are robust when I change GDP to 
GDPGr. 
Results are in columns [1] and [2] of Table 13 . The results validate the results in the 
main test and further show that firms with equity fmancing or are more likely to use R&D 
tax credits and that firms subject to higher tax audit probabilities are less likely to use 
R&D tax credits. Notably, the coefficient is significantly negative for GDPGr, and thus 
suggests that as GDP grows, firms are less likely to use R&D tax credits. 
<See Table 13> 
6.1.4 Alternative Sample 
To limit the potential problems from firms with some zero or small R&D, I use two 
alternative samples: (a) firms with positive R&D and (b) firms with R&D intensity 
greater than 0.005. Firms with zero R&D are not the targets of R&D tax credits, as the 
provision requires firms to invest in QREs to qualify for claiming R&D tax credits. 
Besides, firms with small R&D intensity can be the lower tail outliers, and thus carmot fit 
the regression well.29 Therefore, I test H1 with alternative samples. The results are in 
Table 14 and demonstrate economically and statistically consistent results with the main 
analysis. 
29 Alternatively, firms with large R&D intensity can be the higher tail outliers. Therefore, I 
further restrict the sample that has R&D intensity less than one. The results remain similar to the 
main results. 
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<See Table 14> 
6.1.5 Alternative Measure 
To reduce the potential measurement errors of proxies, I use alternative measures for 
research ability and tax advantages. With regard to size, I use the natural log of market 
value (MV). 30 As MV is highly correlated with StkOption (0.61), I add the interaction 
term to control for the collinearity. Column [1] of Table 15 reports that firms with high 
market value are more likely to use R&D tax credits, which is consistent with the main 
result. While the significance of the coefficient on RDStart reduces from the 0.01 level to 
the 0.05 level, all other coefficients in this column remain similar to the main result. 
<See Table 15> 
With regard to Techlnt, I replace the indicator of high-tech firms with a continuous 
variable measured as one-year-lag R&D intensity (R&Dlnt1. 1) . Column [2] reports 
consistent results with those in the main analysis. In terms of prior success in patenting, I 
use the average of patent counts during the past five years as an alternative measure 
(PatSuccessfl.5). PatSuccess tl-5 is calculated as the natural log of one plus the average of 
patent counts during the past five years to normalize the distribution of patent counts as 
some firms have zero patents. Column [3] reports a significantly positive coefficient on 
PatSuccess11•5, suggesting that my inference is valid for prior success in patenting. 
Regarding RDLead, I use top 10% of firms in terms of the number of patent 
applications within its industry as an alternative benchmark. The untabulated result shows 
30 I did not use natural log of sales as alternative measure for size. Sales are in the formula to 
calculate excess QREs and thus directly affect a firm's likelihood of using R&D tax credits. 
However, the effect is irrelevant to firm size. 
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similarly insignificant coefficient on RDLead with the result in the main test. Finally, 
with respect to StkOption, I replace the dummy variable for a high-risk preference firm to 
the continuous variable that can further measure the impact of the magnitude of holding 
stock options on the likelihood of using R&D tax credits. This is measured as the natural 
log of one plus the number of stock options outstanding. The reason for adding one to the 
option counts is that half of the sample firms do not have stock options outstanding. The 
untabulated result is also consistent with my inference that firms with high-risk 
preference are more likely to use R&D tax credits. 
Turing to tax advantages, I use marginal tax rates (MTax) to replace TaxProfbecause 
using MTax can further test unobservable tax effects on the use of R&D tax credits. 
Furthermore, I use an altermi.tive measure for R&D startups (i.e., fmns that statied 
investing in R&D less than ten years ago). I separate R&D startups into two types: firms 
starting R&D less than five years ago (RDAgeL5) and firms starting R&D from 5 to 9 
years ago (RDAge5-9) , because they have different fixed percentages under IRC §41. The 
maximum fixed percentage is 16% for all types of fmns. However, if lower than the 
maximum, the fixed percentage is 3% for fmns starting R&D less than five years ago and 
some ratio no more than 5/6 of the average prior years' R&D for firms starting R&D 
from 5 to 9 years ago. According to prior estimation in the hypothesis development, the 
estimated R&D fixed percentage is lower for R&D startups. Thus, I expect positive 
coefficients on RDAgeL5 and RDAge5-9. 
Columns [4] and [5] show consistent results with the result related to tax advantages 
in the main analysis. Specifically, Columns [ 4] reports a significantly positive coefficient 
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on MTax, and the untabulated result shows that one standard deviation increase in MTax 
increases the probability that a fum earns R&D tax credits by 5.8%. Column [5] shows 
positive coefficients on RDAgeL5 and R&DAge5-9, suggesting that firms with younger 
R&D age are more likely to use R&D tax credits than the established firms. 
6.2 H2: Firm R&D Spending Induced by R&D Tax Credits 
6.2.1 Additional Control Variable 
To reduce the concern for the correlated omitted variables, I add factors that may 
affect a firm's decision on R&D spending. First, I control for the impact of auditors on 
firms' R&D decisions. Following Godfrey and Hamilton (2005), I use the top-tier 
auditors (Big4) as a proxy for auditor reputation to measure its R&D industry expertise. 
Big4 is an indicator representing that a firm's auditor is in one of the large four audit 
firms in the U.S., including Arthur Andersen before 2002. I expect a positive coefficient 
on Big4, as Godfrey and Hamilton fmd that the top-tier auditors are positively associated 
with R&D expenses. I also control for the auditors who provide tax services 
(AudTaxServ), as their tax planning can affect the use of R&D tax creditsand may further 
influence fmns' R&D decisions. As it is unclear whether the tax planning will increase 
R&D or not, I make no expectation on AudTaxServ. AudTaxServ is an indicator for firms 
with positive tax fees to its auditor. 
My sample period changes from 1997-2007 to 2000-2007, as AuditAnalytics have 
auditor data since 2000. Besides, not every fum in my original datasets has auditor 
information in AuditAnalytics. Therefore, after propensity score matching my sample 
reduces to 524 firm-year observations. 
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In Table 16, Panel A reports the result of the additional controls of Big4 and 
AudTaxServ. While the results show insignificant coefficients on Big4 and AudTaxServ, 
in both cases R&D tax credits still induce more R&D spending after controlling for 
auditors. 
<See Table 16, Panel A> 
· Next, I include the percentage of independent directors out of the· firm' s total 
directors (IndDir), as prior literature suggest that independent directors limit R&D 
spending (Deutsch 2005; Linck et al. 2008). In Table 16, Panel B reports the result ·that 
control for IndDir. The coefficients on IndDir are insignificant in both models. However, 
the coefficient on MRDCR remains significant and positive in both models, .while the · 
significance reduces to from the 0.01 level in Table 9 to the 0.05 level in Table 10. The 
results suggest that the main results are robust. . 
<See Table 16, Panel B> 
6.2.2 Alternative Sample 
To limit the potential problems .from firms with small R&D, I use two alternative 
samples: (a) firms with R&D intensity greater than 0.005 and (b) full sample of R&D tax 
credit users and the matched control sample of non-R&D tax credit users. Because the 
R&D tax credit affects only the firms with incentives to engage in R&D activities, firms 
with small R&D or no revenue may not be the target of the credit provision. The s.ample 
has both positive R&D and sales, representing firms with incentives to engage in R&D 
activities and that have some revenue so that they are not entirely startups or young firms. 
The latter represents R&D intensive firms. Table 17 presents the results. The coefficients 
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on MRDCR remain significant and positive. Thus, my inference is still valid in this 
alternative sample. 
<See Table 17> 
I also replace first-time R&D tax credit users and their matched control sample with 
the full sample of R&D tax credit users and the matched control sample of non-R&D tax 
credit users to test H2. The untabulated results suggest similar inference to the main test 
ofH2. 
6.2.3 Alternative Measure and Model 
I conduct an alternative analysis to address an 1ssue of non-linear relationship 
between the R&D spending and the R&D tax credit. To relieve the concern, following 
prior literature (e.g. , Rao 2013) I use logarithm transformation of both dependent variable 
and the primary test variable to calculate a tax-price elasticity of R&D. The dependent 
variable RD remains the same as that in the main test, representing the reported R&D 
(RepRD) and the adjusted R&D (AdjRD). The primary test variable is the natural log of 
R&D tax credit amounts (RDC) , as this measure allows me to evaluate the elasticity of 
R&D tax credits. The test is done by using the following regressions, and the coefficients 
of interest are a~, which is expected to be positive. 
(10) 
Table 18 tabulates the results in equation (1 0) and those of the additional control for 
an R&D specialist auditor. Column [1] shows the result for the model of Rep RD. The 
one-year-lag natural log of R&D can be the instrumental variable, as R&D investments 
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tend to last more than a year and the sustained prior projects may influence decisions 
about current R&D expenditures (Gupta et al. 2011). Besides, the one-year-lag natural 
log of R&D is highly correlated with RDC (correlation= 0.32). Thus, the one-year-lag 
natural log of R&D is a strong instrumental variable. Column [2] shows the result for the 
model of AdjRD. In both model, I still use frrst-time R&D tax credit users and the 
matched control sample, as this model in the main test. 
<See Table 18> 
The significantly positive a 1 of 0.043 in column [1] suggests that one percent 
increase in the average R&D tax credit induces a 0.043 percent increase in reported R&D 
(0.081 percent increase in adjusted R&D). Besides, both coefficients are significant at the 
0.01 level. 
Additionally, I perform the analysis regressing on the change in R&D, as the main 
test is regressing on the R&D level. As the dependent variable is the change in R&D, 
RD1_1 is removed from control variables. The analysis uses the following modified 
equation (2) to obtain the estimate on MRDCR, which is expected to be positive. 
Table 19 displays the estimates in equation (11). Significantly positivea1 suggests 
consistent inference that the R&D tax credits increases firms' reported or adjusted R&D 
spending. In terms of the control variables, lots of them were significant in the main test 
but not here, including SALE, ROA, and CASH. In the model for reported R&D, the 
significance of coefficient on sdSALE changes from the 0.01 level in Table 9 to the 0.05 
level in Table 19. In the model for adjusted R&D, the significance of coefficients on 
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TobinQ and sdCF also reduces from the 0.01 level in Table 9 to the 0.05 level in Table 19. 
The adjusted R2 is significantly reduced between the main test and this test , which is 
19.24% for the model of reported R&D and 11 .19% for the model of adjusted R&D. 
<See Table 19> 
6.3 H3: Performance of R&D Tax Credit Users 
6.3.1 Additional Control Variable 
Propensity score matching has limited the observable correlated omitted variables. 
However, for verifying the validity of my inference, I include a monitoring factor that 
lends its reputation to a firm' s credibility of financial statements, Big4. If this 
uncontrolled factor is correlated with R&D tax credits, my results may not be robust. 
Therefore, I include this monitoring factor of auditors, Big4, which has been defined in 
the additional test for H2. 
Tables 20 and 21 present the results for the tests including an additional control. For 
the test of H3a, Table 20 shows that the coefficients remain significantly positive on 
excess QREs (ExcQRE) in columns [1] and [2] , suggesting consistent results of positive 
impact on innovation quality. However, column [3] shows an insignificantcoefficient on 
ExcQRE. The results from column [1] to [3] imply that while each patent attributed to 
excess QREs is not cited more than the R&D of non-R&D tax credit users one year later, 
the innovation quality of excess QREs is higher than the R&D of non-R&D tax credit 
users when considering the life of patents. In Table 21 , the impact of excess QREs 
remains significantly negative on future pre-tax profitability, but positive on return 
volatility when R&D tax credit users have a Big4 auditor. Overall, the results are robust 
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when including Big4 while the positive effect of excess QREs on return volatility is 
conditional on Big4. 
<See Table 20 and Table 21 > 
6.3.2 Alternative Sample 
To limit the potential problems from firms with zero patents in H3a, I use two 
alternative samples: (a) firms with non-zero patent applications and (b) the full sample of 
R&D tax credit users and their matched control sample of non-R&D tax credit users by 
propensity score matching. Because most sample firms do not have patents, the sample is 
left censored or skewed to the right. Besides, the measure of innovation quality is 
determined by a firm's application for a patent. Thus, the first sample is less affected by 
the sample with zero patents. Table 22 demonstrates that the coefficients on MRDCR 
remain significant and positive. Thus, my inference is still valid in this alternative sample. 
<See Table 22> 
I also use the full sample of R&D tax credit users and the matched control sample of 
non-R&D tax credit users instead of first-time R&D tax credit users the matched control 
sample of non-R&D tax credit users to test H2. The matching is still using propensity 
score matching of equation (1 ). The untabulated results suggest similar inference to the 
main test ofH3. 
6.3.3 Alternative Measure 
To reduce the concern for measurement errors embedded in proxies for performance, 
I use alternative measures for the dependent variable in each test. For the innovation 
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quality test in H3a, I replace the original dependent variable in equation (5) with three 
alternative patent ranks estimated from other models in Shaffer (2011): the cumulative-
combined (cc), cumulative-structure (cs), and marginal- structure (ms) specifications. For 
equation (6), I alternatively use forward citations until 2012 including self-citations and 
excluding self-citations (FCite2012 and FCite2012 _exSelj), four-year-ahead patent 
citations excluding self-citations (FCite4 _ exSelf), and one-year ahead patent citations 
excluding self-citations (FCitel_exSelj). For pre-tax profitability test in H3b, I use the 
industry-adjusted average future profitability over five-year-ahead (FE5 _indadj) and one-
year-ahead (FEJ_indadj). FE5 _indadj and FEJ_indadj are FE5 and FEJ weighted by the 
average industry profitability over five-year-ahead and one-year-ahead for each firm-year 
respectively. For return volatility, I measure the standard deviation of one-year-ahead 
stock returns (Std_RET_ll) and one-year-lag (Std_RET_tl) . 
Table 23 presents the results of alternative dependent variables. Panels A and B show 
the results for alternative innovation quality measures. The results are quantitatively and 
qualitatively similar with the results in the main tests. Panel C reports significantly 
negative coefficients on ExcQRE for FEJ_indadj but not for FE5 _indadj. This suggests 
that the excess QREs yield lower pre-tax one-year-ahead profitability than the R&D of 
non-R&D tax credit users. However, the excess QREs do not yield any difference in five-
year-ahead profitability after industry adjustments in the profitability measure. Panel D 
presents significantly positive coefficients on ExcQRE for Std_RET_ll and Std_RET_tl. 
The results imply that while the excess QREs of the R&D tax credit users contribute to 
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higher return volatility than non-R&D tax credit users, the users may have been taking 
more risks in the prior year than non-R&D tax credit users. 
<See Table 23> 
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7. CONCLUSION 
Prior literature has found that R&D tax credits are effective in increasing R&D 
expenditures and reducing managers ' myopic behavior (e.g., Klassen et al. 2004; Brown 
and Krull 2008). However, three fundamental questions relating to R&D tax credit 
remain unanswered: (a) How do some firms qualify for and earn R&D tax credits while 
others do not? (b) How R&D tax credits affect firms' R&D decisions? (c) How do R&D 
tax credits affect R&D quality? I study whether firms are more likely to earn R&D tax 
credits when they have more research ability and tax advantages. Then I examine whether 
R&D tax credits affect firms' R&D spending and R&D performance, including 
innovation quality, future profitability, and return volatility attributed to excess QREs. 
In exploring firm characteristics of R&D tax credit users, I make several interesting 
findings, using a sample of firms from 1997 to 2007. First, R&D tax credit users are not 
dominated by just one industry. While R&D tax credit firms are from 3 7 2-digit SIC 
industries, most of them belong to five 2-digit SIC industries. The top five industries in 
order are (a) computer software and data services; (b) chemical, biotech and drug; (c) 
electrical and electronic components; (d) medical and scientific instruments; and (e) 
machinery and computer equipment. Second, I find that most firms do not use R&D tax 
credits consecutively throughout my sample period between 1997 and 2007. The 
continuous R&D tax credit users are approximately 26.23% of total R&D tax credit users. 
Third, most R&D tax credit users have their fiscal years ending in December. Finally, I 
compare firms with actual R&D tax credits with fmns with estimated R&D tax credit 
users by using R&D expenses in Compustat and following Brown and Krull (2008). In 
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this comparison, I find that on average, there exist differences of R&D expense, R&D tax 
credit amount or rate, R&D intensity, patent rank, and forward citations. 
Next, I compare the differences of means in firm characteristics, R&D decisions, and 
R&D performance between R&D tax credit users and non-R&D tax credit users. In t-tests, 
I find that on average, differences exist in firm characteristics, R&D spending, and R&D 
performance except for future profitability. 
I fmd results that are consistent with my hypotheses. I fmd that firms with higher 
research ability, measured by their size, technology intensity, their prior success in 
patenting and higher risk preference, and firms that have higher tax advantages from the 
R&D tax credit, measured by their taxable profits and start-up status, are more likely to 
use R&D tax credits. I also fmd that the R&D tax credits induce more R&D spending. 
Finally, I find that the excess qualified research of R&D tax credit users contributes to 
better innovation quality and higher return volatility, but lower pre-tax profitability when 
compared with R&D expenditures of non-R&D tax credit users. 
My results suggest that the R&D tax credit provision encourages firms to increase 
R&D spending, enhance innovation quality, and take risk. The results are robust to many 
different specifications and sensitivity tests. However, the results are subject to some data 
limitations, including effects of firms' discretionary disclosures and incomplete 
information regarding R&D tax credits in firms' 10-K reports .. 
The main implication of this paper is that the R&D tax credits effectively encourage 
firms to engage in more innovative projects. As of January 1, 2013 , the R&D tax credit 
has once again been reinstated and extended to December 31 , 2013. With the U.S. 
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government's recent emphasis on increasing economic growth, this paper suggests that 
Congress should not let R&D tax credits expire again, in order to continue to provide 
incentives to improve firms' innovation quality. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: A Brief History of R&D Tax Credit Regulations 
Duration Description 
7/1/1981 ~ The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 initially offered a 
12/31/1985 25% tax credit of for R&D expenditures above a base level, 
determined by the average of a firm's previous three years' 
worth of R&D expenditures . 
........................... -.................... ------------
Temporary 
(Permanent) 
Lapse 
1 / 111986~ The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the R&E credit to 20 1 / 1 / 1986~ 
12/31 /1988 percent and tightened some ofthe definitions ofR&D 10/22/1986 
eligible for the credit. · 
..................... -....... -:---:------:-:------------::------------
111/1989~ The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 
12/31 /1989 1988 (enacted on Nov 10, 1988) extended the R&D Tax 
Credits through 12/31189 but further reduced the subsidy 
afforded by the R&E credit by making half of the credit 
amount taxable income. 
····-···----·-····---· ·------·-·---····-------·------···-·-·- --------·--·-
1 / 111990~ The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 extended 
12/31 /1990 the R&D Credit to 12/31 /90 and made the credit amount 
100 percent taxable. 
1 11/1991~ Under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 
12/31/1991 Congress extended the R&D Credit through 12/31191. 
....................................... __ ,, .. , .. ,_ .... , _, ________ , ................ ____ ,, _______ ,_,_,_,_, _____ ,_, _ _____ _ 
1 / 111992~ The TaX. Extension Act of 1991 extended the R&D Credit to 
6/30/1992 6/30/92 . 
.................. .. ........................ -....... .. ................ -----·-·-·---"""'"'"""""" """ """"" ___ , ...... , .... _, __ , ........... _ .......... , ___ , _ _ , ............................... ____ ,., ................... -,..------
7/1/1992~ Fortunately, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 7/1/1992~ 
6/30/1995 1993 (enacted on August 10, 1993) extended the R&D 8/9/1993 
Credit retroactively from 7/1192 through 6/30/95 . 
........................... -...................... ---------------
By 6/30/95, lack of action in Congress led to the R&D 71111995~ 
Credit expiring yet again. This left the first permanent 6130/1996 
one-year gap in the Credit's availability since its original 
inception on 7/1181. 
............................................................ .. .............. --.................. ____ , ____ , .. , ..................... ----::--
711 / 1996~ Eventually, the Small Business Job Protection Act of 7/ 1/1996~ 
5/3111997 1996 (enacted on August 20, 1996) retroactively reinstated 811911996 
the R&D Credit from 7/1196, to 5/31/97. 
--····· ·· .................... , __ ,,,,,,,,,,,,_ ---------
6/1 / 1997~ On 6/1197, the R&D Credit expired again. However, 6/ 1 / 1997~ 
6/30/1998 the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (enacted on August 5, 8/4/1997 
1997) extended the R&D Credit retroactively from 6/1/97 to 
6/30/98. 
------·-"'""""""'-""''''"-""""""''' '''""'"--"""' 
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Appendix 1: A Brief History of R&D Tax Credit Regulations - Continued 
Duration Description 
7/1 / 1998~ The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental 
6/30/1999 Appropriations Act of 1998 (enacted on Oct 21 , 1998) 
pushed the Credit' s expiration to 6/30/99. 
Temporary 
(Permanent) 
Lapse 
7/1/1998~ 
10/20/1998 
-- ............................................ ·-- --.....,---·~-:-----:----- -----
7/1/1999~ In late 1999, the R&E tax credit was reinstated in the Tax 
6/30/2004 ReliefExtension Act of 1999 (enacted on Dec 17, 1999) 
from 7/1199 to 6/30/04. 
711 / 1999~ 
12/16/1999 
·········-············-·---·-··-···········-·----::----::-:-------=-------:--:-----:---=-:---::-:------:--:-----:-::----
7/ 112004~ The credit was renewed most recently by the Working 7/112004~ 
12/31/2005 Families Tax Relief Act of2004 (Public Law 108-311, 10/3/2004 
enacted on Oct 04, 2004) incurred after June 30, 2004 
through 31 December 2005. 
·······························-----
1 / 1 /2006~ The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (enacted on 11112006~ 
12/31/2007 December 20, 2006) extended the R&D Credit retroactively 12/31 /2006 
from 111106 through 12/31107. 
--····---------··-··················-············-·····-··-···-·-··············-- ---··-········-··-- ··--··-----················--· -----
1/1/2008~ The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of2008 1/1/2008~ 
12/31/2009 (enacted on October 3, 2008) retroactively extended the 10/2/2008 
R&D Credit through 2009 
····-·········-·············---········-----------------------------
1/1/2010~ The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, 1 / 112010~ 
12/31/2011 and Job Creation Act of2010 (enacted on December 17, 12/16/2010 
2010) retroactively extended the R&D Credit through 
12/31111. 
i/i/2012~ The American Taxpayer Relief A~t of2012 (enacted on 1/1 /2012~ 
12/31/2013 January 1, 2013) retroactively extended the R&D Credit 12/31/2012 
through 2012. 
100 
Appendix 2: Changes in Rules of R&D tax credits 
81 86 
Overall R&D Credit 
89 90 
I I 
I I 
I I 
96 99 
• 
07 08 
Year 
Taxable: .....________..Y ---------~----------
0 50% 100% 
Regular R&D Tax Creditl 
Statutory 
Credit rate: 25% 20% 
R&D Base: ~~------------------­
Moving Average 
Permanent Lapse: 
(Temporary Lapses 11 Times) 
Alternative Incremental Research Credit 
Credit rates: 
Fixed Base Percentage: Average R&D-to-sales 
ratio for1984-1988 
Jul. 95-Jun. 96 
Jun. 96-Jun. 99 - Jan. 06 - Dec. 08 
1.65%, 2.2%, and 2.75%; 1% increases in rates; 3%, 4%, and 5% until 
2008 
R&D Base: 
Alternative Simplified Research Credit 
Credit rates: 
R&D Base: 
Tier I Issue 
The average of prior four-year sales 
~ 
12% in 07 &08; 14% since 09 
0.5 of the average R&D in prior three years 
Since April 2007, claimants have to provide the supporting documents to satisfy 
the IRS audits that verify that the innovative activities and their associated expenses meet 
the congressional guidelines. 
Source: Congressional Research Service Reports (Guenther, G. 2006; 2008) and a 
Government Accountability Office report (GAO 2009) 
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Appendix 3: Details in the Federal R&D Tax Credit 
Regular R&D Tax Credits (RRC) 
The tax credit for qualified R&D expenses (QREs) provides significant subsidies to 
encourage business investment in research intended to foster innovation and promote 
long-term economic growth (GAO 2009). However, the credit is a temporary provision, 
which results in political uncertainty to the firms. There were three changes in the RRC 
rules in 1986, 1988, and 1989. In all cases about the RRC calculation, the federal R&E 
tax credit is computed by taking qualified R&D expenditures (QREs) that exceed a 
certain base level, multiplying by the statutory credit rate. 
Initially from 1981 to 1985, the credit was equal to 25% of the excess of QREs in a 
given tax year over a fum's base amount. This base was defined as the greater of: (1) 
average QREs in the three previous tax years or (2) 50% of the current year's QREs. The 
credit was nonrefundable, with the excess allowed to be carried back three years and 
forward 15 years. 
Congress made the first significant changes in the credit with the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 (TRA86). The credit rate was lowered from 25% to 20%. As the Technical and 
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 required half of the credit subtracted from R&D 
expense deduction, half of the credit became taxable since 1989. The Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989 further changed the definition of the base level of QREs to a 
fixed quantity defined as the average QREs intensity for the five years between 1984 and 
1988 times the average of the most current four year sales. In the case of startups, a 
special statutory QREs intensity is used, equal to 3 percent. Also, the act of 1989 required 
100 percent of the credit to be taxable since 1990, so the effective credit rate was further 
reduced. 
Alternative Incremental Research Credit (AIRC) 
In 1996, the Small Business Jobs Protection Act added an alternative incremental 
research credit (AIRC) for R&D, which was designed to compensate firms with high 
QREs spending that were denied the credit due to rapidly growing sales; this profile is 
typical of a high technology startup. Firms with high fixed-base percentage in 1984 -
1988 relative to current QREs spending intensity, such as aerospace firms, can also 
greatly benefit from this alternative credit. According to Price-Waterhouse estimates, 
three industries will account for 96% of the benefit of the AIRC: chemicals (including 
pharmaceuticals), industrial machining (including computer manufacturers), and 
electrical and electronic machinery manufacturers. 
The alternative credit has a lower base and also a lower rate of credit. It provides 
three rates to credit firms that invest in R&D beyond a level based on sales over the 
previous four years. Specifically, the initial tier started at 1.65 percent of R&D exceeding 
1 percent of the average revenue for the past four years, with higher rates 2.2 percent of 
R&D exceeding 1.5 percent of the average revenue over past four years and 2.75 percent 
of R&D exceeding 2.0 percent ofthe average revenue over past four years. In 1999, Tax 
Relief Extension Act increased the rates of AIRC by striking '1.65 percent' and inserting 
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'2.65 percent' ; by striking '2.2 percent' and inserting '3.2 percent'; and by striking '2.75 
percent' and inserting '3.75 percent'. Further in 2006, Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 
2006 increased the three rates of AIRC to 3, 4, and 5 percent respectively. However, the 
AIRC accounted for only $4 7 million in credit claims in 2008 and was allowed to expire 
at the end of that year. 
Alternative Simplified Credit (ASC) 
In December 2006, Congress enacted a variant called the "alternative simplified 
credit" (AS C) to simplify the calculation of the base level of QREs. The simplified credit 
was created to make the corporate R&D tax credit accessible to a wider number of firms, 
. and it immediately proved to be a popular option. In 2008 the amount of credit claimed 
under the alternative simplified credit ($3.9 billion) was not far behind the claims under 
the regular credit ($4.3 billion). 
The ASC revives a feature of the original formula for the RRC enacted in 1981, using 
a moving base period of the previous three years. This of course has the same drawback 
as the original formula because spending in one year raises the base amount for the next 
three years. However, some firms may benefit from the ASC, such as the startups, firms 
without QREs documentations from 1984 to 1988, or firms with high base amount or 
rapidly growing sales. 
Since 2007, taxpayers have been able to elect the ASC, which equals 12 percent (for 
tax years before 2009, and 14 percent beginning on or after Jan. 1, 2009) of the QREs for 
the taxable year that exceed 50 percent of the average QREs for the three taxable years 
preceding the credit determination year. If the taxpayer has no QREs in any one of the 
three preceding tax years, the ASC rate equals 6 percent of the QREs for the credit 
determination year. The election to claim the ASC must be made on the original tax 
return and cannot be made retroactively. 
IRS Tier I Issue 
While Congress has been extending and expanding the R&D tax credit, the IRS is 
watching closely to ensure that only eligible firms claim the credit. The firm has the 
burden of proving its qualification for the R&D tax credit. Meeting this burden of proof 
has been a challenge for the unprepared firms. 
In February 2007, the IRS Office of Appeals issued a technical guidance draft titled 
Substantiating Research and Experimentation Expenditures that if finalized would 
expand the R&D tax credit coordinated issue by naming a coordinator that will be 
involved in approving all settlements. In April 2007, the IRS issued an industry directive 
stating that the R&D tax credit claims have been designated as a large and mid-size 
business (LMSB) Tier I issue, which means that the IRS determined the R&D ta:x credit 
to be a possible high-risk compliance issue. The IRS will audit the claimed R&D tax 
credit following its audit guidance. Therefore, to be qualified for the R&D tax credit, the 
claimant has to file the documentation complying the audit guidance that verify that the 
innovative activities and their associated expenses to meet the congressional guidelines 
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Appendix 4: Summary of the State R&D Tax Credits in 39 States 
State 
Duration (Year · Stah1tory Credit Rate3 1 Corporate Base Definition Carryback Carryforward Enacted-ExQired) Tax Rate32 
Arizona 1994- 11% 6.968% Federal (Fixed Base) No 15 Years 
Arkansas 1997- 20% . 1%-6.5% QRE 2 Years Ago No 9 Years 
California 1987- 15% 8.84% Federal (Fixed Base) No Unlimited 
Colorado 1989- 3% 4.63% Average of Prior 2 Years No Unlimited 
Connecticut 1993- 6% 9.00% Non-incremental No Unlimited 
Delaware 2000-2010 10% 8.70% Average of Prior 4 Years No 15 Years 
Georgia 1998- 10% 6.00% Federal (Fixed Base) No 10 Years 
Hawaii 2000- 20% 4.4%-6.4% Non-incremental NA NA(Refundable) 
Idaho 2001- 5% 7.60% Federal (Fixed Base) No 14 Years 
Illinois 1990-2003; 2005- 6.50% 9.50% Average of Prior 3 Years No 5 Years 
Indiana 1985- 15% since 2008 8.50% Federal (Fixed Base) No 10 Years 
Iowa 1985- 6.50% 6%-12% Federal (Fixed Base) NA NA(Refundable) 
....... Kansas 1988- 6.50% 4%-7% Average of Prior 2 Years No Unlimited 
0 Lou isiana 2003-2013 8% 4%-8% Federal (Fixed Base) No No ..j:::.. 
Maine 1996- 5% 3.5%-8.93% Average of Prior 3 Years No 15 Years 
Maryland 2000-2010 10% 8.25% Average of Prior 4 Years No 7 Years 
Massachusetts 1991 - 10% 8% Federal (Fixed Base) No 15 Years 
Michigan 2007- 1.9% (1.52% for 2008) 6.0% Non-incremental NA NA 
Minnesota 1982- 2.50% 9.80% Federal (Fixed Base) No 15 Years 
Missouri 1994-2004 6.50% 3%-5% Average of Prior 3 Years No 5 Years 
Montana 1999-2010 5% 6.75% Federal (Fixed Base) 2 Years 15 Years 
Nebraska 2005- 3% 5.58%-7.81% Average of Prior 2 Years No 20 Years 
New Hampshire 2007-2013 10% 8.5% Federal (Fixed Base) No 5 Years 
New Jersey 1994- 10% 9% Federal (Fixed Base) No 7 or 15 Years 
New Mexico 2000- 4% 4 . 8%~7.6% Non-incremental NA NA 
North Carolina 1996-2013 5% 6.9% Federal (Fixed Base) No 15 Years 
Nmih Dakota 1988- 8% 1.7%-5.2% Federal (Fixed Base) 3 Years 15 Years 
31 Highest-tier credit rate for states with different credit rates for different levels of R&D investments. 
32 Highest-tier income tax rate for states with different income tax rates for different levels of income. 
Appendix 4: Summary of the State R&D Tax Credits in 39 States - Continued 
State Duration (Year Statutory Credit Rate31 Corporate Base Definition Carryback Canyforward Enacted-Expired) Tax Rate32 
Ohio 2001- 7% NA Average ofPrior 3 Years No 7 Years 
Oregon 1989-2011 5% 6.6%-7.6% Federal (Fixeq Base) No 5 Years 
Pennsylvania 1997-2015 10% for large firms (20% for 9.99% Federal (Fixed Base) No 15 Years 
small firms) 
Rhode Island 1994- 16.90% 9.00% Federal (Fixed Base) No 7 Years 
South Carolina 2001- 5% 5% Federal (Fixed Base) No 10 Years 
Texas 2001 - 5% NA Federal (Fixed Base) No 20 Years 
Utah 1999- 6% 5% Federal (Fixed Base) No No (14 Yrs 
Before 08) 
Virginia 2011-2015 15% 6% Non-incremental NA NA 
Vennont 2003- 6% since 2011 (1 0% before 6%-8.5% Federal since 2011 No 10 Years 
2011) (Average of Prior 4 Years 
-
before 2011) 
0 West Virginia 2003- 10% of Incremental QREs 8% Average of Prior 3 Years No No \J) 
(or 3% ofQREs) 
Washington 1995-2014 1.5% NA Non-incremental NA NA 
Wisconsin 1986- 5% 7.9% Federal (Fixed Base) No 15 Years 
Source: The information of state tax codes regarding the state-level R&D tax credit comes from various state government websites. 
Appendix 5: Variable Definitions 
Variable Description Measurement Data Source Name 
AdjRD Natural log of The natural logarithm of current R&D Compustat 
adjusted Research expenditures (xrd) adjusted for misreported 
and development SG&A as identified in equation (4) by Gunny 
(R&D) (2010) 
expenditures 
Age Natural log of firm The natural logarithm of the number of years Compustat and 
age that the firm has been listed on CRSP monthly CRSP. 
returns tape or the Compustat Fundamental 
Annual, whichever occurs first 
AudRDshare Percentage ofR&D All audit clients' R&D (xrd) of the auditor Compustat and 
market share divided by all companies' R&D in the current Audit Analytics 
audited by the year 
auditor 
AudTaxServ Indicator for a Equal to one if a company has a positive tax Audit Analytics 
company with a fees (taxJees) to the auditor (auditor _}key); 
tax-service auditor zero otherwise 
BHAR Buy and hold Buy and hold abnormal returns during the CRSP 
abnormal returns current fiscal year, measured as the 
geometrically summation of the 12-monthly 
returns (Ret) minus the value weighted returns 
(vwret). 
Big4 Indicator for a Big Equal to one if the auditor is a Big 4 firm (or Audit Analytics 
5 audit firm Big 5 before 2002) ; zero otherwise 
Caplnt Capital intensity The natural logarithm ofthe ratio of net Compustat 
property, plant, and equipment (ppent) to the 
number of employees ( emp) in the current year 
Cash Cash/Total assets The ratio of the current cash and cash equivalent Compustat 
(che) to the current total assets (at). 
CashShort Cash shortfall The ratio of the negative free cash flows before Compustat 
R&D to total assets in the current year, - [cash 
flow from operations ( oancj) + R&D (xrd) -
capital expenditures (capx)] / total assets (at). 
CashShortD Indicator for a firm Equal to one for a firm with top ten percent of Compustat 
with high cash cash shortfall in the current year; zero otherwise 
shortfall 
CR Indicator of a user Equal to one for a firm that disclose earned 10-K 
with positive R&D R&D tax credits in the current year; zero 
tax credits otherwise 
ExcQRE Excess QREs per The ratio of the current R&D tax credit amounts 10-K and 
sale dollar divided by [ .2 x (1 -statutory tax rate)] to the Compustat 
current sales (sale) 
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Appendix 5: Variable Definitions- Continued 
Variable Description Measurement Data Source Name 
FCite Count of forward The natural logarithm of one plus the average of Patent Network 
citations per patent the adjusted forward citation count four-year- Dataverse at 
application ahead (FCite4) , one-year-ahead (FCitel), until Harvard Business 
2012 (FCite20 12) across all patents applied for School and CRIE 
by the fmn during the current year. Each Patent Database 
patent's forward citation count is scaled by the 
average citation count of all patents in the same 
technology class and year. 
FCite _ exSelf Count of forward Same as FCite but excluding self-citations for Patent Network 
citations per patent one-year-ahead (FCitel_ exSelf), four-year- Dataverse at 
application ahead. (FCite4 _ exSelf), and until 2012 Harvard Business 
excluding self- (FCite20 12 _ exSelf) School and CRIE 
citations Patent Database 
FE . Future earnings per The ratio of operating income before Compustat 
sale dollar depreciation ( opdbp ), advertising (xad) and 
R&P expenditures (xrd) to sales (sale) over 
one-year-ahead (FE!) and over five subsequent 
years (FE5) . 
FE_ indadj Industry adjusted Future earnings per sale weighted by the Compustat 
future earnings per industry average over one-year-ahead (FE!_ 
sale dollar indadj) and over five subsequent years (FE5 _ 
indadj). 
GDP Real gross Natural logarithm of real gross domestic product Compustat 
domestic product (;;dpr I) in the current year Economic Index 
GDPGr GDP growth The changes in current year's real gross Compustat 
domestic product (gdpr I) divided by the past Economic Index 
year's real gross domestic product (gdprl) 
IndDir Percentage of The percentage of a company's independent Risk Metrics 
independent directors to its total counts of directors in the 
directors current year 
Ins tOwn Institutional Percentage of total institutional shareholdings Thomson Reuters 
ownership to shares outstanding in the current year Institutional (13 F) 
Holdings Data 
Lev Leverage The ratio of the sum of short-term debt (die) and Compustat 
long-term debt (dltt) to total assets (at) in the 
current year 
LevD Indicator for firms An indicator for a firm ranked in the top deciles Compustat 
with high leverage of current leverage 
MRDCR Marginal R&D tax R&D tax credits that are generated by the last 10-K and 
credit rate dollar of current R&D, measured as the changes Compustat 
in R&D tax credit amounts divided by the 
changes in R&D expenditures (xrd). 
MTax Marginal Tax Rate Current marginal tax rate after interest Compustat 
deductions (beg_ mtrint) 
MTB Growth Market value of equity to book value of equity Compustat 
opportunities in the current year (csho x prcc j) I seq 
MV Alternative Natural logarithm of current market value of Compustat 
measure for size equity (csho x prcc f). 
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Appendix 5: Variable Definitions - Continued 
Variable Description Measurement Data Source Name 
NegEarn · Indicator of losses Equal to one if a fmn' s current earnings (ib) is Compustat 
less than zero; otherwise zero. 
NewStk Net cash from new Cash from the sale of common and preferred Compustat 
stock issues stock minus the purchase of common and 
preferred stock divided by total assets (sstk -
lprstkc)/at) in the current year 
NewStkD Indicator for firms Equal to one for a fmn with positive NewStk in Compustat 
with new stock the current year 
issues 
OthRD Unqualified or The current R&D expenditure (xrd) minus 10-K and 
Base Qualified ExcQRE divided by the current sales (sale) Compustat 
R&D per sale 
dollar 
PatRnk Patent rank The natural logarithm of the summation of a CRIE Patent 
fmn' s total patent scores estimated by using the Database 
marginal-combined (me) Patent Rank 
specification in Shaffer (20 11 ). 
PatSuccess11 Prior success in The natural logarithm of one plus patent Patent Network 
patenting application counts in the prior year Dataverse at 
Harvard Business 
School and CRlE 
Patent Database 
PatSuccess(1.5 Alternative The natural logarithm of one plus the average Patent Network 
measure for prior patent application counts during the past five . Data verse at 
success in years Harvard Business 
patenting School and CRIE 
Patent Database 
PostUsage An indicator for the Equal to one in the year of current tax credit 10-K. 
year of using R&D utilization for an R&D tax credit fmn and for its 
tax credits matched control firm; zero otherwise 
RepRD Current R&D The natural logarithm of current R&D (xrd) Compustat 
RD1-1 R&D ill the prior The natural logarithm of R&D (xrd) in the prior Compustat 
year year 
RDAge5-9 Indicator for R&D Equal to one for a firm starting R&D (xrd) from Compustat 
age from 5- to 9- 5 to 9 years ago; zero otherwise 
year-old 
RDAgeL5 Indicator for a rmn Equal to one r for a firm starting R&D (xrd) less Compustat 
with R&D age less than five years ago; zero otherwise 
than five- year-old 
RDC R&D tax credit The natural logarithm ofR&D tax credit 10-K 
amounts amounts in the current year 
RD!nt1_1 R&D Intensity The ratio of R&D (xrd) to sales (sale) in the Compustat 
prior year 
RDLead Indicator for an Equal to one when a firm is ranked in the top Patent Network 
R&D leader 25% of firms in terms of the number of patent Dataverse at 
applications within its industry; zero otherwise Harvard Business 
School and CRIE 
Patent Database 
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Appendix 5: Variable Definitions- Continued 
Variable Description Measurement Data Source Name 
RDStart Indicator of R&D Equal to one for a firm starting to spend R&D Compustat 
startups (xrd) less than ten years ago; zero otherwise 
ROA Return on assets Ratio of current net income (ib) to current total Compustat 
assets (at) 
SALE Alternative The natural logarithm of current sales (sale). Com pus tat 
measure for size 
sdCF Standard deviation The standard deviation of the prior five years' Compustat 
of prior 5-year cash operating cash flows (oancj) divided by the 
flows current total assets (at) 
sdSALE Standard deviation The standard deviation of the prior five years' Compustat 
of prior 5-year sales (sale) divided by the current total assets 
sales (at) 
Seg Operation The natural logarithm ofthe number of Compustat 
complexity segments in the current year 
Std RET Stock return The standard deviation of the 12-monthly stock CRSP 
volatility returns (ret) during the current year. 
.StkOption High-risk Equal to one for a firm with nonzero executive Execucomp 
preference options outstanding in the current year 
(opt _unex _ exer _ num + opt_ unex _ unexer _ num) 
or with nonzero executive options granted 
( option_awards_ num) if the current options are 
exercised in the same year; zero otherwise 
TanATS Tangible assets to The ratio of tangible assets to sales in the Compustat 
sales ratio current year, calculated as the sum of plant 
property and equipment (ppent), inventory 
(invt), investments and advances-equity, and 
investment and advances-other (ivao) divided 
by sales (sale) 
TASSET Size The natural logarithm of current total assets (at) Compustat 
TaxAuditProb Probability of tax The likelihood that a firm in a particular asset Tables of 
audit range will be subject to an IRS audit, calculated Examination 
as the number of corporate tax return audits Coverage in the 
completed in the IRS ' s current fiscal year for an IRS's annual Data 
IRS asset size group divided by the number of Book 
corporate tax returns received in the previous 
year for the same IRS asset size group 
TaxProf Indicator for a firm Equal to one for a firm with nonzero current tax Compustat 
with taxable profits expense (txc) and no operating loss 
carryforwards (tlc;f); zero otherwise 
Techlnt Indicator for a Equal to one for high-tech industries using the Compustat 
technology SIC two-digit classifications of technology areas 
intensive industry developed by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD 2003); 
zero otherwise 
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Appendix 5: Variable Definitions- Continued 
Variable Description Measurement Data Source Name 
TobinQ Investment Tobin's Q, or the ratio of current market value Compustat 
opportunities to current book value of total assets, computed 
as the sum of market value of equity and the 
book value of debt divided by total assets ( csho 
x prcc f + dltt + dlc)l at. 
D_Ad)RD Change in Current adjusted R&D minus adjusted R&D Compustat 
Adjusted R&D (Ad)RD) in the previous year, , divided by total 
assets (at) at the beginning of the current year 
D_RepRD Change in Current reported R&D minus reported R&D Compustat 
Reported R&D (xrd) in the previous year, , divided by total 
assets (at) at the beginning of the current year 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Sample Selection 
Total Firm-
Exclusion criteria Year Total Unique Firms 
Observations 
Non-fmancial and non-regulated 
firms33 in the COMPUST AT and 
CRSP dataset from 1997 to 2007 after 
deleting firm records after merging 42,792 7,644 
with, diversifying and/or spinning off 
from firms with R&D expenditures in 
prior year from SDC's M&A database 
Firms without R&D Firms with R&D 
Tax Credit Tax Credit 
Total Total Firm- Total 
Firm- Total Unique Firm- Years with Unique Firms R&D Tax Years Years Credit Firms 
Firm-years not affected by M&A, 31,851 6,096 10,941 5,583 1,548 divestitures, and spin-offs 
Less: 
Finns with disclosed foreign R&D tax 94 19 347 172 46 
credit in 10-K 
Firms with missing earnings, or with 0, 644 163 73 40 16 
missing or negative total assets 
Finns with all 0 or missing R&D 19,331 3,510 0 0 0 
expenditures 
Firms in SIC codes 9995 and 9997 107 18 16 4 3 
Sample for Hl 11 ,675 2,386 5 36734 
' 
1,483 
Required data available for necessary 
variables and after propensity score 
matching in each analysis 
Sample for H2 573 463 573 573 
Sample for H3a 1,3 99 958 1,399 1,3 99 
Sample for H3b 1,365 964 1,365 1,365 
Sample for H3c 1,395 986 1,395 1,3 95 
33 These are the firms in industries that exclude SIC codes of 4900-4999 and 6000-6999. 
34 I exclude the fmn-year without R&D tax credits for fums with R&D tax credits in all the analyses, as 
these fmn-years may confound the comparison between R&D tax credit users and non-R&D tax credit 
users. 
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Table 2. Characteristics of R&D Tax Credit Users 
Panel A. Distribution of R&D Tax Credit Firms and R&D Tax Credit Firms with 
Disclosed Credit Amounts Currently Earned by Industries 
R&D Credit User with 
(First 2-digit SIC) Industry R&D Credit User Amount Disclosures in 
at Least One Year 
Freguency Percent Frequency Percent 
(0 1) Agricultural production 4 0.27 4 0.34 
(13) Oil and gas extraction 2 0.13 2 · 0.17 
(16) Heavy construction 2 0.13 1 0.09 
(20) Food and kindred products 9 0.61 8 0.68 
(22) Textile mill products 4 0.27 4 0.34 
(24) Lumber and wood products 2 0.13 2 0.17 
(25) Furniture and fixtures 9 0.61 7 0.60 
(26) Paper and allied products 6 0.40 5 0.43 
(27) Printing, publishing and allied 6 0.40 6 0.51 
(28) Chemical, biotech and drug 296 19.96 190 16.24 
(29) Petroleum refining 0.07 0.09 
(30) Rubber and miscellaneous plastics 16 1.08 13 1.11 
(31) Leather products 0.07 0.09 
(32) Stone, clay, glass, concrete products 6 0.40 3 0.26 
(33) Primary metal industries 9 0.61 7 0.60 
(34) Fabricated metal 17 1.15 16 1.37 
(3 5) Machinery and computer equipment 175 11.80 151 12.91 
(36) Electrical and electronic components 247 16.66 208 17.78 
(3 7) Transportation equipment 39 2.63 27 2.31 
(38) Medical and scientific instruments · 241 16.25 183 15.64 
(39) Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 11 0.74 9 0.77 
( 40) Railroad transportation 0.07 1 0.09 
(44) Water transportation 0.07 0 0.00 
( 4 7) Transportation services 0.07 0.09 
( 48) Communications 15 1.01 12 1.03 
( 49) Electrical, gas and sanitary services 15 1.01 12 1.03 
(50) Wholesale of durable goods 4 0.27 4 0.34 
(51) Wholesale of nondurable goods 0.07 0.09 
(54) Food stores 2 0.13 0.09 
(55) Automotive dealer and gasoline service stations 1 0.07 1 0.09 
(56) Apparel and accessory stores 1 0.07 1 0.09 
(57) Home furniture and equipment stores 1 0.07 0.09 
(58) Eating and drinking places 3 0.20 3 0.26 
(59) Miscellaneous retail 4 0.27 4 0.34 
(73) Computer software and data services 308 20.77 263 22.48 
(78) Motion pictures 2 0.13 0.09 
(79) Amusements and recreation 0.07 1 0.09 
(80) Health services 0.07 0 0.00 
(87) Engineering, accounting, other 18 1.21 15 1.28 
Total 1,483 100.00 1,170 100.00 
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Table 2. Characteristics of R&D Tax Credit Users - Continued 
Panel B. Distribution of R&D Tax Credit Firms by Type of R&D Tax Credit Usage 
and the Industry 
(First 2-digit SIC) Industry Overall Continuous Use-stop-
use 
Other 
(0 1) Agricultural production 4 2 0 2 
(13) Oil and gas extraction 2 0 1 
( 16) Heavy construction 2 0 0 2 
(20) Food and kindred products 9 2 0 7 
(22) Textile mill products 4 0 0 4 
(24) Lumber and wood products 2 0 0 2 
(25) Furniture and fixtures 9 1 0 8 
(26) Paper and allied products 6 0 5 
(27) Printing, publishing and allied 6 0 5 
(28) Chemical, biotech and drug 296 79 53 164 
(29) Petroleum refming 0 1 0 
(30) Rubber and miscellaneous plastics 16 3 1 12 
(31) Leather products 1 0 0 1 
(32) Stone, clay, glass, concrete products 6 0 5 
(33) Primary metal industries 9 0 2 7 
(34) Fabricated metal 17 2 4 11 
(35) Machinery and computer equipment 175 35 33 107 
(36) Electrical and electronic components 247 44 44 159 
(3 7) Transportation equipment 39 3 4 32 
(38) Medical and scientific instruments 241 58 44 139 
(39) Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 11 1 1 9 
( 40) Railroad transportation 1 0 0 
( 44) Water transportation 0 0 
( 4 7) Transportation services 1 0 0 1 
( 48) Communications 15 0 2 13 
( 49) Electrical, gas and sanitary services 15 0 2 13 
(50) Wholesale of durable goods 4 0 3 
(51) Wholesale of nondurable goods 0 0 
(54) Food stores 2 0 1 
(55) Automotive dealer and gasoline service stations 1 0 0 
(56) Apparel and accessory stores 1 0 0 
(57) Home furniture and equipment stores 1 0 1 0 
(58) Eating and drinking places 3 0 0 3 
(59) Miscellaneous retail 4 0 2 2 
(73) Computer software and data services 308 67 43 198 
(78) Motion pictures 2 0 0 2 
(79) Amusements and recreation 1 0 0 1 
(80) Health services 0 0 
(87) Engineering, accounting, other 18 5 3 10 
Total 1,483 302 249 932 
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Table 3. Time-Series Distribution of R&D Tax Credit Users 
Panel A. Distribution of Firm-years by Each Fiscal Year and Fiscal Year End 
Month 
Fiscal Fiscal Year-end Month 
12 Total Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1996 7 6 27 4 9 53 
1997 8 7 27 4 6 33 3 6 42 11 5 213 365 
1998 8 9 28 4 6 49 6 5 39 14 3 218 389 
1999 9 5 29 6 3 48 5 4 35 12 3 236 395 
2000 9 1 29 8 6 42 5 5 40 11 2 279 437 
2001 7 3 36 9 8 46 4 6 41 12 3 301 476 
2002 9 4 · 34 8 9 48 6 8 39 14 6 331 516 
2003 9 7 34 5 10 47 7 8 42 14 3 326 512 
2004 7 5 35 8 8 46 7 9 38 9 2 362 536 
2005 11 4 35 13 5 44 7 11 41 9 3 416 599 
2006 11 4 40 11 5 42 8 8 42 11 2 389 573 
2007 34 10 7 41 9 1 414 516 
Total 95 55 354 80 75 479 68 77 440 126 33 3,485 5,367 
Panel B. Distribution of Firms by the Number of Years with R&D Tax Credit 
Usages and by Types of R&D Tax Credit Usages (1997- 2007) 
Number of . Overall RD Tax Continuous RD Use-stop-use RD OtherRD Tax 
firm-years Credit Users Tax Credit Users Tax Credit Users Credit Users 
1 360 0 0 360 
2 308 92 42 174 
3 228 59 41 128 
4 142 33 43 66 
5 110 27 28 55 
6 97 15 27 55 
7 74 14 20 40 
8 65 22 20 23 
9 47 12 19 16 
10 26 2 9 15 
11 26 26 0 0 
Total 1483 302 249 932 
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Table 3. Time-Series Distribution of R&D Tax Credit Users - Continued 
Panel C. Time-Series Distribution of First-Time R&D Tax Credit Firms by Types of 
R&D Tax Credit Usage 
Fiscal Year Overall RD Continuous Use-sto(!-use OtherRD 
1996 53 19 11 23 
1997 330 124 73 133 
1998 129 9 34 86 
1999 115 17 25 73 
2000 135 25 34 76 
2001 108 8 19 81 
2002 100 5 21 74 
2003 95 16 10 69 
2004 103 23 12 68 
2005 120 22 10 88 
2006 101 34 0 67 
2007 · 94 0 0 94 
Total 1483 302 249 932 
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Table 3. Time-Series Distribution of R&D Tax Credit Users - Continued 
Panel D. Distribution of R&D Tax Credit by Industry and by Fiscal Year 
Panel D-1. The Number of Overall R&D Tax Credit Users 
(First 2-digit SIC) Industry Fiscal Year 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
(28) Chemical, biotech and drug 5 47 52 59 81 91 114 113 140 175 170 170 
(35) Machinery and computer equipment 11 64 57 62 59 61 51 50 50 52 54 51 
(3 6) Electrical and electronic components 14 66 67 65 78 92 94 83 89 101 90 80 
(38) Medical and scientific instruments 8 63 70 65 64 70 81 86 88 102 98 86 
(73) Computer software and data services 13 83 100 106 107 107 115 118 111 94 80 63 
Others 2 42 43 38 48 55 61 62 58 75 81 66 
Panel D-2. The Number of Continuous R&D Tax Credit Users 
(First 2-digit SIC) Industry Fiscal Year 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
(28) Chemical, biotech and drug 3 21 18 16 21 23 24 28 42 47 58 52 
(35) Machinery and computer equipment 2 25 25 22 20 15 11 9 8 8 9 7 
(36) Electrical and electronic components 7 22 23 19 19 19 19 19 21 24 24 21 
(3 8) Medical and scientific instruments 4 33 33 22 18 18 17 18 17 20 26 26 
(73) Computer software and data services 2 34 40 36 34 31 33 31 25 20 19 12 
Others 1 8 8 6 9 10 8 6 6 6 9 9 
Panel D-3. The Number of Use-stop-use R&D Tax Credit Users 
(First 2-digit SIC) Industry Fiscal Year 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
(28) Chemical, biotech and drug 1 17 16 18 29 30 33 25 31 40 27 34 
(35) Machinery and computer equipment 3 18 11 13 13 18 12 15 15 12 16 15 
(36) Electrical and electronic components 2 16 15 20 27 26 29 19 23 28 25 19 
(3 8) Medical and scientific instruments 1 12 15 17 16 17 21 19 22 24 21 20 
(73) Computer software and data services 3 11 17 23 21 22 24 20 19 19 14 15 
Others 1 6 13 10 11 12 13 13 9 14 8 8 
Panel D-4. The Number of Other R&D Tax Credit Users 
(First 2-digit SIC) Industry 96 97 98 
Fiscal Year 
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
(28) Chemical, biotech and drug 1 9 18 25 31 38 57 60 67 88 85 84 
(35) Machinery and computer equipment 6 21 21 27 26 28 28 26 27 32 29 29 
(3 6) Electrical and electronic components 5 28 29 26 32 47 46 45 45 49 41 40 
(3 8) Medical and scientific instruments 3 18 22 26 30 35 43 49 49 58 51 40 
(73) Computer software and data services 8 38 43 47 52 54 58 67 67 55 47 36 
Others 0 28 22 22 28 33 40 43 43 55 64 49 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for R&D Tax Credit Users 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics for Overall R&D Tax Credit Users and the 
Subsample of Three Types of R&D Tax Credit Users 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
Overall 
R&D Credit Amounts 4284 40.267 79.218 1.869 0.030 354.210 
Marginal R&D Tax Credit Rate 3999 0.024 0.211 0.000 -0.976 1.000 
R&D I Sales . 5242 0.555 1.130 0.148 0.000 6.150 
FCite1 5367 0.259 0.615 0.000 0.000 11.000 
FCite4 5367 0.966 1.938 0.000 0.000 28.080 
Patent Rank 5367 1.692 1.700 1.400 0.000 5.180 
Patent Count (apply year) 5367 10.992 47.194 1.000 0.000 1282.330 
Patent Count (patent) 5367 8.725 32.634 1.000 0.000 778.000 
R&D/Sale (1984-1988) 351 0.252 1.265 0.057 0.000 20.040 
Continuous R&D Tax Credit Users 
R&D Credit Amounts 1255 39.053 75.032 2.866 0.045 354.210 
Marginal R&D Tax Credit Rate 1231 0.019 0.185 0.000 -0.942 0.991 
R&D I Sales 1356 0.690 1.273 0.187 0.000 6.152 
FCite1 1406 0.323 0.692 0.000 0.000 7.280 
FCite4 1406 1.212 2.320 0.294 0.000 28.083 
Patent Rank 1406 1.710 1.724 1.386 0.000 5.182 
Patent Count (apply year) 1406 12.654 41.535 1.000 0.000 483.500 
Patent Count (patent) 1406 10.362 30.260 1.000 0.000 282.000 
R&D/Sale (1984-1988) 59 0.265 0.759 0.081 0.004 5.495 
Use-stO(!-USe R&D Tax Credit Users 
R&D Credit Amounts 816 31.868 68.803 1.233 0.030 354.210 
Marginal R&D Tax Credit Rate 769 0.027 0.210 0.000 -0.955 0.982 
R&D I Sales 1228 0.602 1.103 0.165 0.000 6.152 
FCite1 1242 0.263 0.645 0.000 0.000 10.999 
FCite4 1242 0.952 1.793 0.000 0.000 22.399 
Patent Rank 1242 1.836 1.728 1.813 0.000 5.182 
Patent Count (apply year) 1242 15 .901 64.118 1.000 0.000 813.000 
Patent Count (patent) 1242 11.980 44.261 1.000 0.000 513.000 
R&D/Sale (1984-1988) 51 0.732 2.841 0.082 0.003 20.044 
Other R&D Tax Credit Users 
R&D Credit Amounts 2213 44.053 84.699 1.778 0.030 354.210 
Marginal R&D Tax Credit Rate 1999 0.026 0.226 0.000 -0.976 1.000 
R&D I Sales 2658 0.465 1.055 0.120 0.000 6.150 
FCite1 2719 0.225 0.552 0.000 0.000 6.430 
FCite4 2719 0.846 1.767 0.000 0.000 20.150 
Patent Rank 2719 1.616 1.672 1.227 0.000 5.180 
Patent Count (apply year) 2719 7.891 40.078 1.000 0.000 1282.330 
Patent Count (patent) 2719 6.392 26.889 1.000 0.000 778.000 
R&D/Sale (1984-1988) 241 0.147 0.672 0.046 0.000 9.930 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for R&D Tax Credit Users- Continued 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics for Overall R&D Tax Credit Users by Top 5 Industry 
Industry Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
(28) R&D Cr~dit Amounts 772 59.930 100.774 2.367 0.045 354.210 
Chemical, _ Marginal R&D Tax Credit Rate 763 0.027 0.207 0.000 -0.976 1.000 
biotech and R&D / Sales 1217 2.202 3.034 1.098 0.000 22.800 
drug FCite1 1217 0.123 0.284 0.000 0.000 3.490 
FCite4 1217 0.466 0.804 0.000 0.000 9.160 
Patent Rank 1217 1.990 1.774 1.889 0.000 5.180 
Patent Count (apply year) 1217 12.515 44.251 1.000 0.000 434.500 
Patent Count (grant year) 1217 11.761 38.521 2.000 0.000 398.000 
(35) R&D Credit Amounts · 550 33.748 74.382 1.623 0.030 354.210 
Machinery and Marginal R&D Tax Credit Rate 535 0.026 0.228 0.000 -0.966 0.950 
computer R&D I Sales 622 0.139 0.253 0.101 0.000 5.090 
equipment FCite1 622 0.381 0.698 0.020 0.000 6.430 
FCite4 622 1.468 2.342 0.603 0.000 20.150 
Patent Rank 622 1.892 1.790 1.696 0.000 5.180 
Patent Count (apply year) 622 12.704 37.961 2.000 0.000 483 .500 
Patent Count (grant year) 622 8.898 23.626 2.000 0.000 282.000 
(36) R&D Credit Amounts 778 37.751 75.349 1.706 0.038 354.210 
Electrical and Marginal R&D Tax Credit Rate 753 0.022 0.220 0.000 -0.957 0.950 
electronic R&D I Sales 919 0.227 0.335 0.136 0.000 3.340 
components FCite1 919 0.371 0.602 0.147 0.000 5.860 
FCite4 919 1.340 1.896 0.696 0.000 14.230 
Patent Rank 919 2.286 1.672 2.427 0.000 5.180 
Patent Count (apply year) 919 21.360 71.321 3.000 0.000 813.000 
Patent Count (grant year) 919 15.436 46.297 3.000 0.000 619.500 
(38) R&D Credit Amounts 700 33.918 69.191 2.898 0.045 354.210 
Medical and Marginal R&D Tax Credit Ratt; 691 0.027 0.211 0.000 -0.942 0.990 
scientific R&D I Sales 881 0.267 0.582 0.109 0.000 6.180 
instruments FCite1 881 0.298 0.612 0.000 0.000 7.280 
FCite4 881 1.201 2.188 0.386 0.000 28.080 
Patent Rank 881 2.000 1.595 2.063 0.000 5.180 
Patent Count (apply year) . 881 8.613 29.046 2.000 0.000 350.000 
Patent Count (grant year) 881 7.671 26.208 2.000 0.000 273.000 
(73) R&D Credit Amounts 937 32.503 66.182 1.300 0.030 354.210 
Computer Marginal R&D Tax Credit Rate 892 0.020 0.199 0.000 -0.975 0.980 
software and R&D I Sales 1097 0.202 0.268 0.169 0.000 4.790 
data services FCite1 1097 0.286 0.860 0.000 0.000 11.000 
FCite4 1097 0.942 2.401 0.000 0.000 24.570 
Patent Rank 1097 0.676 1.199 0.000 0.000 5.180 
Patent Count (apply year) 1097 3.512 39.435 0.000 0.000 1282.330 
Patent Count (grant year) 1097 2.751 24.460 0.000 0.000 778.000 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for R&D Tax Credit Users - Continued 
Panel C. Distribution of Marginal R&D Tax Credit Rates 
Fiscal Marginal R&D Tax Credit Rate 
Overall Year <0 0-0.1 0.1-0.2 0.2-0.4 0.4-0.6 0.6-0.8 >= 0.8 Missing 
1996 7 (15.22%) 34 (73.91%) 1 (2.17%) 1 (2.17%) 2 (4.35%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (2.17%) . 7 (-) 53 (100.00%) 
1997 43 (14.19%) 209 (68.98o/~) 21 (6.93%). 21 (6.93%) 5 (1.65%) 1 (0.33%) 3 (0.99%) 62 (-) 365 (100.00%) 
1998 59 (18 .79%) 212 (67.52%) 15 (4.78%) 16 (5.10%) 5 (1.59%) ~ (1.27%) 3 (0.96%) 75 (-) 389 (100.00%) 
1999 55 (16.98%) 219 (-67.59%) 22 (6.79%) 21 (6.48%) 5 (1.54%) 1 (0.31%) 1(0.31%) 71 (-) 395 (100.00%) 
2000 55 (16.13%) 236 (69.21%} 24 (7.04%) . 10 (2.93%) 5 (1.47%) 6 (1.76%) 5 (1.47%) 96 (-) 437 (100.00%) 
2001 73 (20.33%) 234 (65.18%) 17 (4.74%) 21 (5.85%) 5 (1.39%) 6 (1.67%) . 3 (0.84%) 117(-) 416 (100.00%) 
2002 94 (23.56%) 246 (61.65%) 22 (5 .51%) 16 (4.01%) 8 (2.01%) 7 (1.75%) 6 (1.50%) 117(-) 516 (100.00%) 
2003 93 (23.54%) 245 (62.03%) 21 (5 .32%) 19 (4.81%) 6 (1.52%) 5 (1.27%) 6 (1.52%) 117(-) 512 (100.00%) 
2004 72 (17.96%) 249 (62.09%) . 27 (6.73%) 25 (6.23%) 16 (3 .99%) 4 (1.00%) 8 (2.00%) 135(-) 536 (100.00%) 
2005 62 (15 .05%) 277 (67:23%) 33 (8.01%) 24 (5.83%) 11 (2.67%) 4 (0.97%) 1 (0.24%) 187 (-) 599 (100.00%) 
2006 84 (21.54%) 24 1 (61.79%) 25 (6.41%) . 18 (4.62%) 17 (4.36%) 3 (0.77%) 2 (0.51%) 183 (-) 573 (100.00%) 
...... 2007 61 (19.37%) 196 (62.22%) 19 (6.03%) 14 (4.44%) 15 (4.76%) 6 (1.90%) . 4 (1.27%) 201 (-) 516 (100.00%) ...... 
\0 Overall 758 (18.95%) 2598 (64.97%) 247 (6.18%) 206 (5 .15%) 100 (2 .50%) 47 (1.18%) 43 (1.08%) 1368 (-) 5367 (100.00%) 
Table 5. Actual R&D Tax Credit Users vs. Estimated R&D Tax Credit Users 
This table presents whether using R&D expenditures in Compustat correctly identifies the actual R&D tax 
credit users. Panels A and B show the differences in the number of firms and observations. Panels C 
through E present the descriptive statistics for the Type I error sample (a), the Type II error sample (b), and 
the correctly estimated actual sample (c) identified in Panel B. 
Panel A. Comparison of the Number of Firms 
Frequency Estimated R&D tax credit firms 
(Row Percent) No Yes Total 
Actual 856 1530 (a) 2386 No 
R&D tax (35.88%) (64.12%) 
credit 305 (b) 1178 (c) 
firms Yes (20.57%) (79.43%) 1483 
Total 1165 2708 3869 
Panel B. Comparison ofthe Number of Firm-Years 
Frequency Has estimated R&D tax credit 
Total (Row Percent) No Yes 
No 
6298 5377 11675 Has actual (53.94%) (46.06%) 
R&D tax 1618 3749 
credit Yes 5367 (30.15%) (69.85%) 
Total 7916 9126 17042 
Panel C. Descriptive Statistics of (a) the Type I Error Sample 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
R&D Expense 5377 . 15.829 24.368 5.730 0.007 114.000 
R&D Credit Amounts 5377 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Marginal R&D Tax Credit Rate 5377 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R&D I Sales 5325 0.315 0.719 0.093 0.000 6.152 
FCite1 5377 0.191 0.533 0.000 o.ooo- 11.676 
FCite4 5377 0.795 1.894 0.000 0.000 42.422 
Patent Rank 5377 1.191 1.515 0.000 0.000 5.182 
Patent Count (apply year) 5377 . 9.183 76.010 0.000 0.000 2017.000 
Patent Count (grant year) 5377 7.658 64.500 0.000 0.000 1845.500 
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Table 5. Actual R&D Tax Credit Users vs. Estimated R&D Tax Credit Users 
Panel D. Comparison of Descriptive Statistics between (b) the Type II Error Sample and (c) the Correctly Estimated 
Actual R&D Tax Credit Users 
True Positive False Negative 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Min Max N Mean Std Dev Median Min Max 
R&D Expense*** 3749 29.213 30.682 17.137 0.055 114.000 1618 18.085 24.625 8.338 0.000 1 i4.000 
R&D Credit Amounts 3008 39.153 78.233 1.843 0.030 354.210 1276 42.892 81.464 1.893 0.038 354.210 
Marginal R&D Tax Credit Rate 3008 0.023 0.212 0.000 -0.975 1.000 991 0.027 0.208 0.000 -0.976 0.991 
R&D I Sales*** 3697 0.456 0.953 0.155 0.005 6.152 1545 0.794 1.443 0.090 .0.000 6.152 
FCite1 * 3749 0.270 0.574 0.000 0.000 6.889 1618 0.235 0.699 0.000 0.000 10.999 
FCite4** 3749 1.005 1.856 0.000 0.000 24.567 1618 0.877 2.114 0.000 0.000 28.083 
Patent Rank*** 3749 1.857 1.708 1.761 0.000 5.182 1618 1.308 1.620 0.128 0.000 5.182 
Patent Count (apply year)** 3749 11.836 44.858 1.000 0.000 813.000 1618 9.038 52.167 0.000 0.000 1282.333 
Patent Count (grant year)** 3749 9.396 31.113 1.000 0.000 619.500 1618 7.171 35.872 0.000 0.000 778.000 
........ 
***,**, *indicate that the mean is significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed t tests) . 
tv 
........ 
Panel E. Comparison of Descriptive Statistics between True R&D Tax Credit Users and Estimated R&D Tax Credit 
Users 
True R&D Tax Credit Users Estimated R&D Tax Credit Users 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Min Max N Mean Std Dev Median Min Max 
R&D Expense*** 5367 25 .859 29.434 14.552 0.000 114.000 9126 21.327 27.926 9.208 0.007 114.000 
R&D Credit Amounts*** 4284 40.267 79.218 1.869 0.030 354.210 9126 2.291 12.208 0.318 0.000 336.440 
Marginal R&D Tax Credit Rate* ** 3999 0.024 0.211 0.000 -0.976 1.000 8385 0.008 0.127 0.000 -0.975 1.000 
R&D I Sales*** 5242 0.555 1.130 0.148 0.000 6.152 9022 0.373 0 .. 826 0.124 0.000 .6.152 
FCitel *** 5367 0.259 0.615 0.000 0.000 10.999 9126 0.224 0.551 0.000 0.000 11.676 
FCite4*** 5367 0.966 1.938 0.000 0.000 28.083 91 26 0.881 1.881 0.000 0.000 42.422 
Patent Rank*** 5367 1.692 1.700 1.400 0.000 5.182 9126 1.464 1.630 0.893 0.000 5.182 
Patent Count (apply year) 5367 10.992 47.194 1.000 0.000 1282.333 9126 10.273 65.055 0.000 0.000 2017.000 
Patent Count (grant year) 5367 8.725 32.634 1.000 0.000 778.000 9126 8.372 53.380 0.000 0.000 1845.500 
* * *, * *, * indicate that the mean is significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two -tailed t tests). 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for R&D Tax Credit Users and Non-R&D Tax Credit Users 
Panel A. Dependent and Independent Variables for Testing Hypothesis 1 (Treatment vs. Control) 
R&D Tax Credit Users (CR=l) Non-R&D Tax Credit Users (CR=O) 
(N = 5,367) (N = 11,675) 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
TASSET1 149.008 *** 129.709 *** 835.676 5.653 4883.201 98.988 77.000 940.527 5.653 4883.201 
Techlnt 0.582 *** 1.000 *** 0.493 0.000 1.000 0.431 0.000 0.495 0.000 1.000 
PatSuccess11 1.029 *** 0.693 *** 1.151 0.000 3.555 0.589 0.000 0.957 0.000 3.555 
RDLead 0.155 *** 0.000 *** 0.362 0.000 1.000 0.068 0.000 0.252 0.000 1.000 
StkOption 0.357 *** 0.000 *** 0.479 0.000 1.000 0.255 0.000 0.436 0.000 1.000 
TaxProf 0.376 *** 0.000 *** 0.484 0.000 1.000 0.337 0.000 0.473 0.000 1.000 
RDStart 0.536 * 1.000 * 0.499 0.000 1.000 0.522 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Lev 0.110 *** 0.021 *** 0.155 0.000 0.588 0.174 0.118 0.181 0.000 0.588 
Cashshort 2.108 *** 0.000 *** 5.807 0.000 48.431 3.524 0.000 7.721 0.000 48.431 
GDP 9.367 *** 9.379 *** 0.089 9.151 9.488 9.326 9.325 0.092 9.151 9.488 
...... 
N Panel B. Dependent and Independent Variables for Testing Hypothesis 2 (Treatment vs. Control) N 
R&D Tax Credit Users (N = 573) Non-R&D Tax Credit Users (N = 573) 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
RepRD1 25.167 * 11.899 *** 30.753 0.000 110.750 21.681 5.973 32.003 0.000 110.750 
AdjRD1 25.146 * 11.899 *** 30.756 0.000 110.750 21.668 5.921 32.001 0.000 110.750 
MRDCR 0.057 *** 0.000 *** 0.235 -0.942 0.987 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RDI-1 2.311*** 2.379 *** 1.392 -1.394 4.650 1.821 1.783 1.694 -1.630 4.650 
TobinQ 2.456 *** 1.768 *** 2.057 0.352 16.338 2.098 1.433 1.823 0.352 16.338 
SALE 438.650 *** 114.310 820.169 0.560 3890.237 727.813 142.053 1149.770 0.560 4758.016 
ROA . -0.016 *** 0.047 ** 0.211 -1.189 0.174 -0.076 0.030 0.295 -1.583 0.181 
sdCF 0.069 *** 0.048 * 0.067 0.012 0.518 0.083 0.053 0.083 0.012 0.518 
sdSALE 0.192 *** 0.165 0.137 0.024 0.789 0.218 0.163 0.171 0.026 0.914 
Lev 0.122 ** 0.050 ** 0.155 0.000 0.588 0.141 0.087 0.155 0.000 0.588 
Cash 0.293 *** 0.238 *** 0.245 0.004 0.886 0.236 0.161 0.233 0.004 0.880 
Ins tOwn 0.286 ** 0.159 ** 0.316 0.000 1.199 0.243 0.043 0.301 0.000 0.978 
NegEarn 0.272 *** 0.000 *** 0.446 0.000 1.000 0.375 0.000 0.485 0.000 1.000 
Note 1: The analysis uses the log transformation, but here I present the variable without the log transformation. 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for R&D Tax Credit Users and Non-R&D Tax Credit Users- Continued 
Panel C. Dependent and Independent Variables for Testing Hypothesis 3a (Treatment vs. Control) 
R&D Tax Credit Users {N = 1,399} Non-R&D Tax Credit Users {N = 1,399} 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
PatRnk 1.217 0.125 *** 1.517 0.000 5.182 1.152 0.000 1.565 0.000 5.182 
FCite4 0.491 *** 0.000 *** 0.612 0.000 1.873 0.372 0.000 0.555 0.000 1.873 
FCitel 0.168 *** 0.000 *** 0.259 0.000 0.909 0.129 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.909 
ExcQRE 0.810 *** 0.045 *** 1.580 0.000 8.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OthRD 0.284 ** 0.032 *** 0.732 0.000 4.709 0.226 0.058 0.508 0.000 4.709 
SALE 360.572 *** 79.420 752.863 0.240 4029.700 577.952 86.693 1050.230 0.240 4758.016 
Caplnt 85.047 59.468 75.500 14.487 461.781 89.844 58.180 86.868 13.515 461.781 
Ins tOwn 0.188 0.000 0.284 0.000 1.199 0.202 0.000 0.306 0.000 1.628 
BHAR 0.026 ** -0.075 ** 0.667 . -1.308 4.325 -0.034 -0.124 0.637 -1.308 4.325 
ROA -0.073 0.028 * 0.258 -1.583 0.174 -0.089 0.020 0.286 -1.583 0.181 
Cash 0.371 *** 0.343 *** 0.280 0.004 0.919 0.282 0.210 0.252 0.004 0.919 
Lev 0.116 * 0.028 *** 0.157 0.000 0.588 0.127 0.061 0.155 0.000 0.588 
....... 
N 
Age 2.077 *** 1.946 *** 0.868 0.000 4.043 2.261 2.197 0.888 0.000 4.043 
w 
Panel D. Dependent and Independent Variables for Testing Hypothesis 3b (Treatment vs. Control) 
R&D Tax Credit Users {N = 1,365} Non-R&D Tax Credit Users {N = 1,365} 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev . Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
FE5 0.021 0.109 *** 0.428 -2.129 0.417 0.020 0.054 0.321 -2.129 0.417 
FEI 0.046 0.163 *** 0.509 -2.627 0.494 0.046 0.114 0.376 -2.627 0.494 
ExcQRE 0.775 *** 0.043 *** 1.543 0.000 8.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OthRD 0.283 ** 0.033 *** 0.728 0.000 4.709 0.233 0.055 0.535 0.000 4.709 
MV 5.562 *** 5.544 ** 1.565 1.567 8.759 5.332 5.326 1.895 1.567 8.759 
TanATS 0.615 *** 0.700 *** 0.273 0.100 1.000 0.539 0.500 0.281 0.100 1.000 
MTB 4.386 *** 2.989 *** 4.127 0.000 24.020 3.692 2.487 3.725 0.000 24.020 
Ins tOwn 0.194 0.000 0.287 0.000 1.199 0.200 0.000 0.304 0.000 1.628 
Cash 0.369 *** 0.336 *** 0.280 0.004 0.919 0.283 0.210 0.254 0.004 0.919 
Caplnt 85.771 60.534 75.739 14.487 461.781 90.513 59.626 86.959 13.515 461.781 
Seg 0.229 0.000 0.453 0.000 2.079 0.240 0.000 0.493 0.000 2.303 
Lev 0.115 ** 0.028 *** 0.155 0.000 0.588 0.129 0.062 0.156 0.000 0.588 
ROA -0.067 ** 0.029 0.250 -1.583 0.174 -0.091 0.022 0.284 -1.583 0.181 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for R&D Tax Credit Users and Non-R&D Tax Credit Users- Continued 
Panel E. Dependent and Independent Variables for Testing Hypothesis 3c (Treatment vs. Control) 
R&D Tax Credit Users {N = 1,395} Non-R&D Tax Credit Users {N = 1,395} 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Std RET 0.188 *** 0.166 *** 0.103 0.044 0.621 0.177 0.151 0.106 0.044 0.621 
ExcQRE 0.769 *** 0.043 *** 1.533 0.000 8.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OthRD 0.281 ** 0.033 *** 0.725 0.000 4.709 0.230 0.054 0.541 0.000 4.709 
MV 5.553 *** 5.528 ** 1.546 1.567 8.759 5.323 5.258 1.840 1.567 8.759 
TanATS 0.602 *** 0.600 *** 0.282 0.100 1.000 0.533 0.500 0.284 0.100 1.000 
MTB 4.369 *** 2.989 *** 4.094 0.000 24.020 3.683 2.503 3.619 0.000 24.020 
Ins tOwn 0.191 0.000 0.285 0.000 1.199 0.201 0.000 0.301 0.000 1.485 
Cash 0.381 *** 0.352 *** 0.287 0.004 0.919 0.287 0.202 0.259 0.004 0.919 
Capfnt 86.083 60.315 76.655 14.487 461.781 90.693 58.904 88.871 13 .515 461.781 
Seg 0.236 0.000 0.453 0.000 2.079 0.262 0.000 0.5 15 0.000 2.303 
Lev 0.113 ** 0.026 *** 0.154 0.000 0.588 0.125 0.050 0.156 0.000 0.588 
ROA -0.077 0.026 0.256 -1.583 0.174 -0.092 0.027 0.290 -1.583 0.181 
-N 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and I 0% levels, respectively (two-tailed t tests for the means; two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test ~ 
for the medians). 
Panel F. Distribution ofPatent Counts (Application Year) 
Credit Patent Counts (Application Year) Over-
Users 0 >0- 2 >2- 4 >4 -7 >7 -15 >15 - 30 >30- 50 >50 -100 >100 - 500 >500 all 
Yes 2463 (45.89%) 1019 (18.99%) 419 (7.81%) 371 (6.91%) 441 (8.22%) 302 (5.63%) 142 (2.65%) 79 (1.47%) 122 (2.27%) 9 (0.17%) 5367 
No 7452 (63.83%) 1931 (16.54%) 637 (5.46%) 481 (4. 12%) 491 (4.21 %) 281 (2.41%) 137 (1.17%) 132 (1.13%) 105 (0.90%) 28 (0.24%) 11675 
Overall 9915 (58.18%) 2950 (17.3 1%) 1056 (6.20%) 852 (5 .00%) 932 (5.47%) 583 (3.42%) 279 (1.64%) 211 (1.24%) 227 (1.33%) 37 (0.22%) 17042 
Table 7. Correlation 
Panel A. Hl (Before Propensity Score Matching) 
This table presents the correlation analyzed with Pearson Test in the left diagonal and with Spearman Test in the right diagonal in full sample before 
propensity score matching. *** and** indicate that the correlations are significant at the l percent and 5 percent level in two-tail, respectively. The 
sample consists of 17,042 firm -years. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
CR TASSET Techlnt PatSuccess0 RDLead StkOption TaxProf RDStart Lev Cashshort GDP 
(1) 0.13 *** 0.14 *** 0;20 *** 0.14 *** 0.10 *** 0.04 *** 0.01 * -0.20 *** -0.14 *** 0.21 *** 
(2) 0.11*** -0.18 *** 0.39 *** 0.34 *** 0.63 *** 0.25 *** -0.18 *** 0.23 *** -0.24 *** 0.14 *** 
(3) 0.14 *** -0.1 9 ** * 0.01 0.03 *** -0.10 *** -0.02 *** 0.12 *** -0.24 *** -0.04 *** -0.06 *** 
(4) 0.20 *** 0.45 *** 0.01 0.56 *** 0.36 *** 0.08 *** -0.14 *** 0.03 *** -0.15 *** 0.00 
(5) 0.14 *** 0.36 *** 0.03 *** 0.72 *** 0.31 *** 0.06 *** -0.11 *** 0 .05 *** -0.13 *** 0.00 
(6) 0.10 *** 0.65 *** -0.10 *** 0.40 *** 0.31 *** 0.25 *** -0.26 *** 0.12 *** -0.25 *** 0.03 *** 
(7) 0.04 *** 0.25 *** -0.02 *** 0.08 *** 0.06 *** 0.25 *** -0.15 *** 0.00 -0.24 *** -0.09 *** 
(8) 0.01 * -0.20 *** 0.12 *** -0.15 *** -0.11*** -0.26 *** -0.15 *** -0.15 *** 0.18 *** -0.09 *** 
-
(9) -0.17 *** 0.23 N *** -0.22 *** 0.04 *** 0.03 *** 0.09 *** -0.02 ** -0.12 *** 0.09 *** -0.08 *** 
V1 (10) -0.09 *** 0.06 *** -0.05 *** -0.07 *** -0.05 *** -0.08 *** -0.13 *** 0.12 *** 0.11 *** -0.06 *** 
(11) 0.21 *** 0.14 *** -0.06 *** 0.00 0.00 0.03 *** -0.09 *** -0.08 *** -0.06 *** -0.02 ** 
Table 7. Correlation - Continued 
Panel B. H2 (After Propensity Score Matching) 
This table presents the correlation analyzed with the Pearson Test in the left diagonal and with the Spearman Test in the right diagonal in full sample 
before propensity score matching. ***, **, and * indicate that the correlations are significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level in two-tail, 
respectively. The sample consists of 1,146 finn -years, or 573 pairs of treatment and control fum-years. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
RepRD AdjRD MRDCR RDt-1 TobinQ SALE ROA sdCF sdSALE Lev Cash Ins tOwn Neg_Earn 
(1) 1.00 *** 0.12 *** 0.94 *** 0.21 *** 0.60 *** 0.15 *** -0.29 *** -0.15 *** 0.05 0.11 *** 0.31 *** -0.12 *** 
(2) 0.84 *** 0.12 *** 0.94 *** 0.21 *** 0.59 *** 0.15 *** -0.29 *** -0.15 *** 0.05 0.11 *** 0:31 *** -0.12 *** 
(3) 0.09 *** 0.08 *** 0.03 0.10 *** 0.00 0.08 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.06 ** 0.08 *** 0.05 -0.06 ** 
(4) 0.94 *** 0.77 *** 0.03 0.18 *** 0.59 *** 0.13 *** -0.23 *** -0.12 *** 0.07 ** 0.11 *** 0.31 *** -0.11 *** 
(5) 0.13 *** 0.13 *** 0.01 0.10 *** -0.05 * 0.27 *** 0.05 -0.10 *** -0.21 *** 0.36 *** 0.11 *** -0 .06 * 
(6) 0.58 *** 0.39 *** 0.01 0.57 *** -0.13 *** 0.44 *** -0.52 *** -0.06 ** 0.29 *** -0.40 *** 0.30 *** -0.46 *** 
(7) 0.13 *** 0.08 *** 0.03 0.11 *** -0.08 *** 0.51 *** -0.36 *** -0 .02 -0.13 *** -0.10 *** 0.21 *** -0.81 *** 
(8) -0.24 *** -0.20 *** -0.09 *** -0.19 *** 0.12 *** -0.51 *** -0.57 *** 0.35 *** -0.25 *** 0.32 *** -0.23 *** 0.38 *** 
>-' (9) 
-0.18 *** -0.16 *** -0.06 ** -0.14 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.13 *** 0.36 *** -0.10 *** -0.02 -0.16 *** 0.04 N 
0\ (10) 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 * -0.17 *** 0.24 *** -0.07 ** -0.12 *** -0.06 * -0.56 *** 0.02 -0.02 
(11) 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.04 0.10 *** 0.35 *** -0.43 *** -0.22 *** 0.30 *** -0.04 -0.38 *** 0.00 0.22 *** 
(12) 0.38 *** 0.31 *** 0.04 0.37 *** 0.07 ** 0.37 *** 0.24 *** -0.27 *** -0.19 *** 0.02 -0.01 -0.21 *** 
(13) -0.12 *** -0.08 *** -0.05 * -0.10 *** 0.01 -0.47 *** -0.69 *** 0.41 *** 0.12 *** 0.02 0.24 *** -0.25 *** 
Table 7. Correlation - Continued 
Panel C. H3a (After Propensity Score Matching) 
This table presents the correlation analyzed with Pearson Test in the left diagonal and with Speannan Test in the right diagonal in full sample before 
propensity score matching. ***,**, and* indicate that the con-elations are significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level in two-tail, 
respectively. The sample consists of2,798 firm-years , or 1,399 pairs of treatment and control fmn-years. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
PatRnk FCite4 FCitel ExcQRE OthRD SALE Cap_lnt Ins tOwn BHAR ROA Cash Lev Age 
(1) 0.45 *** 0.44 *** -0.02 0.04 ** 0.29 *** 0.36 *** 0.30 *** 0.08 *** 0.10 *** -0.08 *** 0.12 *** 0.30 *** 
(2) 0.36 *** 0.88 *** 0.10 *** 0.05 *** 0.18 *** 0.16 *** 0.17*** 0.04 ** 0.09 *** 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
(3) 0.3 1 *** 0.88 *** 0.08 *** 0.05 *** 0.19 *** 0.15 *** 0.16 *** 0.04 ** 0.08 *** 0.03 0.00 -0.01 
(4) -0.04 ** 0.10 *** 0.08 *** -0.41 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.02 0.05 *** 0.07 *** 0.14 *** -0.08 *** -0.15 *** 
(5) 0.03 0.06 *** 0.07 *** -0.41 *** -0.39 *** 0.00 -0.03 * -0.12 *** -0.38 *** 0.42 *** -0.22 *** -0.24 *** 
(6) 0.34 *** 0.15 *** 0.11 *** -0.11 *** -0.41 *** 0.23 *** 0.27 *** 0.16 *** 0.52 *** -0.50 *** 0.29 *** 0.41 *** 
(7) 0.29 *** 0.04 * 0.03 -0.07 *** -0.05 *** 0.24 *** 0.15 *** 0.00 0.01 -0.15 *** 0.23 *** 0.29 *** 
(8) 0.33 *** 0.14 *** 0.11 *** -0.04 ** -0.06 *** 0.37 *** 0.11 *** 0.08 *** 0.22 *** -0.12 *** 0.01 0.25 *** 
....... (9) 0.06 *** 0.05 N ** 0.05 *** 0.05 *** -0.07 *** 0.07 *** -0.01 0.04 ** 0.25 *** -0.04 * 0.00 0.08 *** 
.......:) (10) 0.09 *** 0.08 *** 0.05 *** -0.01 -0.36 *** 0.53 *** 0.00 0.24 *** 0.16 *** -0.25 *** -0.05 *** 0.25 *** 
(11) -0.10 *** 0.03 0.06 *** 0.18 *** 0.43 *** -0.52 *** -0.14 *** -0.14 *** 0.03 -0.28 *** -0.55 *** -0.44 *** 
(12) 0.13 *** -0.04 ** -0.05 *** -0.08 *** -0.21 *** 0.26 *** 0.23 *** 0.03 * -0.02 -0.05 ** -0.43 *** 0.26 *** 
(13) 0.33 *** -0.05 ** -0.06 *** -0.1 7 *** -0.26 *** 0.45 *** 0.26 *** 0.26 *** 0.02 0.25 *** -0.44 *** 0.24 *** 
Table 7. Correlation - Continued 
Panel D. H3b (After Propensity Score Matching) 
This table presents the correlation analyzed with Pearson Test in the left diagonal and with Spearman Test in the right diagonal in full sample before 
propensity score matching.***,**, and* indicate that the correlations are significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level in two-tail, 
respectively. The sample consists of2,730 firm-years, or 1,365 pairs of treatment and control firm-years. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
FE5 FEJ ExcQRE OthRD MV TanATS MTB Ins tOwn Cash Cae.Int Seg Lev ROA 
(1) 0.79 *** 0.11*** -0.18 *** 0.32 *** -0.11 *** 0.10 *** 0.22 *** -0.12 *** 0.17*** 0.04 ** 0.00 0.44 *** 
(2) 0.79 *** 0.13 *** -0.13 *** 0.33 *** -0.06 *** 0.16 *** 0.19 *** -0 .04 ** 0.15 *** -0.02 -0.04 ** 0.48 *** 
(3) -0.20 *** -0.17 *** -0.40 *** 0.05 *** 0.09 *** 0.10 *** -0.01 0.13 *** -0.05 ** -0.08 *** -0.09 *** 0.08 *** 
(4) -0.50 *** -0.50 *** -0.01 -0.1.3 *** 0.42 *** 0.12 *** -0.03 * 0.44 *** 0.00 -0.04 ** -0.23 *** -0.40 *** 
(5) 0.20 *** 0.22 *** -0.01 -0.11 *** 0.04 ** 0.46 *** 0.23 *** -0.05 *** 0.23 *** 0.08 *** 0.10 *** 0.38 *** 
(6) -0.27 *** -0.27 *** 0.15 *** 0.43 *** 0.06 *** 0.13 *** -0.07 *** 0.65 *** 0.21 *** 0.00 -0.25 *** -0 .35 *** 
(7) -0.05 ** -0.03 * 0.06 *** 0.07 *** 0.38 *** 0.14 *** 0.02 0.29 *** -0.09 *** 0.06 *** -0.12 *** 0.14 *** 
(8) 0.19 *** 0.17 *** -0.05 *** -0.10 *** 0.35 *** -0.08 *** 0.00 -0.10 *** 0.14 *** 0.00 0.00 0.21 *** 
-
(9) -0.27 *** -0.25 *** 0.20 *** 0.42 *** -0.04 ** 0.67 *** 0.28 *** . -0.13 *** -0.14 *** 0.03 * -0.56 *** -0.24 *** N 
00 (10) 0.03 0.02 -0 ,03 0.06 *** 0.23 *** 0.24 *** -0.11 *** 0.10 *** -0.14 *** 0.09 *** 0.24 *** 0.01 
(11) -0.03 -0.06 *** 0.04 ** 0.05 *** 0.11*** -0.04 ** -0.01 0.07 *** -0.03 * 0.14 *** 0.02 0.00 
(12) 0.02 0.02 -0.06 *** -0.06 *** 0.08 *** -0.19 *** -0.06 *** 0.03 * -0.44 *** 0.25 *** 0.07 *** -0.03 * 
(13) 0.44 *** 0.49 *** -0.13 *** -0.48 *** 0.37 *** -0.31 *** -0.04 ** 0.23 *** -0.28 *** -0.01 0.03 -0.02 
Table 7. Correlation- Continued 
Panel E. H3c (After Propensity Score Matching) 
This table presents the correlation analyzed with Pearson Test in the left diagonal and with Spearman Test in the right diagonal in full sample before 
propensity score matching. ***,**, and* indicate that the correlations are significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level in two-tail, 
respectively. The sample consists of2,790 firm-years, or 1,395 pairs oftreatment and control finn-years. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Std RET ExcQRE OthRD MV TanATS MTB Ins tOwn Cash Cap_Int Seg_ Lev ROA 
(1) 0.11 *** 0.25 *** -0.28 *** 0.22 *** 0.09 *** -0.18 *** 0.38 *** -0.19 *** -0.25 ** * -0.22 *** -0.37 *** 
(2) 0.13 *** -0.37 ** * 0.06 *** 0.11*** 0.09 *** -0.01 0.11*** -0.04 ** -0.11 ** * -0.08 *** 0.09 *** 
(3) 0.23 *** -0.37 ** * -0.12 *** 0.43 *** 0.12 *** -0.02 0.38 *** 0.00 -0.03 * -0.21 *** -0.33 *** 
(4) -0.22 *** 0.04 ** -0 .12 *** 0.07 *** 0.44 *** 0.21 *** -0.06 *** 0.24 *** 0.10 *** 0.11 *** 0.38 *** 
(5) 0.20 *** 0.15 *** 0.44 *** 0.07 *** 0.14 *** -0.06 *** 0.57 *** 0.23 *** -0.02 -0.23 *** -0.30 *** 
(6) 0.21 *** 0.09 *** 0.12 *** 0.37 *** 0.15 *** 0.01 0.29 *** -0.10 *** 0.05 *** -0.15 *** 0.12 *** 
(7) -0.21 *** -0.02 -0.05 *** 0.35 *** -0.06 ** * 0.01 -0.12 *** 0.14 *** -0.01 0.01 0.21 *** 
(8) 0.33 *** 0.15 *** 0.39 *** -0.06 *** 0.58 *** 0.28 *** -0.15 *** -0.15 *** 0.04 ** -0.55 *** -0.30 *** 
........ (9) -0.17 *** -0.07 *** -0.05 *** 0.26 *** 0.24 *** -0.11 *** 0.10 *** -0.15 *** 0.12 *** 0.24 *** 0.02 N 
\0 (10) -0.26 *** -0.10 *** -0.08 *** 0.13 *** -0.05 *** -0.03 0.05 *** -0.04 ** 0.18 *** 0.02 -0.04 ** 
(11) -0.16 *** -0.08 *** -0.21 *** 0.10 *** -0.18 *** -0.08 *** 0.05 ** -0.44 *** 0.25 *** 0.08 *** -0.02 
(12) -0.36 *** 0.03 -0.33 *** 0.36 *** -0.25 *** -0.05 *** 0.24 *** -0.33 *** 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
Table 8. Firm Characteristics of R&D Tax Credit Users 
This table presents the logistic regression analyses with the dependent variable being the indicator of using 
R&D tax credits ( CR), indicating whether the firm earns R&D tax credits in current year. 
Dependent Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
Research Ability 
TASSET 
Techlnt 
PatSuccessu 
RDLead 
StkOption 
Tax Advantage 
TaxProf 
RDStart 
Controls 
Cashshort 
Lev 
CashshortD 
LevD 
GDP 
Intercept 
Expected 
Sign 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
Year and Industry FE 
Robust SE Clustered by Firm 
Pseudo R 
Observations 
[1] 
Coefficient 
(z statistics) 
0.118 *** 
(3 .69) 
0.894 *** 
(7.04) 
0.226 *** 
(4.72) 
-0.148 
(-0.98) 
0.273 ** 
(2 .24) 
0.245 *** 
(3.23) 
0.286 *** 
(3.63) 
-0.005 *** 
(-2.70) 
-1.532 *** 
(-7.22) 
-2.051 
(-0.55) 
16.918 
(0.49) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1429 
17042 
Use of R&D Tax Credits (CR =1) 
[2] [3] 
Marginal Effect 
0.023 *** 
(3.70) 
0.179*** 
(7.13) 
0.045 *** 
(4.69) 
-0.029 
(-1.01) 
0.056 ** 
(2.19) 
0.050 *** 
(3 .17) 
0.057 *** 
(3 .69) 
-0.001 *** 
(-2.70) 
-0.306 *** 
(-7.32) 
-0.409 
(-0.55) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1429 
17042 
Coefficient 
( z statistics) 
0.129 *** 
(4.05) 
0.881 *** 
(6.92) 
0.222 *** 
(4.65) 
-0.140 
(-0.93) 
0.282 ** 
(2.33) 
0.248 *** 
(3.27) 
0.273 *** 
(3.48) 
-0.008 *** 
(-3 .13) 
-2.190 *** 
( -8.33) 
0.231 
(1.56) 
0.855 *** 
(4.54) 
-2.089 
(-0.56) 
17.276 
(0.50) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1453 
17042 
[4] 
Marginal Effect 
0.026 *** 
(4.06) 
0.176*** 
(7.01) 
0.044 *** 
(4.62) 
-0.027 
(-0.96) 
0.058 ** 
(2.27) 
0.050 ** * 
(3.21) 
0.054 *** 
(3.53) 
-0.002 ** * 
(-3.13) 
-0.437 *** 
( -8.48) 
0.048 
(1.50) 
0.194 *** 
(4.22) 
-0.417 
(-0.56) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1453 
17042 
The defmition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis 
(with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (z statistics) in column [1] and [3 ]. I also report marginal 
effects in column [2] and [ 4]. The symbols ** *, * *, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent (two-tailed) level, respectively. 
' 2 
CR = a0 + "fp11Research Ability+ L:a,1Tax Advantage+ LfJmControls+ Lf3mlndustry+ Lf3Xear+s (1) 
i:l j : l 
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Table 9. Impact of R&D Tax Credits on R&D Spending 
This table presents the results based on the regressions with the dependent variable being reported or 
adjusted R&D expenditures. 
Dependent Variable Natural Log of Reported Natural Log of Adjusted 
Expected R&D (RepRD) R&D (AdjRD) 
Independent Variables Sign Coefficient VIF Coefficient VIF (t statistics) (t statistics) 
MRDCR + 0.419 *** 1.06 0.516 *** 1.06 
(6.48) (4.19) 
RDr-1 + 0.823 *** 2.89 1.177*** 2.89 
(28.32) (13 .74) 
TobinQ + 0.035 *** 1.31 0.079 *** 1.31 
(3 .86) (4.07) 
SALE ? 0.122 *** 4.99 -0.114 4.99 
(4.43) (-1.37) 
ROA -0.246 ** 3.00 -0.113 3.00 
(-2.01) (-0.38) 
sdCF -0.978 *** 2.17 -2.806 *** 2.17 
(-2.64) (-3.04) 
sdSALE -0.387 *** 1.40 -0.238 1.40 
(-2.78) (-0.54) 
Lev -0.155 1.41 -0.197 1.41 
(-1.07) (-0.51) 
Cash + 0.375 *** 2.12 -0.090 2.12 
(2.79) (-0.22) 
Ins tOwn + 0.016 1.73 -0.008 1.73 
(0.28) (-0.05) 
NegEarn ? 0.067 3.08 0.078 3.08 
(0.96) (0.49) 
lnstOwn x NegEarn + 0.154 1.77 0.101 . 1.77 
(1.46) (0.42) 
Intercept -0.102 -0.082 
(-0.52) (-0.10) 
Year and Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Robust SE Clustered by Finn Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.9118 0.6688 
0 bservati ons 1146 1146 
The defmition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis 
(with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (t statistics) of the variable in that column. *** , **,and* 
indicate that correlations are significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively 
The above result is based on the analysis in equation (2): 
(2) 
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Table 10. Performance of Excess QREs 
Panel A. This table presents the regression analyses with the dependent variable being a firm's total patent 
ranks (PatRnk), the average of four-year-ahead citations per patents (FCite4) and one-year-ahead citation 
per patent (FCitel), respectively in columns 1 through 3. 
Total Patent Rank Average 4-year-Ahead 1-year-Ahead Dependent Variable Expected (PatRnk) · Patent Citation Patent Citation 
Sign (FCite4) (FCitel) Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Independent Variables (t statistics) · (t statistics) (t statistics) 
ExcQRE + 0.468 *** 0.251 *** 0.089 *** 
(4.38) (5.48) (5.06) 
OthRD + 0.948 *** 0.277 *** 0.110 *** 
(7.99) (6.09) (5.54) 
SALE ? 0.315 *** 0.096 *** 0.037 *** 
(11.54) (11.16) (9.64) 
Caplnt + 0.003 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 
(7.23) (3 .73) (3.44) 
Ins tOwn + 0.734 *** 0.131 *** 0.047 *** 
(7.36) (3.64) (3 .11) 
BHAR + 0.113 *** 0.032 * 0.015 * 
(3.58) (1.67) (1.71) 
ROA ? -0.443 *** -0.070 -0.033 
(-3 .25) (-1.46) (-1.49) 
Cash + 0.665 *** 0.250 *** 0.111 *** 
(4.68) (4.31) (4.45) 
Lev ? 0.481 ** -0.017 -0.008 
(2.56) (-0.28) (-0.29) 
Age ? 0.291 *** -0.040 *** -0.019 *** 
(8.31) (-3.51) (-4.23) 
Intercept -2.232 *** -0.717*** -0.289 *** 
(-8.91) (-7.99) (-7.38) 
Year and Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Robust SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.3997 0.2545 0.1904 
Observations 2798 2798 2798 
The defmition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis 
(with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (t statistics) of the variable in that column. ExcQRE and RD 
are deflated by sales. * * *, * *, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
based on two-tailed tests . 
The above results are based on the analyses in equation (5) and (6): 
(5) 
(6) 
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Table 10. Performance of Excess QREs - Continued 
Panel B. This table presents the regression analyses with the dependent variables being the average of 5-
year-ahead earnings to sales (FE5), 1-year-ahead earnings to sales (FE!), and stock return volatility 
(Std_RET) , respectively in column 1 through 3. 
Dependent Variable Profitability Return 
Expected 5-year-Ahead 1-year-Ahead Expected 
Volatility 
Sign Earnings (FE5) Earnings (FEJ) Sign (Std_REI) 
Independent Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient ( t statistics) ( t statistics 2 (t statistics) 
ExcQRE -0.057 *** -0.055 *** + 0.041 *** 
(-3 .57) ( -4.44) (6.39) 
OthRD +I- -0.232 *** -0.251 *** + 0.027 *** . 
(-8.81) (-7.83) (3.82) 
MV + 0.021 *** 0.023 *** 
-0.009 *** 
(4.70) (4.03) (-6.98) 
TanATS ? -0 .074 * -0.1 43 *** ? -0.002 
(-1.82) ( -3.06) (-0 .26) 
MTB ? -0.004 * -0.003 + 0.004 *** 
(-1.75) (-1.12) (4.90) 
Ins tOwn + 0.066 *** 0.039 * -0.022 *** 
(3.49) (1.72) (-4.29) 
Cash ? 0.019 0.084 ? 0.042 *** 
(0.31) (1.39) (3.95) 
Caplnt ? 0.000 ** 0.000 ** ? 0.000 
(2.38) (2 .18) (0.40) 
Seg 0.011 0.018 + 0.001 
(0.58) (0.90) (0.22) 
Lev -0.027 -0.011 + -0.013 
(-0.49) (-0.1 8) (-1.03) 
ROA + 0.251 *** 0.450 *** -0 .081 *** 
(5.43) (7.4 7) (-9.53) 
Intercept -0.116 -0.139 0.131 *** 
(-1.32) (-1.33) (8.69) 
Year and Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Robust SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.3642 0.3881 0.4487 
Observations 2730 2730 2790 
The definition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis 
(with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (t statistics) of the variable in that column. ExcQRE and 
OthRD are deflated by sales. ***, **, and* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
The above result is based on the analysis in equation (8) and (9): 
FE=a0 +a1ExcQRE + "J.:J31Controls+ 'l.:.Pmlndustry + 'l.:.fJ,Year+& (8) 
(9) 
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Table 11. Firm Characteristics of R&D Tax Credit Users (One Year Lagged)-
Dependent Variable: Use of R&D Tax Credits (CR =1) 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Independent Expected Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal 
Variables Sign (z statistics) Effect ( z statistics) Effect ( z statistics) Effect (z statistics) Effect 
Research 
Ability 
TASSET,_ 1 + 0.084 ** 0.018 ** 0.095 *** 0.020 *** 0.103 *** 0.022 *** 0.11 4 *** 0.024 *** 
(2.37) (2.37) (2.69) (2 .70) (2.95) (2.95) (3.27) (3.28) 
Techlnl,_t + 0.838 *** 0.177* ** 0.823 *** 0.174 *** 0.851 *** 0.180 *** 0.835 *** 0.176 *** 
(6.17) (6.25) (6.05) (6.12) (6.28) (6.37) (6.15) (6.24) 
PatSuccess1_1 + 0.254 *** 0.054 *** 0.248 *** 0.052 *** 
(5.61) (5.58) (5.50) (5.48) 
PatSuccess1_2 + 0.211 *** 0.045 *** 0.206 *** 0.043 *** 
(4.17) ( 4.15) (4.08) (4.06) 
RDLead 1_J + -0.137 -0.028 -0.126 -0.026 -0.113 -0.023 -0 .102 -0.021 
,_. 
(-0.99) (-1.02) (-0.92) (-0.94) (-0.70) (-0.71) (-0.64) (-0.65) 
w Stk0ption,_1 + 0.331 ** 0.071 ** 0.344 *** 0.074 *** 0.332 ** 0.072 ** 0.346 *** 0.075 *** 
~ (2.52) (2.47) (2.63) (2 .57) (2 .53) (2.48) (2.65) (2.59) 
Tax 
Advantage 
Tax-Prof,_ 1 + 0.217 *** 0.046 *** 0.219 *** 0.047 *** 0.210 *** 0.045 *** 0.212 *** 0.045 *** 
(2.68) (2.65) (2.71) (2.68) (2.61) (2.57) (2.64) (2.60) 
RDStarl,_t + 0.331 *** 0.069 *** 0.318 *** 0.067 *** 0.353 *** 0.074 *** 0.339 *** 0.071 *** 
(3.88) (3.94) (3.73) (3.79) ( 4.13) (4.20) (3.98) (4.04) 
Controls 
Cashshort,_1 -0.007 *** -0.002 *** -0.009 *** -0.002 *** -0.008 *** -0.002 *** -0.009 *** -0.002 *** 
(-3.17) (-3.17) (-2.85) (-2.85) (-3 .28) (-3.29) (-2.90) (-2.91) 
Lev,_1 -1.468 *** -0.309 *** -2.136 *** -0.449 *** -1.519 *** -0.320 *** -2.200 *** -0.463 *** 
(-6.25) (-6.32) (-7.46) (-7.58) (-6.43) (-6.50) (-7.69) (-7.81) 
GDP,_1 ? -1.907 -0.402 -1.958 -0.41 2 -1.823 -0.384 -1.893 -0.399 
( -0.49) (-0.49) (-0.50) (-0.50) (-0.47) (-0.47) (-0.49) (-0.49) 
CashshortD1_1 + 0.114 0.024 0.104 0.022 
(0.69) (0.68) (0.63) (0.62) 
LevD1_1 + 0.892 *** 0.209 *** 0.917 *** 0.216 *** 
(4.27) (4.07) (4.40) (4.20) 
Table 11. Firm Characteristics of R&D Tax Credit Users (One Year Lagged)- Continued 
Dependent Variable: Use of R&D Tax Credits (CR =1) 
[l] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Independent Expected Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal 
Variab les Sign ( z statistics) Effect (z statistics) Effect (z statistics) Effect ( z statistics) Effect 
Intercept 15.817 16.271 15.079 15.713 
(0.44) (0.45) (0.42) (0.44) 
Year and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust SE Clustered by Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
firm 
Pseudo R2 0.1387 0.1387 0.1412 0.1412 0.1360 0.1360 0.1386 0.1386 
Observations 13915 13915 13915 13915 13915 13915 13915 13915 
This table presents the results of estimating logistic regressions of equation (1) but changes the independent variables to those at the beginning of the 
current year (t-1) or the beginning of the prior year (t-2) . The dependent variable is the indicator of using R&D tax credits (CR), which equals one (CR = 
I) when firms disclose earned R&D tax credits in cmTent year. Relatively, firms without disclosing earned R&D tax credits in any year during the 
sample period 1997-2007 are classified as non-R&D tax credit users ( CR = 0). The defmition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5 
;::; one year before (t-1). The number without parenthesis (with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (Z statistics) in column [1 ], [3] , [5], and [7]. I also 
Vl report marginal effects in column [2], [4] , [6] , and [8]. The symbols***,**, and* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent (two-
tailed) level, respectively. 
Table 12. Firm Characteristics of R&D Tax Credit Users (Tobit Regression) 
This table presents the results of estimating equation (I) using the Tobit regression. The dependent variable 
is the indicator of using R&D tax credits (CR), which equals one (CR = 1) when finns disclose earned 
R&D tax credits in current year. Relatively, frrms without disclosing earned R&D tax credits in any year 
during the sample period 1997-2007 are classified as non-R&D tax credit users (CR = 0). 
Dependent Variable: 
Independent Variables 
Research Ability 
TASSET 
Techlnt 
PatSuccesstl 
RDLead 
StkOption 
Tax Advantage . 
TaxProf 
RDStart 
Controls 
Cashshort 
Lev 
CashshortD 
LevD 
GDP 
Intercept 
Year and Industry FE 
Robust SE Clustered by firm 
Pseudo R 
Observations 
Expected Sign 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
Use of R&D Tax Credits (CR =1) 
Coefficient 
(t statistics) 
0.077 *** 
(4.28) 
0.500 *** 
(6.91) 
0.116*** 
(4.62) 
-0.094 
(-1.20) 
0.152 ** 
(2.33) 
0.149 *** 
(3.59) 
0.137 *** 
(3.12) 
-0.004 *** 
(-3.03) 
-1.166 *** 
(-8.14) 
0.132 
(1.56) 
0.416 *** 
(3.83) 
-1.255 
(-0.60) 
10.484 
(0.55) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1035 
17042 
The defmition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis 
(with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (t statistics). The symbols * * *, * *, and * denote significance at 
the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent (two-tailed) level, respectively. 
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Table 13. Firm Characteristics of R&D Tax Credit Users (Additional Control 
Variables) 
This table presents the results of estimating logistic regressions of equation (1) but add additional control 
variables, including NewStkD, TaxAuditProb, and GDPGr. The dependent variable is the indicator of using 
R&D tax credits ( CR), which equals one ( CR = 1) when firms disclose earned R&D tax credits in current 
year, or equals zero when no credit in any year (CR = 0). 
Dependent Variable: 
Independent Variables 
Research Ability 
TASSET 
Techlnt 
PatSuccess0 
RDLead 
StkOption 
Tax Advantage 
TaxProf 
RDStart 
Controls 
Cashshort 
Lev 
CashshortD 
LevD 
NewStkD 
TaxAuditProb 
GDP 
GDPGr 
Intercept 
Year and Industry FE 
Robust SE Clustered by firm 
PseudoR 
Observations 
Expected Sign 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
Use of R&D Tax Credits (CR =1) 
[1] [2] 
Coefficient Coefficient 
(z statistics) (z statistics) 
0.223 *** 
(6.09) 
0.846 *** 
(6.66) 
0.206 *** 
(4.35) 
-0.099 
(-0.67) 
0.364 *** 
(2.94) 
0.308 *** 
(4.07) 
0.199 ** 
(2.51) 
-0.010 *** 
(-3.72) 
-2.051 *** 
(-7.87) 
0.233 
(1.57) 
0.788 *** 
(4.24) 
0.446 *** 
(6.41) 
-0.018 *** 
(-3.49) 
-3.222 
( -0.86) 
27.273 
(0.79) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1525 
17042 
0.215 *** 
(5.42) 
0.826 *** 
(6.05) 
0.229 *** 
( 4.41) 
-0.131 
(-0.84) 
0.389 ** 
(2.98) 
0.212 *** 
(2.60) 
0.182 ** 
(2.18) 
-0.011 *** 
(-3.71) 
-2.048 *** 
(-7.37) 
0.297 
(1.78) 
0.865 *** 
(4.24) 
0.454 *** 
(6.23) 
-0.019 *** 
(-3.31) 
-7.309 *** 
(-2.62) 
-1.804 
(-1.07) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1492 
17042 
The defmition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis 
(with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (z statistics). The symbols***,**, and* denote significance 
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent (two-tailed) level, respectively. 
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Table 14. Firm Characteristics of R&D Tax Credit Users (Alternative Sample) 
This table presents the results of estimating logistic regressions of equation (1) in an alternative sample. 
The dependent variable is the indicator of using R&D tax credits (CR), which equals one (CR = 1) when 
firms disclose earned R&D tax credits in current year. Relatively, firms without disclosing earned R&D tax 
credits in any year during 1997-2007 are classified as non-R&D tax credit users (CR = 0). 
Dependent Variable: Use of R&D Tax Credits (CR =1) 
Alternative Sample: Sample with Positive R&D Sample with R&D intensity> 
0.5% 
[1] [2] 
Independent Variables Expected Sign Coefficient Coefficient ( z statistics) (z statistics) 
Research Ability 
TASSET + 0.099 *** 0.121 *** 
(2.95) (3.39) 
Techlnt + 0.965 *** 1.078 *** 
(7.04) (6.81) 
PatSuccessu + 0.273 *** 0.241 *** 
(5.51) (4.66) 
RDLead + -0.174 -0.154 
(-1.13) (-0.97) 
StkOption + 0.303 ** 0.309 ** 
(2.38) (2.36) 
Tax Advantage 
TaxProf + 0.234 *** 0.282 *** 
(2.92) (3.39) 
RDStart + 0.369 *** 0.410 *** 
(4.32) (4.62) 
Controls 
Cashshort -0.014 *** -0.013 *** 
(-4.50) ( -3.68) 
Lev -2.483 *** -2.482 *** 
(-8.85) (-8.60) 
CashshortD + 0.324 ** 0.372 ** 
(2.00) (2.15) 
LevD + 1.117*** 1.066 *** 
(5.68) (5.33) 
GDP ? -1.517 -1.881 
(-0.39) (-0.4 7) 
Intercept 12.097 15.982 
(0.34) (0.43) 
Year and Industry FE Yes Yes . 
Robust SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes 
PseudoR 0.1571 0.1526 
Observations 15423 13875 
The defmition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis 
(with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (z statistics) in column [1] and [3]. I also report marginal 
effects in column [2] and [ 4]. The symbols ** *, * *, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent (two-tailed) level, respectively. 
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Table 15. Firm Characteristics of R&D Tax Credit Users (Alternative Measures) 
Dependent Variable: Use of R&D Tax Credits (CR =1) 
Sample: Full Full Full Full Full 
Alternative Measure: Research Ability Research Ability Research Ability Tax Advantage Tax Advantage 
[I] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Independent Variables Expected Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Sign ( z statistics) ( z statistics) (z statistics) (z statistics) (z statistics) 
Research Ability 
TASSET + 0.113*** 0.130 *** 0.085 ** 0.132 *** 
(3.32) (4.09) (2.40) (4.14) 
SIZE: MV + 0.292 *** 
(9.63) 
Techlnt + 0.848 *** 0.880 *** 0.876 *** 0.878 *** 
(6.56) (6.92) (6.77) (6.87) 
RD!ntu + 0.024 *** 
(3.45) 
PatSuccess tt + 0.219 *** 0.245 *** 0.234 *** 0.216 *** 
-
(4.72) (4.75) ( 4.88) (4.51) w 
\0 PatSuccess tt-5 + 0.238 *** 
( 4.10) 
RDLead + -0.048 -0.091 -0.057 -0.144 -0.133 
(-0.33) (-0 .59) ( -0.40) (-0.96) (-0.88) 
StkOption + 2.381 *** 0.310** 0.270 ** 0.242 ** 0.266 ** 
(6 .24) (2.44) (2.22) (1.97) (2.19) 
Tax Advantage 
TaxProf + 0.229 *** 0.160 ** 0.249 *** 0.246 *** 
(3.01) (1.97) (3.28) (3.24) 
MTax + 1.625 *** 
(3.78) 
RDStart + 0.166** 0.295 *** 0.299 *** 0.295 *** 
(2.09) (3.54) (3 .77) (3.73) 
RDAgeL5 + 0.175** 
(1 .96) 
RDAge5-9 + 0.353 *** 
(4.38) 
Controls 
,....... 
+::>. 
0 
Table 15. Firm Characteristics of R&D Tax Credit Users (Alternative Measures)- Continued 
Dependent Variable: Use of R&D Tax Credits (CR =1) 
Sample: Full Full Full Full Full 
Alternative Measure: Research Ability Research Ability Research Ability Tax Advantage Tax Advantage 
[I] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Independent Variables Expected Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Sign ( z statistics) (z statistics) ( z statistics) (z statistics) (z statistics) 
Cashshort -0.009 *** -0.009 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.008 *** 
(-3.19) (-2.99) (c3.11) (-2.71) (-3.02) 
Lev -1.816 *** -2.339 *** -2.220 *** -2.192 *** -2.217 *** 
(-6.89) ( -8.25) (-8.43) ( -8.12) ( -8.43) 
CashshortD + 0.147 0.242 0.229 0.298 ** 0.228 
(0.98) (1.41) (1.55) (1.96) (1.54) 
LevD + 0.661 *** 0.961 *** 0.857 *** 0.917*** 0.866 *** 
(3.36) (4.64) (4.55) (4.78) (4.60) 
GDP ? -2.601 -3.495 -2.191 -2.312 -2.006 
(-0.69) (-0.85) (-0.59) (-0.61) (-0.54) 
MV x StkOption ? -0.366 *** 
(-6.26) 
Intercept 21.172 30.334 18.287 19.267 16.524 
(0.61) (0.80) (0.53) (0.55) (0.48) 
Year and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.1591 0.1326 0.1452 0.1450 0.1459 
Observations 16809 13670 17042 16486 17042 
This table presents the results of estimating logistic regressions of equation (1) with alternative measures. The dependent variable is the indicator of 
using R&D tax credits (CR) , which equals one (CR = 1) when firms disclose earned R&D tax credits in current year. Relatively, firms without 
disclosing earned R&D tax credits in any year during ·the sample period 1997-2007 are classified as non-R&D tax credit users ( CR = 0). The defmition 
of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis (with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (z statistics). The 
symbols *** , **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent (two-tailed) level, respectively. 
Table 16. Impact of R&D Tax Credits on R&D Spending (Additional Controls) 
Panel A. This panel presents the results based on the regressions in equation (2) but add additional 
control variables, including Big4 and AudTaxServ. The dependent variable is reported or adjusted R&D 
expenditlires. 
Dependent Variable Natural Log of Reported Natural Log of Adjusted 
Expected R&D (RepRD) R&D(AdjRD) 
Independent Variables Sign Coefficient VIF Coefficient VIF (t statistics) ( t statistics) 
MRDCR + 0.449 *** 1.10 0.496 *** 1.10 
(6.19) (2.84) 
RDtJ + 0.935 *** 2.77 1.508 *** 2.77 
(43.79) (12.94) 
TobinQ + 0.039 ** 1.29 0.127 *** 1.29 
(2.54) (3 .00) 
SALE ? 0.029 4.95 -0.428 *** 4.95 
(1.34) (-3.58) 
ROA 0.006 2.72 0.629 2.72 
(0.05) (1.56) 
sdCF -0.118 2.17 0.116 2.17 
(-0.31) (0.09) 
sdSALE -0.416 * 1.56 -0.91 1.56 
(-1.84) (-1.17) 
Lev -0.362 * 1.37 -1.022 1.37 
(-1.86) (-1.59) 
Cash + -0.168 2.39 -1.802 *** 2.39 
( -0.96) (-3 .19) 
Ins tOwn + -0.005 1.95 0.167 1.95 
(-0.07) (0.59) 
NegEarn ? 0.029 3.37 0.026 3.37 
(0.39) (0.10) 
InstOwn x NegEarn + 0.047 1.85 -0.481 . 1.85 
(0.36) (-1.19) 
Big4 + -0.03 1.44 -0.274 1.44 
(-0.52) (-1.15) 
AudTaxServ + 0.052 1.55 0.149 1.55 
(1.09) (0.81) 
Intercept -0.083 1.348 
(-0.28) (1.33) 
Year and Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Robust SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes 
AdjustedR2 0.9342 0.6894 
Observations 524 524 
The defmition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis 
(with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (t statistics) ofthe variable in that column.***,**, and* 
indicate that correlations are significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent (two-tailed) level, 
respectively. 
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Table 16. Impact of R&D Tax Credits on R&D Spending (Additional Controls)-
Continued 
Panel B. This panel presents the results based on the regressions in equation (2) but add an additional 
control variable, including JndDir. The dependent variable is reported or adjusted R&D expenditures. 
Dependent Variable Natural Log of Reported Natural Log of Adjusted 
Expected R&D (RepRD) R&D (AdjRD) 
Independent Variables Sign Coefficient VIF Coefficient VIF (t statistics) (t statistics) 
MRDCR + 0.314 *** 1.24 0.876 ** 1.24 
(2.72) (2 .1 8) 
RDu + 0.813 *** 2.52 1.524 *** 2.52 
(9.80) (6.54) 
TobinQ + 0.058 * 1.69 0.013 1.69 
(1.88) (0.19) 
SALE ? 0.162 ** 3.45 -0.35 1 * 3.45 
(2.21) ( -1.80) 
ROA -0.193 3.93 2.530 3.93 
(-0.31) (1.39) 
sdCF -0.434 1.87 1.561 1.87 
(-0.69) (0.84) 
sdSALE -0.600 *** 1.48 -0.455 1.48 
(-2.60) (-0.77) 
Lev -0.291 1.95 -0.763 1.95 
(-1.34) (-1.03) 
Cash + 0.520 ** 2.56 -0.660 2.56 
(2.25) (-1.22) 
Ins tOwn + 0.114 1.75 0.246 1.75 
(1.28) (0.89) 
NegEarn ? 0.033 4.21 0.456 4.21 
(0.27) (0.93) 
JnstOwn x NegEarn + 0.278 * 2.49 0.088 2.49 
(1.65) (0.16) 
IndDir -0.034 1.32 0.115 1.32 
(-0.24) (0.22) 
Intercept -0.348 2.350 * 
(-0.72) (1.66) 
Year and Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Robust SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes 
Adjusted K 0.9108 0.7273 
Observations 352 352 
The defmition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis 
(with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (t statistics) of the variable in that column. ***, **, and * 
indicate that correlations are significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent (two-tailed) level, 
respectively. 
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Table 17. Impact of R&D Tax Credits on R&D Spending (Alternative Sample) 
This table presents the results based on the regressions in equation (2) with the dependent variable being 
reported or adjusted R&D expenditures. 
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Reported R&D Natural Log of Adjusted R&D (ReeRD) (AdjRD) 
Alternative Sample: Sample with R&D intensity Sample with R&D intensity 
>0.5% >0.5% 
[1] [2] 
Independent Expected Coefficient Coefficient 
Variables Sign (t statistics) (t statistics) 
MRDCR + 0.417*** 0.428 *** 
(6.65) (6.82) 
RDI-I + 0.798 *** 0.815 *** 
(22.36) (22.18) 
TobinQ + 0.03 *** 0.029 *** 
(2.66) (2.64) 
SALE ? 0.169 *** 0.169 *** 
(5.08) (5.02) 
ROA -0.356 *** -0.395 *** 
(-3.63) (-3.94) 
sdCF -1.014 *** -1.107 *** 
(-3.66) (-3.91) 
sdSALE -0.301 *** -0.317 *** 
(-3.74) (-3 .84) 
Lev -0.249 *** -0.281 *** 
(-2.62) (-2.88) 
Cash + 0.365 *** 0.367 *** 
(3.74) (3.66) 
Ins tOwn + 0.012 0.006 
(0.24) (0.13) 
NegEarn ? 0.048 0.029 
(0.98) (0.55) 
InstOwn x NegEarn + 0.272 ** 0.297 *** 
(2.50) (2.68) 
Intercept -0.445 -0.464 
(-1.63) (-1.64) 
Year and Industry FE Yes Yes 
Robust SE Clustered by firm Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.9285 0.9257 
Observations 1132 1132 
The definition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis 
(with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (t statistics) ofthe variable in that column.***,**, and* 
indicate that correlations are significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent (two-tailed) level, 
respectively. 
RD = a 0 + a,MRDCR + .J:J3jControls + LJ3jndustry + LJ3Jear + t: (2) 
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Table 18. Impact of R&D Tax Credits on R&D Spending (Alternative Measure) 
This table presents the results based on the regressions with the dependent variable being a firm's reported 
or adjusted R&D expenditures. 
Dependent Variable Natural Log of Reported Natural Log of Adjusted Expected R&D (RepRD) R&D(AdjRD) 
Independent Variables Sign Coefficient VIF Coefficient VIF (t statistics) (t statistics) 
RDC + 0.043 *** 1.14 0.081 *** 1.14 
(3 .10) (2.51) 
RD,_! + 0.817*** 2.70 1.182 *** 2.70 
(29.34) (16.41) 
TobinQ + 0.033 *** 1.24 0.079 *** 1.24 
(3.75) (3 .93) 
SALE ? 0.124 *** 4.41 -0.117 4.41 
(4.79) (-1.56) 
ROA -0.265 ** 2.82 -0.155 2.82 
(-2.39) (-0.59) 
sdCF -1.060 *** 2.02 -2.884 *** 2.02 
(-3.41) (-3.33) 
sdSALE -0.399 *** 1.31 -0.248 1.31 
(-2.83) (-0.54) 
Lev -0.180 1.35 -0.20 1 1.35 
(-1.38) (-0.56) 
Cash + 0.395 *** 2.06 -0.045 2.06 
(3.46) (-0.14) 
Ins tOwn + 0.015 1.57 -0.024 1.57 
(0.27) (-0.15) 
NegEarn ? 0.069 2.95 0.050 2.95 
(1.17) (0.33) 
InstOwn x NegEarn + 0.156 1.73 0.127 1.73 
(1 .50) (0.51) 
Intercept 0.110 0.564 
(0.73) (1.59) 
Year and Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Robust SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.9055 0.6507 
Observations 1146 1146 
The defmition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis 
(with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (t statistics) of the variable in that column. ***, **,and* 
indicate that correlations are significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent (two-tailed) level, 
respectively. The above result is based on equation (10): 
RD=a0 +a,RDC+ LfljCONTROLS+ LflJndustly+ Lfl"Year+E: (10) 
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Table 19. Impact of R&D Tax Credits on R&D Spending (Alternative Model) 
This table presents the results based on the regressions with the dependent variable being a firm' s reported 
or adjusted R&D expenditures. 
Dependent Variable Change in Reported R&D Change in Adjusted R&D 
Expected (l::,.RepRD) (l::,.AdjRD) 
Independent Variables 
Sign Coefficient VIF Coefficient VIF 
(t statistics) ( t statistics) 
MRDCR + 0.046 *** 1.06 0.049 *** 1.07 
(6.38) (4.15) 
TobinQ + 0.003 *** 1.31 0.005 ** 1.34 
(3.67) (2.14) 
SALE ? -0.001 2.40 -0.003 2.50 
(-0.78) (-1.42) 
ROA · 0.000 2.87 0.028 2.95 
(0.01) (0.68) 
sdCF -0.143 *** 2.16 -0.273 ** 2.11 
(-4 .07) (-2.25) 
sdSALE -0.025 ** 1.39 0.009 1.38 
(-2.27) (0 .28) 
Lev -0.018 1.41 0.011 1.39 
(-1.64) (0.37) 
Cash + 0.007 1.80 0.001 1.76 
(0.85) (0.05) 
Ins tOwn + -0.007 1.71 0.000 1.73 
(-1.63) (0 .01) 
NegEarn ? 0.009 3.06 0.014 3.15 
(1.54) (0.98) 
lnstOwn x NegEarn + 0.016 1.76 0.027 1.77 
(1.19) (0.92) 
Intercept 0.005 0.035 
(0.35) (1.46) 
Year and Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Robust SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes 
AdjustedR2 0.1924 0.1119 
Observations 1146 808 
The definition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis 
(with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (t statistics) of the variable in that column. ***, **,and* 
indicate that correlations are significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent (two-tailed) level, 
respectively. The above result is based on equation (11): 
MD=a0 +a,MRDCR+ 2J3jCONTROLS+ 2.J3Jndustly+ l.:P"Year+e (11) 
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Table 20. Performance of Excess QREs - Innovation Quality (Additional Control) 
This table presents the results based on the regression analyses in equations (5) and (6) with a Big4 auditor. 
The dependent variables are a firm's total patent ranks (PatRnk), the average of four-year-ahead citations 
per patents (FCite4) and one-year-ahead citation per patent (FCitel), respectively in columns 1 through 3. 
Total Patent Rank Average 4-year-Ahead 1-year-Ahead Dependent Variable (PatRnk) Patent Citation Patent Citation (FCite4) (FCitel) 
Independent Variables . Expected Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Sign (t statistics) ( t statistics) (t statistics) 
ExcQRE + 0.571 *** 0.092 * 0.035 
(3 .58) (1.73) (1.45) 
OthRD + 1.118 *** 0.1 09 ** 0.031 
(7.35) (2.08) (1.29) 
SALE ? 0.316 *** 0.066 *** 0.030 *** 
(6.73) (6.03) (5.27) 
Caplnt + 0.003 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 
(4.89) (2.09) (1.65) 
Ins tOwn + 0.562 *** 0.098 * 0.049 ** 
(4.03) (1.83) (2.06) 
BHAR + 0.090 0.038 0.006 
(1.31) (1.61) (0.63) 
ROA ? -0.410 ** 0.034 0.009 
(-2.46) (0.59) (0.32) 
Cash + 0.744 *** 0.327 *** 0.168 *** 
(4.33) (4.17) (4.23) 
Lev ? 0.446 -0.205 ** -0.061 
(1.63) (-2.46) (-1.32) 
Age ? 0.408 *** -0.041 ** -0.028 ** * 
(7.16) (-2.43) (-3.62) 
Big4 ? 0.056 0.070 ** 0.013 
(0.53) (2.04) (0.77) 
Intercept -2.827 *** -0.400 *** -0.168 *** 
(-8.09) ( -3 .57) (-3.78) 
Year and Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Robust SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R 0.3857 0.2851 0.1683 
Observations 1534 1534 1534 
The defmition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis 
(with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (t statistics) of the variable in that column. ExcORE and RD 
are deflated bv sales.***,**, and* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 21. Performance of Excess QREs - Future Profitability and Return 
Volatility (Additional Control) 
This table presents the results based on the regression analyses with an additional control of a Big4 auditor. 
The dependent variables are the average of 5-year-ahead earnings to sales (FE5), 1-year-ahead earnings to 
sales (FEI), and stock return volatility (Std_RET). 
Dependent Variable · Profitabilit~ Return 
5-year-Ahead 1-year-Ahead Volatility 
Earnings (FES) Earnings (FEZ) (Std_RET) 
Independent Variables Expected · Coefficient Coefficient Expected Coefficient Sign (t statistics) (t statistics) Sign (t statistics) 
ExcQRE -0.054 *** -0.052 *** + 0.039 *** 
(-3.18) (-4.02) (4.02) 
OthRD +I- -0.241 *** -0.301 *** + 0.028 *** 
(-10.98) (-11.05) (3.07) 
MV + 0.020 *** 0.015 *** -0.005 *** 
(3.03) (1.73) (-2.61) 
TanATS ? -0.199 *** -0.328 *** ? -0.003 
(-2.65) (-3.74) (-0.23) 
MTB ? -0.003 0.005 + 0.002 *** 
(-1.09) (1.33) (2.71) 
Ins tOwn + 0.073 ** 0.067 *** -0.023 *** 
(2.37) (1.88) (-3.72) 
Cash ? 0.154 0.226 ** ? 0.024 ** 
(1.63) (2.12) (2.12) 
Caplnt ? 0.000 * 0.00 1 ** ? 0.000 
(1.67) (2.17) (-1.34) 
Seg 0.010 0.023 + -0.010 *** 
(0.43) (1.18) (-2.68) 
Lev 0.067 0.008 + -0.019 
(0.88) (0.09) (-1.37) 
ROA + 0.302 **'!' 0.505 *** -0.084 *** 
(4.93) (6.49) (-9.50) 
Big4 + 0.057 ** 0.074 -0.01 1 * 
(2.21) (2.40) (-1.83) 
Intercept -0.165 *** -0.126 * 0.123 *** 
(-2.62) (-1.66) (6.54) 
Year and Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Robust SE Clustered by Firm Yes . Yes Yes 
Adjusted R 0.4168 0.4677 0.4797 
Observations 1494 1494 1556 
The defmition of each independent variable in Panel A through Dis described in Appendix 5. The number 
without parenthesis (with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (t statistics) of the variable in that column. 
ExcQRE and OthRD are deflated by sales.***,**, and* indicate significance at the 0.01 , 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 22. Performance of R&D Tax Credit Users (Alternative Sample) 
This table presents the results based on the regression analyses in equations (5) and (6) with an alternative 
sample with non-zero patents. 
Total Patent Rank Average 4-year-Ahead 1-year-Ahead 
. Dependent Variable Expected . (PatRnk) Patent Citation Patent Citation (FCite4) (FCitel) Sign Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Independent Variables (t statistics) (t statistics) . (t statistics) 
ExcQRE + 0.489 *** 0.145 ** 0.075 * 
(3 .11 ) (2.05) (1.79) 
OthRD + 1.020 *** 0.155 *· 0.102 ** 
(6.03) (1.86) (2.52) 
SALE ? 0.368 *** 0.052 *** 0.037 *** 
(9.21) (4.21) (5.12) 
Caplnt + 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 
(4.94) (0.03) (0.57) 
Ins tOwn + 0.396 *** -0.021 -0.016 
(3 .10) (~0 . 37) (-0.48) 
BHAR + -0.001 0.043 ** 0.020 
(-0.03) (2.10) (1.40) 
ROA ? -0.409 ** -0.139 * -0.100 * 
(-2.15) (-1.72) (-1.67) 
Cash + 0.711 *** 0.283 *** 0.198 *** 
(3.26) (3 .31) (3 .32) 
Lev ? 0.726 *** -0.264 ** -0.117 
(2.83) (-2.33) ( -1.56) 
Age ? . 0.418 *** -0.041 ** -0.032 *** 
(8.58) (-2.20) (-2.97) 
Intercept -2.551 *** -0.323 ** -0.251 *** 
(-7.20) (-2.33) . (-3.88) 
Year and Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Robust SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R 0.4053 0.2952 0.1 768 
Observations 1462 1462 1462 
The defmition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis 
(with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (t statistics) of the variable in that column. ExcQRE and RD 
are deflated by sales.***,**, and* indicate significance at the 0.01 , 0.05 , and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 23. Performance of Excess QREs (Alternative Measure of the Dependent 
Variable) 
Panel A. This Panel presents the results based on the regression analyses in equation (5) with the 
dependent variable being a firm's total patent ranks (PatRnk) estimated from different models (Shaffer 
2011), the cumulative-combined (cc), cumulative-structure (cs), and marginal-structure (ms) Patent·Rank 
specifications, respectively in columns I through 3. 
Dependent variables Total Patent Rank Total Patent Rank Total Patent Rank 
(PatRnk-<:,c) · (PatRnk-<:,s) (PatRnk- ms) 
Independent variables Expected Coefficient ·coefficient · Coefficient Sign (t statistics) (t statistics) (t statistics) 
ExcQRE + 0.501 *** 0.500 *** 0.514 *** 
(4.33) (4.35) (4.53) 
OthRD + 1.035 *** 1.031 *** 1.038 *** 
(7.69) (7.70) (7.82) 
SALE ? 0.386 *** . 0.386 *** 0.386 *** 
(11.43) (11.44) (11.52) 
Caplnt + 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 
(7 .33) (7.34) (7.32) 
Ins tOwn + 0.699 *** 0.696 *** 0.664 *** 
(5 .89) (5.88) (5.78) 
BHAR + 0.118*** 0.118 *** 0.115 *** 
(3.33) (3.32) (3.28) 
ROA ? -0.555 *** -0.557 *** -0.556 *** 
(-3.67) (-3.70) (-3.69) 
Cash + . 0.760 *** 0.752 *** 0.740 *** 
. (5.12) (5 .08) (5.05) 
Lev ? 0.435 ** 0.434 ** 0.415 ** 
(2.19) (2.20) (2 .12) 
Age ? 0.360 *** 0.359 *** 0.345 *** 
(8.86) (8.86) (8.73) 
Intercept -2.677 *** -2.676 *** . -2.751 *** 
(-9:22) (-9.25) (-9.65) 
Year and Industry fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Year and Industry Yes Yes Yes 
. 2 Adjusted R 0.4123 0.4127 0.4121 
Observations 2798 2798 2798 
The defmition of each independent variable is described in Appendix 5. The number without parenthesis 
(with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (t statistics) ofthe variable in that column. ExcQRE and RD 
are deflated by sales. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 23. Performance of Excess QREs (Alternative Measure of the Dependent 
Variable) - Continued 
Panel B. This panel presents the results based on the regression analysis in equation (6) with the 
dependent variable being a firm's total forward citations until 2012 including self-citations and excluding 
self-citations (FCite2012 and FCite2012_exSelj), average four-year-ahead citations per patents excluding 
self-citations (FCite4-exSe(f) and one-year-ahead citation per patent excluding self-citations (FCitel-exSelj), 
respectively in column 1 through 4. 
Dependent Total Forward Citations Until Forward Patent Citation Excluding 
Variable: 2012 Self-Citations 
Including Excluding Self- Average 4-Year- 1-Year-Ahead Self-Citations Citations Ahead (FCitel_ exSelj) (FCite2012) (FCite2012_exSelj) ( FCite4 _ exS elf) 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
Independent Expected Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
variables Sign (t statistics2 (t statistics2 ( t statistics) (t statistics 2 
ExcQRE + 0.338 *** 0.316 *** 0.229 *** 0.081 *** 
(4.72) (4.54) (5.01) (4.12) 
OthRD + 0.387 *** 0.366 *** 0.256 *** 0.098 *** 
(5.27) (5.12) (5.60) (4.42) 
SALE ? 0.144 *** 0.136 *** 0.094 *** 0.037 *** 
(10.17) (9.78) (1 0.40) (7.77) 
Caplnt + 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 ** 
(3.80) (3.54) (3.13) (2.48) 
Ins tOwn + 0.209 *** 0.204 *** 0.123 *** 0.037 * 
(3.58) (3.55) (3 .15) (1.82) 
BHAR + 0.048 * 0.040 0.030 . 0.014 
(i.75) (1.52) (1.57) (1.55) 
ROA ? -0.121 -0.118 -0.090 -0.051 * 
(-1.56) (-1.53) (-1.61) (-1.65) 
Cash + 0.411 *** 0.384 *** 0.268 *** 0.127 *** 
(4.33) (4.21} (4.32) (3.89) 
Lev ? -0.017 -0.021 -0.049 -0.024 
(-0.19) (-0.23) (-0.76) (-0.69) 
Age ? -0.050 *** -0.046 *** -0.044 *** 
-0.024 *** 
(-2.79) (-2.60) ( -3.64) (-4.14) 
Intercept 
-1.109 *** -1.042 *** -0.648 *** -0.277 *** 
(-7.68) (-7.29) (-6.71) (-6.56) 
Year and Industry FE · Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by fmn Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.271 0.2639 0.2088 0.1273 
Observations 2798 2798 2798 2798 
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Table 23. Performance of Excess QREs (Alternative Measure of the Dependent 
Variable)- Continued 
Panel C. This panel presents the results based on the regression analysis in equation (8) with the 
dependentvariables being the industry adjusted pre-tax profitability (FE-indadj) , measured as average of5-
year-ahead earnings to sales (F£5-indadj) , 1-year-ahead earnings to sales (FE! -indadj) weighted by the 
industry average pre-tax profitability respectively in columns 1 and 2. 
Dependent variable 
Independent Expected 
variables Sion 
ExcQRE 
OthRD +I-
MV + 
TanATS ? 
MTB ? 
Ins tOwn + 
Cash ? 
Caplnt ? 
Seg 
Lev 
ROA + 
Intercept 
Year Fixed Effect 
. Robust SE Clustered by firm 
Adjusted R 
Observations 
Industry Adjusted Profitability 
Average of 5-Year-Ahead Earnings to 
Sales (FE5_indadj) 
Coefficient 
(t statistics) 
-0.95 
(-1.38) 
-2.975 * 
(-1.72) 
0.015 
(0.10) 
-0.76 
(-1.43) 
-0.056 
(-0 .75) 
0.549 
(0.83) 
0.302 
(0.38) 
0.009 ** 
(2.03) 
-0.219 
(-0.52) 
2.463 
(1.53) 
1.25 
(0.86) 
-2.164 
(-0 .67) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0288 
2730 
151 
1-Year-Ahead Earnings to 
·Sales (FEJ_indadj) 
Coefficient 
(t statistics) 
-0.715 * 
( -1.78) 
-9.095 * 
(-1.89) 
0.276 
(1.32) 
-2.455 
(-0.94) 
-0.187 * 
(-1.71) 
0.86 
(1.02) 
6.839 
(0.98) 
0.01 
(1.00) 
0.017 
(0 .02) 
6.388 
(1.51) 
-0.682 
(-0.15) 
-6.385 
( -1.22) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0546 
2730 
Table 23. Performance of Excess QREs (Alternative Measure of the Dependent 
Variable) - Continued 
Panel D. This panel presents the results based on the regression analyses in equation (9) with the 
dependent variables being stock return volatility one-year-ahead (Std_RET_ll) and one-year-lag 
(Std_RET_tl) , respectively. 
Independent variables Expected Sign 
ExcQRE 
OthRD 
MV 
TanATS 
MTB 
Ins tOwn 
Cash 
Caplnt 
Seg 
Lev 
ROA 
Intercept 
Year and Industry Fixed Effect 
SE Clustered by Firm 
Adjusted R 
Observations 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
Stock Return Volatility 
1-Year-Ahead (Std_RET_ll) 1-year-Lag (Std_RET_tl) 
Coefficient Coefficient 
( t statistics) (t statistics) 
0.023 *** 0.035 *** 
(2.95) (3.64) 
0.020 ** 0.037 *** 
(2.51) (2.91) 
-0.014 *** -0.011 *** 
(-6.63) (-6.40) 
0.005 0.007 
(0.45) (0.61) 
0.004 *** 0.002 *** 
(4.97) (2.66) 
-0.032 *** -0.030 *** 
(-4.93) (-3.93) 
0.019 0.038 * 
(1.39) (1.92) 
0.000 0.000 
(0.91) (0.70) 
0.005 0.001 
(0.97) (0.21) 
-0.001 -0.036 ** 
(-0.04) (-2.13) 
-0.121 *** -0.068 *** 
(-10.20) (-4.20) 
0.242 *** 0.127 *** 
(11.67) (6.41) 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
0.3669 0.3628 
2570 2222 
The definition of each independent variable in Panel A through Dis described in Appendix 5. The number 
without parenthesis (with parenthesis) is the coefficient estimate (t statistics) of the variable in that column. 
ExcQRE and OthRD are deflated by sales. ***, **,and* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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